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Bridging  the  Air  Gap  is  a  Ministry  of  Defence  (MoD) 
sponsored  research  into  the  assurance  of  Cross  Domain 
Solutions(CDS); to discover and examine the possible impact 
and  exposure  implications  of  establishing,  operating  and 
managing  highly  classified  systems  that  are  operationally 
required  to  multilaterally,  multilevel  interface  with  lower 
classified  domains,  coalition  networks  and  possibly  the 
Internet. Information Assurance (IA) is the key to trusting, 
maintaining and developing Defence Cyber Operations and 
Information  Exploitation  capabilities.  MoD’s  Network 
Enabled  Capability  (NEC)  has  intrinsic  and  often  complex 
interdependencies, information interactions and knowledge 
transactions  which  can  be  chaotic,  unsafe,  insecure  and 
untrusted. To comprehend, structure, make safe, secure and 
risk manage the NEC’s enterprise architecture, its integrity 
and dependability requires educated IA practitioners and an 
assured, cultured aware user community.   
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The military has 5 domains of operations: Land, Sea, Air, Space and now Cyber. This 5th 
Domain is a heterogeneous network (of networks) of Communication and Information 
Systems  (CIS)  which  were  designed  and  accredited  to  meet  Netcentric  capability 
requirements; to be robust, secure and functional to the organisation’s needs. Those 
needs  have  changed.    In  the  globalised  economy  and  across  the  Battlespace, 
organisations now need to share information. Keeping our secrets, secret has been the 
watchwords of Information Security and the accreditation process; whilst sharing them 
securely  across  coalition,  geo-physically  dispersed  networks  has  become  the  cyber 
security dilemma.  
 
The  diversity  of  Advanced  Persistent  Threats,  the  contagion  of  Cyber  Power  and 
insecurity of coalition Interoperability has generated a plethora of vulnerabilities to the 
Cyber  Domain.   Necessity  (fiscal  and  time-constraints) has created security  gaps  in 
deployed CIS architectures through their interconnections. This federated environment 
for superior decision making and shared situational awareness requires that Bridging 
the  (new  capability)  Gaps  needs  to  be  more  than  just  improving  security 
(Confidentiality,  Integrity  and  Availability)  mechanisms  to  the  technical  system 
interfaces. The solution needs a new approach to creating and understanding a trusted, Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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social-technical CIS environment and how these (sensitive) information assets should 
be managed, stored and transmitted. 
 
Information  Assurance  (IA)  offers  a  cohesive  architecture  for  coalition  system  (of 
systems) interoperability; the identification of strategies, skills and business processes 
required  for  effective  information  operations,  management  and  exploitation.    IA 
provides trusted, risk managed social-technical (Enterprise) infrastructures which are 
safe, resilient, dependable and secure. This thesis redefines IA architecture and creates 
models that recognise the integrated, complex issues within technical to organisational 
interoperability and the assurance that the right information is delivered to the right 
people at the right time in a trustworthy environment and identifies the need for IA 
practitioners and a necessary IA education for all Cyber Warriors. 
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CHAPTER 1  
Bridging the Gap: An Information Perspective 
 
The responsibility will fall on young officers to build trust across the ranks to improve 
information  sharing.  In  this  age,  I  don’t  care  how  technologically  or  operationally 
brilliant  you  are;  if  you cannot  build trust  [across  various  multiple  participants],  you 
might as well go home.                  
Marine Corps Gen. James N. Mattis 
Commander of U.S. Joint Forces Command 
 
In  an  age,  where  having  accurate  and  timely  Information  makes  the  difference  to 
superior decision making (Khatri & Ng, 2000; Bradley, Pridmore, & Byrd, 2006) and 
where  Cyberspace  has  transformed  how  these  decisions  make  immediate, 
instantaneous  impact  on  the  global  market  place  (Coyle,  1999),  affecting  many 
communities of interests; it has become imperative to get the right information to the 
right person at the right time. This imperative makes all the difference as the process of 
sharing trusted information has far greater influence than mere communication (Katz 
& Lazarsfeld, 2006).  
Getting it right; through a process of gaining trust and managing risks, providing safe 
and secure information that can flow across resilient and protected systems and where 
the information assets are both dependable and timely should be, and within this thesis 
will be argued as the aim and scope of Information Assurance (IA).  Through providing 
some solutions to the problems of interoperability and secure cyber communication, 
this thesis will redefine the Art and Science of IA. Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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Moreover, this thesis will provide an argued solution to its fundamental question:- 
Can Information Assurance provide sufficient Trust and Risk Reduction to 
allow  information  processed,  stored  and  communication  within  highly 
sensitive (often critical) networks, with their own discrete security domains 
(including encryption mechanisms), which are often Air-gapped (physically 
and  electronically  isolated)  to  interact  safely  and  securely,  particularly 
across  many  interoperable  networks  and  including  the  possibility  of 
interfacing with the Internet. 
Substantiate the need to better define Information Assurance (making it more distinct 
and effective than its current scope which is heavily dependent upon its roots within 
Information Security); innovate an IA Architecture that is based on the developed this 
thesis goals’ of assurance and not just on the dimensions of security; provide an eight 
dimensional model to better understand the need for tolerance and trust across many 
different interoperable networks and the maintenance of cross-domain solutions for 
system  (and  system  of  systems)  dependability;  create  a  professional  framework  to 
direct  what  IA  skills  we  need  today  and  define  the  necessary  IA  education  that  is 
needed for the 21st Century Cyber workplace and ultimately argue how we should best 
employ Information Assurance for Governments, Enterprises and the Military; to use it 
more effectively and reliably.  
Information Assurance has become one of the most important studies in Computer 
Science,  Information  Technology  and  Cyber  Knowledge  Transfer  and  probably  will 
have  a  significant  social  and  cultural  impact  to  our  globalised  knowledge  economy 
(Drahos  &  Braithwaite,  2002).  Without  an  assured  process  between  two 
interconnecting systems, trust can soon diminish, whilst risks will grow and the need to 
share through its layers of interoperability will rapidly fall back to a defensive need to 
know  operation  and  the  enterprise  cyber  operations  will  once  again  rely  on  more 
critical (inefficient and unresponsive) stove-piped networks and their isolating security 
domains  and  curtaining  policies.  An  Assured  environment  is  not  risk  free,  but  it 
promotes  the  interoperability  of  services  and  communication  channels  between 
communities  of  interest  (COI)  whilst  actively  reducing  and  managing  risk  through 
education,  professional  best  practices,  Ignorance  Management,  Shared  Situational 
Awareness (SSA), controlled Information Exploitation (IX). Information Assurance can 
provide a comprehensive cyber defence strategy; dependable Information Operations 
(IO),  resilient  Infrastructure  Architectures  and  networks  and  above  all,  through 
Business (Enterprise and IA) Architecture, a Trusted environment. In the hierarchy of Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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human needs (Maslow, 1943; Huitt, 2007): water, food and shelter, law and order are 
surely  still  the  most  important  things  to  us  all;  but  the  transformation  toward 
increasing  dependence  on  Information Technologies  (Powell  &  Dent-Micallef, 1997) 
and  the  continuance  of  digital  interconnections,  the  network  effects,  have  these 
information systems and technologies becoming pervasive and essential to us all. It is 
the control of this Cyberspace that has become a strategic priority to states and non-
state actors. As our Information and its infrastructures have become national assets, 
they  also  constitute  a  tier-1  national  security  risk  that  requires  appropriate 
management controls and defences (Cabinet Office, 2011a).   
 
There  is  an  unprecedented  reliance  on  information  infrastructure  as  Governments, 
Enterprises  and  the  Military  find  that  their  transformation  to  Information  driven 
operations,  increased  operational  transparency  and  exploitation  have  generated 
complex risks and a considerable reduction in their ability to control the information 
flows. The sense of necessity, comfort, wonder and curiosity within the virtual world is 
a  real  paradigm  where  informed  cyber  actors  and  agents  have  increased  their 
transformation  skills  as  they  digitally  create,  adjust,  innovate,  exploit,  survey, 
manipulate,  subvert  or  sabotage  cyber  domains.  This  poses  varied  and  complex 
assurance issues to managing Cyberspace.  
 
 
Figure 1: Netcentric Operations and Military Mobility (Benedict, 2011) 
Bridging  the  Gap is a  holistic  investigation  to see  whether  there might  be  practical 
technical or human factor solutions that assures interconnection of highly classified Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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domains to the information rich environment that the Internet offers. Without access to 
timely and effective use of information our decisions become jaded, inappropriate or 
suspect. We need our information to be accurate, trusted and not compromised, lost, 
leaked, disseminated, unauthorised publication or corrupted.  
 
“Our reliance on cyberspace stands in stark contrast to the inadequacy of our 
cyber security,”            DoD Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace, 2011 
 
This Ministry of Defence (MoD) sponsored research will determine how we achieve 
acceptable assurance and limit the risk of establishing, operating and managing a highly 
classified system interfacing to cross domains and ultimately the Internet. The Network 
Enabled  Capability  (NEC)  and  its  ISTARs  community  has  intrinsic,  often  complex 
interdependencies, where information interactions and knowledge transactions needs 
to cross many domains. The NEC doctrine of Information Superiority predicates the 
need  for  information  security  and  its  assurance  to  provide  accredited,  safe,  secure, 
robust  and  trusted  sources.  The  foundation  lies  with  better  networks  that  provide 
better  information  sharing  which  leads  to  better  decision;  actions  and  effects.  The 
benefit  is  operation  efficiency  and  superior  military  capability  (MoD,  2011).  The 
military’s robust, secure and extensive information domains are not what is generally 
associated with the ubiquitous, open access Internet and its hosted web-based services 
but  rather  a  bespoke  environment  under  full  control  of  its  owners  or  coalition 
partnership.  However, it is the mating, mash up and interconnection of any network 
that  needs  to  be  investigated,  because  the  boundary  between  military  computer 
network  operations  (CNO)  and  others  have  become  blurred,  removed  or  created 
without authority. Recognising that Information and Knowledge in its various forms, 
media, databases, reports, services, interpretation and usage have become one of the 
most important assets to our business, but do we really comprehend this?   
 
Analysis suggests that the only way to really secure a military system is to isolate it. 
Disconnect  the  system  from  other  networks,  in  particular  the  Internet  and  its 
associated  risks  to  Computer  Network  Attacks  (CNA)  and  Computer  Network 
Exploitation (CNE) as well as to other elements of the information domain (see figure 
3). From a security perspective the Internet is unorganised, chaotic, unsafe, insecure, 
untrustworthy  environment  of  viruses,  worms,  exploited  vulnerabilities,  denial-of-
service attacks, cyber power, cybercrime and cyber war but it can also be an assured 
world of creativity, innovation, commerce and social cohesion.  Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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1.1  A New World 
 
The Council of the European Union (2010) has made Information Assurance one of its 
14 main policies and it has become a key component of the US Comprehensive National 
Cybersecurity Initiative (The US National Security Council, 2008) and the subsequent 
International Strategy for Cyberspace (The US National Security Council, 2011). This 
thesis  will,  in  part,  need  to  consider  the  impact  of  IA  to  the  cyber  environment 
(Cyberspace)  and  in  particular  to  current  security  policies  and  domain  isolation.  
Through IA, we need to find an effective approach and possible Cross-Domain Solutions 
(CDS) between the “Need to Know” (keeping our secrets safe and available only to a 
closed authorised community) and the “Need to Share” (allowing information to used 
and accessed by global communities of interest); hence the thesis will demonstrate 
how, when and most importantly, why we need to Bridge the Air Gaps: by developing 
and  employing  the  need  for  trust  and  risk  management,  education  and  skilled 
practitioners, tolerant organised structures with resilient architecture, dependable and 
safe procedures and appropriate use of security and protective countermeasures: in 
effect by applying the proposed IA definition, models and frameworks. The Council 
defines Information Assurance in the field of communication and information systems is 
the  confidence  that  such  systems  will  protect  the  information  they  handle  and  will 
function as they need to, when they need to, under the control of legitimate users. Effective 
IA  shall  ensure  appropriate  levels  of  confidentiality,  integrity,  availability,  non-
repudiation  and  authenticity.  IA  shall  be  based  on  a  risk  management  process.  This 
definition derives authority from many similar declarations in national policies (CESG, 
2003), Security Taxonomy (Savola, 2007) and IA Glossaries (Committee on National 
Security Systems, 2010). However, all these IA definitions rest upon the 3 tenets of 
Information Security: Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability (CIA). This thesis will 
argue that these foundation tenets, the CIA and the 5 other dimensions of security: 
Non-repudiation, Authentication, Access Control, Privacy and Communication Security 
(ITU-T X.805, 2005) are themselves only one of 8-Dimensions of Information Assurance 
(as proposed in Chapter 6) that is required to fully understand, address and assure the 
holistic issues of cyberspace, its environment, capabilities and culture. 
Information in Cyberspace has a complex paradigm; the need for a trusting, dynamic 
“Need to Share” (Alberts D. S., Garstka, Hayes, & Signori, 2001) opposed to the secure 
but  distrusting,  restrictive  “The  Need  to  Know”  (Denning,  1976)  which  is  further 
complicated  by  anonymity  and  the “Need  to Hide” (Buda,  Choi,  Graveman,  &  Kubic, 
2001). The common operating environment has become a need to protect information Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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across security domains so that Enterprises survive the interoperability of increasing 
networks  of  networks  and  the  systems  of  systems  that  form  the  information 
infrastructures across cyberspace. This environment is expanding, evolving, constantly 
exploited and is becoming both an economic asset and liability that has been described 
as  a  new mindset  to  security  practitioners  (Task  Force on  National Security  in  the 
Information Age, 2002).  
The  intelligence  community  (G2)  has  longed  deliberated  the  importance  of  sharing 
information  and  to  keeping  secrets,  secret  (Frigns,  2004;  Liles  &  Liles,  2009). 
Information Services (IS), Knowledge Transfer (KT), Superior Decision Making (SDM) 
and  holistic  Shared  Situational  Awareness  (SSA)  and  Cyber  Situational  Awareness 
(CSA)  are  becoming  an  ever  more  important  component  to  businesses,  their 
intelligence  communities  as  well  as  transformational  Government  policing  and 
warfighting (Kelly O. L., 2008; Bailey, 2010; Bieniek, 2011). Moreover, the increasing 
dependencies  on  cyber  governance,  assured  e-commerce  and  social  computing  is 
making information a critical asset for nations, enterprises and online communities, the 
military and to individuals.  The Need to Share (Dawes, Cresswell, & Pardo, 2009) and 
also the Need to Belong1 (Baumeister & Leary, 1995) requires an assured skilled and 
educated workforce to manage, maintain and service the cyber environment and the 
cultures it supports.  Within the military (and many enterprises) we need a framework 
to culturally shift our mindset from 20th Century security practices to cross-domain 
assurance which will provide a comprehensive, dependable, resilient and trustworthy 
architecture  that  is  capable  and  tolerant  to  withstand  and  survive  the  emerging, 
interoperable, evolving cyber environment. This culture shift, however, presents the 
Military,  as  well  as  Governments  and  Commercial  Enterprises,  with  a  number  of 
complex challenges to solve (Anderson & Rainie, 2010; Sommer & Brown, 2011).  
A challenge and another fundamental question raised by this Thesis is:  How do we 
provide Assurance when we do not control the asset we want to secure and protect? 
There  is  a  considerable  array  of  threats,  attack  methods  and  injected  software 
instruction  approaches  to  our  networks  and  to  our  information  assets  (processed, 
stored or communicated) that provide new challenges every day (McCumber, 1991). 
Harvard  Professor  Joseph  Nye  described  this  cyberspace  security  challenge  at  the 
                                                        
 
1 Existing evidence supports (Baumeister & Leary, 1995) the hypothesis that the need to 
belong is an innate, powerful, fundamental, and extremely pervasive motivation to affiliate with 
others and be socially accepted.  Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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opening of the Munich Security Conference, 2011, where he remarked that: “The threat 
is real but national governments had only just now started to tackle the issue.” Cornelia 
Habig  (2011)  reported  that  this  further  reinforced  the  need  to  address  complex 
security  and  assurance  challenges.  “In  the  EU,  but  also  on  the  national  level,  the 
responsibilities  in  terms  of  cybercrime  issues  are  immensely  fragmented…Every  two 
seconds, there are new cyber-crime incidents, and every four seconds, there is an attack on 
the network of the German administration,”  was the worrying criticism expressed by 
German Federal Minister of the Interior; Thomas de Maizière. The conference remarks 
demonstrated  a  collective  concern  of  Governments  and  the  Military  towards  the 
potential  damage  that an  unpoliced cyberspace could  do  national  and international 
interests. The threats are real; many of the defences are inadequate. 
Coalition Collaboration 
 
Collaboration is defined as: “The act of working together with others to achieve a goal” 
The UK’s MoD Comprehensive Approach (Joint Discussion Note 4/05, 2006), its own 
and  NATO’s  Network  Enabled  Capability  (NEC)  and  the  US  Joint  Force  Command’s 
Effects Based Operational Approach (EBOA) have all proposed the need for an agile, 
robust  interoperable  “Netcentric”  network  for  Joint  Actions  and  coalition 
communications. This desire and operational imperative to interconnect modern and 
legacy systems that allows coalition forces to benefit from extensive and responsive 
Information  Exploitation  (IX),  Knowledge  Transfer  and  digital  encapsulation  of  the 
Operational theatre, providing commanders an accurate, trustworthy Cyber picture and 
Cyber  Situational  Awareness,  “knowing  what’s  going  on”  (Knight,  2001),  thereby 
facilitating  Superior  Decisions.  These  doctrines  also  call  for  the  projection  of 
Cyberpower, conduct of Cyberwar and Information Operations (IO). Whereas, a key UK 
NEC component2 is the assurance and protection of its 4 Domains: (1) Networks, (2) 
Information and (3) People operating in a (4) Joint Actions Environment  (MoD, 2005). 
The US Committee on National Security Systems (CNSS, 2006) defined this Joint 
Actions’  Communication  and  Information  Systems  (CIS)  environment  as  a  “Cross-
Domain Solution” (CDS) as “any information assurance solution that provides the ability 
to access or transfer information between two or more security domains.”  
                                                        
 
2 The MoD’s Joint Services Publication (JSP 777) provides a clear expression of what the UK 
means by NEC in order to engender a much wider and more common understanding of its tenets 
not only within the UK's Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces, but also across Government, 
within Defence Industry and Academia, and with allies and coalition partners.  Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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Interoperability  has  become  a  key  network  driver  for  transforming  governments 
(Cabinet Office, 2005), businesses and other institutions; the use of Cyberspace (its 
capability) to communicate and securely transact with peers, other enterprises (B2B) 
and  the  global  audience  of  active  users  has  far  reaching  opportunities  and 
development.  However,  these  interacting  activities  require  system  availability, 
resilience, tolerance, dependability, security and above all an ability to create trust. As 
such the Cross Domain Solution has three main assurance categories: 
  The need to allow Access Solutions; (allow users to request /pull information 
resources in multiple multi-lateral and multi-layered domains). Access Control, 
Authentication and System Integrity 
  The need to provide Cross Domain Transfer Solutions; (enabling secure and 
accurate  movement,  copy,  and  deletion  of  information  from  one  domain  to 
another and ensuring system dependability and resilience.) 
  To need to have Accredited Solutions; (Providing structured, safe, secure and 
trusted CDS for Information Operations and Exploitation). 
The information assured CDS domain will need to be structured, resilient, dependable, 
safe, secure, protected, risk managed. Above all we need User Communities to become 
SMART  and  capable  of  pulling  cyber  resources.  According  to  the  US  DOD  it  now 
requires that Information Operations (IO) be regarded as a military core competency, 
“on par with air, ground, maritime, and special operations” (DoD, 2003, p. 4). The ability 
to control the information environment, including interrelated physical, informational, 
and cognitive dimensions, is now seen as vital to national security (DoD JP 3-13, 2006) 
and  the  Department  recognise  that  Cyberspace  is  a  cognitive  dimension,  in  which 
“people think, perceive, visualize, and decide,” that is seen as most important (DoD JP 3-
13, 2006, pp. 1-2). This directive places Information as a Strategic Asset and recent 
military  documentation  emphasized  the  significant  need  for  dependable  and 
interoperable information infrastructures, the net-centricity of military cyberspace as 
described by Joint Publication 3–13, Information Operations and Joint Publication 3–24, 
Counterinsurgency Operations describe that there is: “The ability to be “persuasive in 
peace, decisive in war, preeminent in any form of conflict” (DoD, 2000, p. 1). 
 
Sara  King’s  (King,  2010)  discussion  paper  “Military  Social  Influences  in  the  Global 
Information Environment” identified that:- According to Scales (2006) and others (Boyd, 
2007; Darley, 2007) this new era of “psycho-cultural battle” - otherwise termed a “war of 
ideas” (Murphy, 2010, p. 90) or a battle for “hearts and minds” (Claessen, 2007, p. 97) - 
is already underway in Iraq and Afghanistan. Modern battle is likely to be more about 
winning  public opinion  than  about  seizing  contested  geophysical  terrain. The  modern Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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battlefield is likely to be in the information environment.  King’s observation that modern 
wars are more to do with manipulating human factors rather than destruction of assets 
is an important paradigm for 21st Century Netcentric Warfare. Military Information 
operations are moving away from the targeting of munitions to the targeting of opinion, 
thoughts and cultural change. This theme is further explored and analysed with the 
Human-Computer Interface that have evolved within the layers of interoperability. In 
particular the developing the need to share, allowing participation and collaboration at 
all levels, educating and training users to exploit assured information, to know where 
the  assets  are    located  and  configured,  to  be  able  to  translate,  transform  and  non-
repudiate and to trust the asset in making decisions.  
 
Information Exploitation is essential to future governance in what is now strategically 
developed the Diplomatic, Intelligence, Information & Interests, Military and Economic 
(DI3ME) domain. Cyberspace is the DOD’s Netcentric domain and it has been described 
as: “the extent to which a system or group has at its center the complex connection of 
people  with  common  interests  via  communications  and  computer  networks.”  Dave 
Chesebrough, 2006.  Although this description places both Information Technology and 
People as essential elements for the deployment and exploitation of Netcentricity; it 
doesn’t encapsulate the full extent and nature of Cyberspace. Chapters 2 and 3 will 
develop the Cyber Environment and in particular its creation as the 5th Military Domain 
of Operations. However, Chesebrough (2006) did further identify 4 components that 
made the Network domain; these where:  
1.  A system of lines or channels that cross or interconnect: a network of railroads. 
2.  A complex, interconnected group or system: an espionage network. 
3.  An extended group of people with similar interests or concerns who interact and 
remain in informal contact for mutual assistance or support [a social or 
professional network] 
4.  In Computer Science, a system of computers interconnected by telephone wires or 
other means in order to share information. Also called [the] net. 
The Network Effect of these definitions, when combined, becomes one complex domain 
which the DoD defines as the Global Information Grid (GIG). The interconnection of 
theatres of operations, technologies and people formulate the Cross-Domain Problem 
where deployed systems are required to link digitally to others and the networks need 
to become interoperable to share data. The Information Exchange creates degrees of 
complexity  as  people  with  common  interest  interact  with  technology  to  create  a 
desired common awareness.   Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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Figure 2: The LISI Interoperability Maturity Model (2004) 
Information Exchange through interoperability within the military (NATO’s Network 
Enhanced  Capability  and  the DoD  GIG)  has millions of computing  devices  linked in 
classified networks becoming ever more reliant on cyberspace for its command and 
control,  logistics,  information  and  intelligence  operations,  targeting  and  munitions 
(Fire)  as  well  as  personal  management  and  business  operations.  Resolving  the 
assurance issues of interoperability has become a major component to finding a cross-
domain solution. The goal of military CIS interoperability is to achieve the advance 
collaboration at the Enterprise Level. This, as Figure 2 illustrates, is the uppermost of 
DoD’s 5 Levels of the Information System Interoperability Maturity Model with its focus 
on the increasing levels of sophistication between system of systems interoperability.    
Although  technical  interoperability  is  essential,  it  is  not  sufficient  to  ensure  effective 
operations. There must be a suitable focus on procedural and organizational elements, 
and  decision  makers  at  all  levels  must  understand  each  other’s  capabilities  and 
constraints. Training and education, experience and exercises, cooperative planning, and 
skilled  liaison  at  all  levels  of  the  joint  force  will  not  only  overcome  the  barriers  of 
organizational culture and differing priorities, but will teach members of the joint team to 
appreciate the full range of Service capabilities available to them.                    (DoD, 2000) 
 Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
Engineering Doctorate  Page 11 
 
As  quoted,  the  years  of  experience  in  Bosnia,  Iraq  and  Afghanistan  has  taught  the 
coalition partners; Interoperability between military systems, be them owned by any 
one nation or federated across communities of interest have generated many complex 
problems. Interoperability is more than a legacy issue or a technical interface problem, 
its concerns the harmonisation of organisations, alignment of policies and procedures, 
cultural changes, federated leadership and an understanding of how system of systems 
operate  and  evolve.  Cross-Domain  Solutions  are  the  application  of  Information 
Assurance  to  the  challenges  of  interoperability.  IA  has  to  address  the  many  levels 
involved in the harmonisation and alignment of Organisation, Systems and Networks, 
properly  define  and  architect  the  requirement  of  the  Enterprise,  build  in  system 
resilience and tolerance to intrusion making the solutions both safe and dependable. 
The systems have to gracefully decline when under attack and appropriate business 
continuity and disaster recovery must be prepared and be ready to be deploy at a 
moment notice. Information Assurance will be required and applied to systems that 
previously did not interact and often have constraints within their own operations or 
from the onset with new systems that are designed to interact. This is an important 
first step; however, there will be systems that as of yet have not been conceived or are 
required to interoperate, so the IA architecture must anticipate future considerations 
and be able to cope with uncertainties.. 
  
A holistic perspective is that Reality is layered with a virtual world, as illustrated in 
Figure 3, which now has 5 domains: Land, Sea, Air, Space and Cyber.  The cost of doing 
business in the first 4 domain represent an escalation of equipment costs, training and 
accessibility, in the 5th domain cost is negligible, anybody can become a cyber-warrior. 
The  military  5-layered  model(figure  2)  is  supported  by  the  geographical  location 
(location will be a key component to Access Control, knowing where the user should be 
is an determining element of authentication) and the physical interconnectivity and 
interoperability  of  ubiquitous  edge  devices.  This  man-made  physical  operating 
environment is constantly changing and needs to be resilient and transnational.  We 
should not consider Cyberspace or the Cyber environment has being virtual or a cloud – 
Cyberspace  exists  in  physical  devices  within  DNS,  Service  Orientated  Architectures 
(SOA)  and  distributive  databases  forming  a  local  interface  to  real  world  of  packet 
routers, telephony and inter-operating networks of networks. Behind these devices are 
the  logical  layers  that  provide  software-enabled  functions  with  emergent  logical 
connections  and  often  producing  unforeseen  outcomes;  thereby  introducing 
vulnerabilities, risk and business impact (Castonguay, 2011). Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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Figure 3: The Military Information Lattice (Richardson C. J., 2011) 
 
The MoD’s domain security architecture insists through its accreditation process that 
highly sensitive secure systems remain physically isolated, the Air Gap. Unfortunately, 
today’s  enterprises,  transformational  government  departments  and  the  defence 
environment  online  communities’  sensitive  business  information  is  often  the  same 
information that needs to be passed beyond the trusted perimeter. We need to extend 
the trust to cross domains, make our sessions safe and secure; essentially we need to 
assure  our  knowledge  transfer  environment  to  multiple  parties  within  our 
communities  of  interest  (COI).    Understandingly,  Security  needs  to  be  positioned 
strategically in the enterprises. This is a real world issue; the communication paradigm 
is becoming more dependent upon the safe and secure, processes of virtual machines, 
their trustworthiness and the availability of information infrastructures being critical 
to operational success. The development of the Effects Based Approach to Operations 
(EBAOs), Cyber Situational Awareness (CSA) and NEC domains (Networks, Information 
and People) is fraught with complexities and an increasing concern for dependable, 
safe  and  integral  systems  that  can  be  defended  against  orchestrated  cyber-attacks. 
Information Assurance (IA) is the key to trusting, maintaining and developing Defence 
Communication and Information Systems (CIS) capabilities. Furthermore, Information 
Assurance  research  has  to  also  focus  on  a  capability  gap  in  education.  Enterprises 
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required  us  to  develop good,  educated  IA  practitioners  and  change  the online  user 
culture to a more assured, cyber-culturally aware environment. To Framework the IA 
profession will allow continuous specialized training to contextual and conceptualise 
the ever present risks and demand to assure systems and provide a career structure for 
practitioners in this important aspect of Engineering and Computer Science. Bridging 
the professional capability gap of qualifying and sustaining IA practitioners is a real 
requirement.   
 
Until recently the defensive computer network defence (CND) posture has been the 
developing a security doctrine to monitor, detect, respond to unauthorized computer 
activity and attempts to mitigate risk through countermeasures and security devices 
(Wilson C. , 2006; Stallings, 2006a; CESG, 2006g; MacIntosh, Reid, & Tyler, 2011) using 
policies  and  procedures  that  protected  the  information  by  creating  compliant, 
accredited  security  domains  with  limited  access,  restricted  user  privileges  often 
firewalled behind encryption. These security silos afforded protection through policies 
& procedures, vetting & restriction of users and the use of IT devices and the security 
architect traded operability with security producing air gapped networks where often a 
user had 8 or more DTEs to access 8 different networks (Bethea, 2003). This security 
technique was exemplified by the McCumber Model in 2004. However, it isn’t CND that 
troubles the minds of strategic planners, moreover the ability to strike back. It is the 
implacable effects of fear, uncertainty and doubt (FUD) over cyber security that has 
fuelled this new direction of military cyber offense and the impalpable complexity of 
cyber  activities  and  the  perceived  inability  to  defend  that  reinforces  the  military 
strategic idiom, that the best defence is offense (Mazanec, 2009; Lin, 2009; Hopkins, 
2011).  Government bodies are clearly at variance, agitated and concerned about the 
development  of  cybercrime  and  unattributed  hostile  intent  vectored  through 
cyberspace. This globally agile, evolving, expansive and exploited cyber domain has 
little (nearly non-effective) international policing, fewer effective laws and a great deal 
of  anonymity,  chaos  and  inherent  systemic  risks  (Davì,  2010).  The  threats  of 
cybercrime,  cyber  terrorism,  cyber  war  inflicting  damage  and  destruction  (Cyber 
Weapons  of  Mass  Destruction)  upon  indefensible,  open  networks  are  attracting 
diplomatic, political and military responses to militarise cyberspace; to actively develop 
and build cyber weapons (e.g. Stuxnet, Duqu, botnets, etc), to expand offensive cyber 
operations to implicitly threaten states and/or to regulate and actively stop malicious 
cyber  threats or  face  retaliatory  consequences.  Conceivably,  states  can build server 
farms of numerous racked processors running thousands of virtual machines to exploit 
a  “zero  day  vulnerability”  which  turn  infest  and  herd  many  millions  of  devices Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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connected to the internet in order to conduct mass denial of services, generate Zombie 
launch sites for malware or assumption of control over SCADA and Command & Control 
(C2)  systems.  The  Cyber  Pearl  Harbor  scenario,  crippling  critical  information 
infrastructures, is seen by many (successive US Sec. of Def. John Hamre, 1997; Richard 
Clarke, 2010 and Leon Panetta 2011) as a very real threat to the State, world economic 
and social order.  In this Cyberpower struggle for allocating scarce funding to offence 
and defence, IA has to compete against and recognise the very persuasive and militant 
body  who  want  to  build  asymmetric  cyber  weapons  to  deter  (or  attack)  potential 
attackers.  
The counter argument to 20th Century Deterrence is knowing how to use Information 
Assurance in the 21st Century. The greater part of the 20th Century was dominated by the 
threats of war, World Wars and Nuclear Deterrence. Deterrence is that you possess both 
the  capability  and  the  will  to  either  retaliate  or  initiate  a  first  pre-emptive  strike  to 
thwart an eminent attack (Powell R. , 1990) and consequently some of today’s military 
thinkers have developed a cyber-strategy to deploy and use offensive cyber weapons as 
a method of deterring potential cyber assaults and providing a means to retaliate in the 
5th Dimension – Cyberspace.  Revisiting, Professor Nye’s remarks  (Habig, 2011), he 
could have further informed his audience with “offensive internet weapons have been 
introduced as a deterrent but the national governments have not quite a clue how to use 
them.”  The  use  of  virtual  weapons  as  a  deterrent  in  a  virtual  space  can  have 
unintentional consequences (Beard, 2009; Sterner E. , 2011) and emergent properties 
not readily envisaged by the software engineer or by these cyber warriors (Zimet, et al., 
2009; Rid & McBurney, 2012). The consequences become more complex as they will 
affect  the  many  layers  of  interoperability  and  wanting  to  become  target  selective 
produces intangibles within an evolving and chaotic network of networks (Schneier B. , 
2008; Alperovitch, 2011; Crosston, 2011). 
What is required is better Information Assurance, rather than MAD (mutual assured 
destruction or senseless, foolish, deranged) Cyber Offensive Weapons.  The pressing 
global  problem  of  cyber  insecurity  and  system  interoperability  is  how  to  develop 
resilience, trust and dependability to allow interacting information infrastructures and 
cyber activities to be safe and secure, to have system of systems whose information 
infrastructures are tolerant (fault and Intrusion tolerant) and risk managed, where the 
decision making cycle has assured information delivered to the right people.  Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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1.2 The Research Approach 
 
Cyberspace, and the technologies that enable it, allow people of every nationality, race, 
faith and point of view to communicate, cooperate, and prosper like never before... By its 
self, the Internet will not usher in a new era of international cooperation. That work is up 
to us, its beneficiaries. Together, we can work together to build a future for cyberspace 
that is open, interoperable, secure and reliable. This is the future we seek, and we invite all 
nations, and peoples, to join us in that effort. President Obama, 2011 
 
Most  people  working  in  cyber  security  recognize  that  the  interconnections  and 
complexities  of  our  economy  can  have  a  huge  effect  on  the  destructiveness  of  cyber-
attacks. They refer casually to "network effects," "spill over effects" or "knock-on effects." 
Yet there is little understanding of how such effects actually work, what conditions are 
necessary to create them, or how to quantify their consequences. 
US Cyber Consequences Unit, Dept. of Homeland Security 
 
Purpose 
Government  classified  networks  have  created  in  many  cases  information  silos  that 
protect their data sources but fail to inform the greater needs of the communities of 
interest.  The  current  security  given to  the  UK  Government  by  CESG  and  its  parent 
organisation GCHQ is that sensitive data (impact level 4 upwards) should be adequately 
protected using firewalls and other security devices and that networks that are secret 
and  top  secret  should  be  isolated.  These  air  gapped  networks  with  their  security 
domains  impose  very  restrictive  practices  to  the  movement  and  communication  of 
information and deny sharing and Information Exploitation. In the world where the 
timely use information is the asset that needs to be encouraged, the need to share 
across these domains often outweighs the necessity to keep our information secure. 
This  research  aims  is  to  find  a  balance  between  protection  and  availability  of 
information (its information security) and the need to Exploit Information that is also 
trusted  and  dependable.  This  new  environment  creates  the  need  for  trusted  cross-
domain  solutions  and  the  development  of  Information  Assurance  offers  such  a 
possibility. 
 
As illustrated in figure 4, the research approach follows 6 main themes: Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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In bridging the gap, this thesis addresses the following primary aims:  
 
  To  provide  an  Information  Assurance  Capability  that  will  facilitate  Cross  –
Domain Solutions. This capability will need a framework that formulates the 
assurance  implications  of  interoperability  within cyberspace,  human factors, 
protection  of  networks  and  secure  data  content,  alignment  of  enterprise 
architecture,  any  organisation  culture  changes,  information  exploitation, 
management  and  service  dependability  from  bridging  the  air  gap  between 
highly  classified  networks  and  possible  interaction  with  lower  classified 
networks and the Internet and how it might be done. The investigation will also 
consider when those bridges might be considered an acceptable risk. 
 
  Establish and develop an information assurance framework and appropriate 
models to meet operational interoperability requirements; whereby the study 
shall analysis various contextual and conceptual considerations of aligning and 
harmonising  domain  internetworking,  thereby  offering  an  assured  cross-
domain solution to military CIS interoperability 
.     
  Exploring six main topics within the layered environments and thereby framing 
the  Cyber  Landscape  through  modelling  IA  concepts.  Analysing  dependable, 
resilient convergence of technologies and networks and developing a Cyber-
Assured  Culture  through  Education;  Promoting  Transferable  Skills  & 
Figure 4: Discovering the Cause and Effects of Bridging the Gaps Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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Professionalism will provide a new capability for Information Assurance. IA will 
demonstrate how to provide solutions to system interoperability; operational 
benefits; operational security and new community learning outcomes.  
  Illustrate the value of this research approach to the network-centric security 
problems of NEC (and the Global Information Environment) and highlighting 
the  real  human-centric  assurance  issues  to  the  various  layers,  domains  and 
environments  of  an  interoperable  Cross-Domain  Solution  and  provide  a 
discussion on how the qualitative experience of this research and individual 
perceptions can be analysed and developed. 
 
  To  identify,  formulate  and  exhibit  this  approach  and  model  implementation 
demonstrating it as a worthwhile Doctoral investigation. The thesis will be a 
successful  project  managed  research  programme  with  achievable,  realistic 
outcomes within well-defined goals and agreed deliverable products. 
 
 
Engineering Objectives 
 
The four prime Engineering Objectives: 
  EO1  -  Develop  IA  Models  that  will  demonstrate  a  holistic  understanding  of 
Information  Assurance  and  Cross  Domain  Solutions  required  to  bridge: 
Physical, Virtual and Human Air Gaps. The models shall review a wider context 
of IA to Interoperability as well as specific analysis to the military context of 
cyberspace; its strategic, operational and tactical cyber environment.  
 
  EO2  -  Determine  a  contextual  framework  and  model(s)  of  Information 
Assurance  to  provide  Enterprise  Architecture  and  strategic  cultural  change 
awareness; to make a structured, safe, dependable, secure, protected, risked 
managed  and  trusted  approach  to  assure  interoperability  of  networks;  the 
secure  continuum of information; increasing  trust  of  people, operations and 
systems and the reliability of the Cyber picture of the Joint Action environment. 
 
  EO3 - Determine an Architect view of the existing contexts, concepts, logical, 
system,  technologies  and  management  that  will  formulate  a  more  inclusive 
Information Assurance Framework to the Cross Domain problem. Conceptually 
framework  and  model  any  assured  solutions  that  illustrates  the  need  for 
Holistic  System  Situational  Awareness,  System  Analysis,  Engineering,  and 
Simulation to develop core skills for IA Practitioners and a revised Information 
Assurance Architecture (IA2). 
 
 EO4 - Provide innovative and original research that will provide sufficient new 
grounding  to  Science  within  the  confines  of  an  Engineering  Doctoral  thesis 
investigating  the  problems  of  bridging  air  gaps.  Demonstrating  independent 
working  and  the  critical  awareness  of  relevant  sources,  illustrating  where 
appropriate  the  literature  searches,  retrieval  and  synthesis  and  analysis  of 
findings in relation to the desired aims. Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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The Culture 
The  5-day  Research  Methods  and  Implementation  course  run  by  Southampton 
University  for  first  year  PhD  and  EngD  students  provided  an  invaluable  insight  of 
research mechanisms, methodologies and procedures required for academic rigour and 
organising the research process. The various readings and assignments over the 2-year 
taught element of the Engineering Doctorate emphasised the need for qualitative and 
quantitative research such as Bloom’s Taxonomy (see figure 27) and the adaptations of 
methodologies  to  suit  the  particular  line  of  discovery,  objective  achievements  and 
measurement (Parmet, 2008). Clearly an appropriate research methodology had to be 
adopted to underpin this Thesis and its intention to provide a genuine contribution to 
the  state  of  knowledge  in  Information  Security  and  its  Assurance,  in  particular  an 
assured Bridging of the Air Gap. 
 
An adaptive approach to the research methodology using the herringbone model (see 
figure 4) was used rather than choosing a specific methodology such as those proposed 
by  Peter  Checkland’s  Soft  System  Methodology  (Checkland,  1981)  or  Peter  Senge’s 
System Thinking (Senge P. , 1990; Senge, Kleiner, Roberts, Ross, & Smith, 1994). This 
might at first make further epistemological complexities to this very complex issue; 
however  the  agile use  of  the  herringbone allowed  the  tailoring  of some  formalized 
approaches allowing a greater insight and interpretation of the Hypothesis and helped 
span a number of key component issues that in themselves where worthy research 
topics (Connell, Lynch, & Waring, 2000). A Qualitative method evolved during the initial 
research and examination of current literature, Defence research (DoD, MoD, NATO and 
DSTL)  and  current  operational  difficulties  both  in  Iraq  theatre  (Op  Telic3)  and 
Afghanistan theatre (Op Herrick 4). An examination of the current  State  of  Art  of 
Information  Assurance  and  the  Interoperability  Framework  has  identified  that  the 
current  structure of  Assurance  is  both  restrictive  and intolerant  to  the problems it 
needs  to  define,  explore  and  resolve. The strategic communication  and information 
                                                        
 
3 Operation TELIC is the codename under which all British operations of the 2003 Invasion of Iraq 
and post invasion peace keeping and redevelopment. 
4 Operation HERRICK is the codename under which all British operations in the War in 
Afghanistan have been conducted since 2002. It consists of the British contribution to the NATO-led 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and support to the US-led Operation Enduring 
Freedom (OEF).  Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
Engineering Doctorate  Page 19 
 
flow issues occurring in present operations (2002-2012) within Afghanistan and in 
particular with the coalition secret network - the Afghanistan Mission Network (AMN) 
– postulate a new motivation to change the rules for network interoperability.  
 
Finding a cross-domain solution is not just a quest to find an appropriate technological 
interface  to  meet  the  stringent  demands  of  military  communication  security 
(Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability) but to change the concept of Information 
Assurance  as  a  product  of 
security  into  its  own 
science  worthy  of  the 
recognition that the UK, the 
European  Commission  and 
the USA has bestowed upon 
it. By developing a strategic 
position  for  IA,  this  thesis 
will  create  a  strategic  fit 
that  can  develop 
Information  Assurance 
across  the  organisation  as 
well as developing methods 
and  techniques  to  deploy 
technologies that align and 
harmonise with the military 
thinking  of  the  layer  of 
interoperability  (Khalilzad 
&  White,  1999;  Tolk  & 
Muguira,  2003).  The 
current  definitions  of 
Information Assurance have not presently evolved sufficiently or conclusively from its 
roots in Information Security; the time has come for it to do so! 
 
Military Commanders using Network Centric Warfare (NCW) and NATO’s NEC with 
their interoperable networks of networks are increasing concerned with networking 
people, organizations, institutions, services, nations, etc., even though its functionality 
relies on information delivered via the technical networks (Tolk A. , 2003).  NATO’s 
own  Reference  Model  for  Interoperability  is  embedded  in  its  Command  &  Control 
Technical  Architecture  (NC3TA)  where  it  measures  the  effectiveness  through  four 
Figure 5: Network Centric Operations Layers of 
Interoperability (Källqvist, 2008) Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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quality criteria: Data Quality, Information Quality; Knowledge Quality and Awareness 
Quality.   
 
 
Figure 6: Network Centric Warfare Metric Framework (Tolk, 2003) 
The  Quality  of  these  Information  Services  (Knowledge/Awareness  of  Actions; 
Semantic/Information  Interoperability  and  Data/Object  Model  Interoperability) 
measures  the  performance  of  using  the  data,  information  and  knowledge  for  the 
operation to improve the results, mission effectiveness and overall system/operation 
agility. It is the degrees of organic information and how it was shared that provides the 
quality of coalition awareness and decisions. Information Assurance has to deliver this 
quality  across  the  layers  of  interoperability.  Further  investigation  of  the  current 
literature  (Classified  and  Unclassified)  and  the  necessary  qualitative  research 
formulated the need to pragmatically model the situational awareness of the complex 
issues involved and to determine the quality of interactions as illustrated in Figure 6. 
To  quantify  the  nature  of  the  security  issues  formulate  and  contain  the  degree  of 
Information “Share-ability”, their semantic complexities and interrelationships requires 
a  detailed  and  yet  broad  understanding  of  these  issues,  engineering  constraints, 
common  criteria evaluation  and  the  development  of  Information  as  an asset in  the 
Revolution of Military Affairs (RMA) and net-centric operations.   Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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Creating  a  holistic  assurance  picture  using  pragmatic  modelling  and  adapting 
qualitative and interpretive methods have enabled a systematic convergence of this 
study’s research. The plethora of changes in Computer Science, Information Technology 
(IT), Communication and Information Systems (CIS) has transformed and will probably 
continue  to  transform  military  operations  as  well  as  of  those  of  Government  and 
Enterprises. The benefits of these changes can be exploited by our operational agility, 
the sharing and exploitation of information providing the communities of interest (COI) 
a Shared Situational Awareness (SSA). However, with urgent operational requests from 
military  theatres  and  the  needs  of  information  to  cross  security  domains  of  many 
networks  has  produced  a  plethora  of  potential  vulnerabilities,  risk  and  emergent 
properties  that  are  often  overlooked,  unrecognised  or  negated  for  operational 
necessities.  
 
The Transformational Government Agenda (Cabinet Office, 2005) outlines the need for 
a  culture  change  to  the  development,  dependability  and  deployment  of  UK 
Communication  and  Information  Systems.  This  new  agenda  requires  Government 
systems  to  become  secure,  robust  and  interoperable.  As  such,  the  new  Enterprise 
System Architecture needs to articulate, describe and frame the coalition network of 
networks  that  supports  an  interoperable  System  of  Systems  infrastructure  that  is 
inclusive  of  information  services,  management,  and  its  assurance  as  well  as  being 
tolerant  to  incidents.    Within  the  MoD  this  has  been  recognised  as  the  capability 
relationship between deployed traditional defence information (legacy) systems and 
procured modern information technologies that should transform defences Systems 
into  an  inclusive  interoperable  environment  of  Network  Enabled  Capability  (MoD, 
2006)  of  Information  Technology  (IT),  Information  Services  (IS)  Information 
Management  (IM),  Information  Exploitation  (IX)  and  their  Information  Assurance. 
Traditional Military CIS combat platforms and system acquisitions have very high costs, 
extremely long lead times  (Committee of Public Accounts, 2011) but are developed 
ruggedised, hardened, secured, and tested to ensure the highest level of performance, 
confidentiality,  integrity  and  availability;  thereby  meeting  compliance  and 
accreditation standards for Information Security (MoD, 2010).   
 
Military  systems  are  proprietary  and  communicate  securely  with  little  effect  on 
performance but their development processes does require considerable configuration 
management and documentation processes that are maintained throughout the system 
life cycle. The system security compliance is captured in the Risk Management and 
Accreditation  Document  Set  (RMADS).  As  military  systems  became  more  software Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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intensive in computing devices, infrastructure and communications, procurement and 
integration  have  incurred  increased  costs  to  meet  legal  and  regulatory  demands 
designed  to  ensure  openness  and  fiscal  responsibility.  Moreover,  their  system 
complexity,  operational  and  environment  requirements  to  meet  mission-critical 
battlefield  requirements  of  high  reliability;  ease  of  maintenance  and  built-in  safety 
systems  require much  more  than  quality  assurance  (Perlo-Freeman,  Cooper,  Ismail, 
Sköns,  &  Solmirano,  2011).  However,  the  lack  appropriate  Information  Assurance 
methodologies in their design  and ineffective maintenance of the RMADS especially 
when  compared  with  more  mature,  hardware-intensive  engineering  (e.g.  avionic 
systems,  network  rail,  air  traffic  control  systems)  and  development  processes  have 
caused  considerable  system  life  cost  uplifts  and  urgent  operational  re-engineering 
resulting in a number reviews of MOD Asset Management (MOD, 2007; Dunn & Moore, 
2011; Committee of Public Accounts, 2011) 
 
The Cross Domain Solution generates risk, fear, uncertainty and doubts across many 
high-level  data  custodians  who  explicitly  believe  that  authorities  want  the  data 
protected as offered by accredited security domain, air gapped from other networks; 
not allowing for interoperability across different secured information infrastructure 
domains.  There is little trust, assurance or appropriate risk appetite in the system 
engineering, traffic engineering, system compliance and accreditation. However, they 
recognise  the  demand  for  more  Social  computer  engineering  investigations,  risk 
management, security operational capability and extending practitioners’ knowledge to 
allow for improved interoperability of classified systems within the UK; with MoD’s 
systems;  inter-HMG  departments;  with  coalition  partners;  with  NATO;  with  Non-
Government Organisations (NGO’s); in particular with highly classified cyber domains 
such as Secret, Top Secret and above. NEC Interoperability itself has produced a layer 
effect upon network centric operations as illustrated earlier in Figure 4. These layers 
direct Information Assurance to align the organisational and technical interoperability 
across each layer and thereby establishing a coherent and inclusive framework that 
addresses the layer interfaces. In defining these interfaces, it is crucial to note that the 
information asset is not regarded as integral to the physical technical infrastructure nor 
tightly  coupled  to  applications.  The  direction  of  this  research  is  therefore  to 
contextualise the concepts, doctrine, policies, technologies, procedures and education 
that may allow converging organisational and technical interoperability of  classified 
military networks and Information Infrastructures in both multi-level (vertical) and 
multi-lateral  (horizontal)  operations  providing  cross  domain  solutions  to  different 
classified security (Physical and Logical) domains; thereby Bridging the Air Gaps.  Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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Thesis Hypothesis 
“Can  Information  Assurance  provide  sufficient  Trust  and  Risk  Reduction  to  allow 
information processed, stored and communication within highly sensitive (often critical) 
networks, with their own discrete security domains (including encryption mechanisms), 
which are often Air-gapped (physically and electronically isolated) to interact safely and 
securely, particularly across many interoperable networks and including the possibility of 
interfacing with the Internet.” 
The hypothesis is that a controlled, obeisance, human-centric information assurance 
framework stacked on a trusted, robust, data train can provide a secure, cross-domain 
knowledge transfer environment thereby removing the need for network and other air 
gaps.  That such a assured framework can encapsulate the Human-Computer / Human-
Cyber Interfaces as information flows (Processed, Stored and Transmitted) across the 
five layers of Cyberspace (EO1 and EO2). Such an Assured Environment has to provide 
a  safe,  secure,  accurate  operation  and  be  sensitive  to  the  situational  awareness  of 
decision makers and operational commanders as well as the security of this country’s 
secrets. Moreover, it has to satisfy security and protection policies of the Information 
Assets across the complexities of Information and Knowledge exchange and inform the 
holistic nature of this assured cyber environment to its communities of interests by 
educated assurance practitioners (EO3 and EO4). The assured capabilities of the Net-
Centric environment require more effort to context-dependent research and modelling 
IA inferences and impact.  The interpretive perspective and quantitative methods of 
Enterprise  Architecture  (EA)  can  provide  better  understanding  towards  cyber-
orientated  21st  Century  Defence  Information  Architecture,  its  Systems  Engineering, 
Assurance and Human Factors. A special sub-set of EA could be Information Assurance 
Architecture (IA2) which will need to provide an appropriate infrastructure for cyber-
domains to support single service, purple, NATO and coalition operations and missions 
and any NGO corresponding actions within a contextual references (who, when, why, 
etc.). Furthermore is has to be based on the information exchange (flows) requirements 
of the mission. The architecture should be a layered approach to existing and future 
systems where classified data is structured, processed safely and securely in trusted 
domains to provide appropriate knowledge transfer and understanding to enable the 
NEC Benefits Chain and Cyber Situational Awareness.  The Research Direction of this 
Assurance  Community  and  its  CDS  has  begun  to  move  away  from  technological 
solutions  to  managerial  and  organizational  issues  through  Qualitative  Research 
methodologies  (Kaplan  &  Maxwell,  1994;  Kaplan,  Truex,  Wastell,  Wood-Harper,  & 
DeGross, 2004).  Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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The Threat 
“Over the last decade the threat to national security and prosperity from cyber-attacks 
has increased exponentially. Over the decades ahead this trend is likely to continue to 
increase in scale and sophistication, with enormous implications for the nature of modern 
conflict. We need to be prepared as a country to meet this growing challenge, building on 
the advanced capabilities we already have,” Strategic Defence and Security Review, 2010 
The  Ministry  of  Defence  through  its  Strategic  Defence  and  Security  Review,  (MoD, 
2010)  its  Comprehensive  Approach  Doctrine,  JDN  4/05  (MoD,  2006);  Information 
Strategy (MoD, 2009) and its Network Enabled Capability, JSP 777 (MoD, 2006) has 
identified  that  it  needs  to  protect,  integrate,  manage  and  exploit  its  information 
structures  to  enable  commanders  to  make  proportionate  and  appropriate  superior 
decision  through  shared  situational  awareness.  At  present  policies,  regulations  and 
accreditation prohibit certain network operations and electronic data transfer from 
multiple secure domains, thereby reducing interoperability and limiting information 
away from task-orientated communities of interest that exploit collaborative processes in 
a single Information Domain (MoD, 2005). 
The Government wants and needs to: “Close the gap between the requirements of a 
modern digital economy and the rapidly growing risks associated with cyber space... that 
MOD will become significantly more focussed (to its) approach to cyber, by ensuring the 
resilience of our vital networks and by placing cyber at the heart of defence operations, 
doctrine and training. We (HMG) will also work to develop, test and validate the use of 
cyber capabilities as a potentially more effective and affordable way of achieving our 
national  security  objectives;  address  shortcomings  in  the  critical  cyber  infrastructure 
upon which the UK as a whole depends, both to tackle immediate weaknesses in security 
and to ensure that we maintain access to a trusted industrial base,” Strategic Defence and 
Security Review, 2010 
 
At  present,  the  Ministry  of  Defence  does  not  have  a  coherent  Cyber  Security 
Architecture and no Information Assurance Architecture underpinning its systems of 
systems approach and tolerant operations. Possible NATO and DoD IA2 are aligned to 
security mechanisms and accreditation rather than system operability, dependability 
and  intrusion  tolerance.  The  current  MoD  Communications  and  Information 
Infrastructures have been built up in an ad-hoc manner through the acquisition and 
deployment of individual systems, each establishing its own security domain through 
the  accreditation  and  the  purple  spotting  technical  approval  system  to  join  tactical, Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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operational,  enterprise  and  strategic  networks.  The  ISTARs  platforms  and  future 
Defence Communication and Information Infrastructures must address the needs of 
technical  and  operational  requirements  for  better  decision  making  through  shared 
situational  awareness  with  an exploitive  information  domain  that  can maintain  the 
assurance of the right information to the right people, at the right time.  Many military 
systems  are  highly  secretive  in  purpose,  design,  capabilities,  operations  and 
deployment.  The  economic,  expansive,  evolutionary  and  sometimes  explosive 
convergence  and  accessibility  to  quantity  and  quality  of  data,  information  and 
knowledge transfer to the user and potential threat actors is creating a transparent, 
vulnerable world at an alarming rate to Governments and their Defence Departments. 
This  globalised  transparency5  of open access; open source is counter intuitive to 
accredited structured, safe, secure and trusted systems. 
 
This  study  wasn’t  going  to  be  easy;  a  positive  outcome  of  the  research  has  a  high 
operational impact on the future conduct of Operational Exploitation of Information 
and  Knowledge  crossing  many  classified  security  domains6  (Campen,  Dearth,  & 
Goodden, 1996; Hughes, 2002; Pollock, 2002; Fenz & Ekelhart, 2009). How and where 
can  the  Air  Gap  be  bridged  is  a  current  operational  necessity  for  information 
exploitation across coalition networks. However, the hypothesis of Bridging the Air Gap 
is currently in direct conflict with a number of key Defence Communication  Doctrine, 
Policies and Security Procedures. No Government Communication and Information 
System (CIS) can be operated without prior Accreditation  (CESG, 2005; Cabinet Office, 
2010b; MoD, 2010)   The  UK’s  Technical  Authority  for  Information  Assurance;  the 
Government’s Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) is amendment that the Air Gap is 
both necessary and enforceable by accreditation. This provides a stark, negative barrier 
to  the  hypothesis.  The  contrast  of  secure,  accredited  military  systems  is  the  often 
quoted  insecure  and  unsafe  commercial  off-the-shelf  (COTS)  information  systems. 
                                                        
 
5  Transparency  can  seriously  degrade  several  principles  of  war,  most  significantly  mass, 
manoeuvre, and surprise; e.g. it can provide a threat actor near-real time, accurate battlespace 
visibility of a State’s military posture at both the strategic and theatre levels. 
6 Defence uses network with a different security domain and security classification in isolated 
closed  user  groups  and  network  topology.  All  Top  Secret  networks  are  built  and  securely 
maintained  separately  from  other  networks,  e.g.:  JOCs,  SLI,  NIPRNet,  SIPRNet  are  all 
independent and isolated networks (Air Gapped). 
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Security is often easily financially offset by these COTS which have been developed, 
marketed,  and  upgraded  within  a  2-year  life  cycle  (Al-Kuwaiti,  Kyriakopoulos,  & 
Hussein, 2009; Anderson & Rainie, 2010). These systems are often not ruggedised, nor 
robust enough for tactical military operations, with some COTS exhibiting too great a 
risk than those which would be acceptable for used by public safety or national security 
organizations.    The  economic  security  challenge  today  (Paquet  &  Saxe,  2005)  is  to 
produce agile, robust COTS systems that are responsive to the Enterprise whilst being 
secure, and seen to be secure, to satisfy regulations, policies, laws (in particular those 
concerning data protection and privacy) and accurate reporting (Akdeniz, Walker, & 
Wall, 2000; Allor, 2007; Colwill, 2010). The Enterprises’ profit-and-loss statements are 
the bedrock of commercial decisions on information system life cycle designs (Hanseth, 
2002; Howard & Lipner, 2005). Getting the “Greatest Bang for the Buck” with just-in-
time  component  delivery,  acceptance  of  degraded  system  performance,  reduced 
operational  response  rates,  and  increased  repair  times  are  considered  financially 
acceptable  if  the  equipment  will  do  the  job.  Software  (and  to  a  lesser  extended 
firmware and some hardware) have been rushed through factory testing or untested 
beta  version  released  are  launched  on  unsuspecting  customers  and  field  testing  is 
forced actual operational environments and consequently user enterprise bottom lines.   
 
In  the  recent  past,  it  was  common  practice  for  COTS  systems  been  shipped  under 
licence,  without  access  to  source  code?  These  flawed  software  or  implementation 
operational glitches were either corrected with software patches or left in the field 
until new software version was developed (Schneier B. , 2008).  Furthermore, it is quite 
common to find that same code was third party developed, often with an overseas sub-
contractor,  with  minimal  documentation,  flow  charts  or  configuration  management 
(Furnell & Thomson, 2009).  Consequently, security is often seen as a bolt-on extra by 
Enterprises and high assurance software the exclusive reserve for military and some 
government projects willing to pay a premium. Table 1 illustrates some of the current 
security issues in the marketplace.  
 
The introduction and adoption by industry of new technologies such as wireless, voice 
over Internet protocol (VOIP), and radio frequency identification devices (RFID) are 
rapid,  with  little  design  concern  for  security  and  privacy.  Introduction  of  this 
technology  in  the  commercial  market  is  based  on  user  acceptability,  legal 
consequences,  and  bottom-line  cost  analysis,  not  on  considerations  of  information 
safety, potential loss of life, or national security policy. 
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Security Issues  System Security  non-compliance 
Security hinders operation  Agile operations, working flexibility, collaboration and 
mobility provide opportunities but increased risks and 
exposure with little understanding of Assurance and Risk 
Management. 
Communication channel are 
diverse, their security products 
are obsolete. 
The main problems across new media channels and devices 
include data leakage, archive failures, spam, malware and 
policy non-compliance. 
Inter-enterprise collaboration is 
not working because of security 
barriers 
The need for greater collaboration is a top business, 
government and defence priority, interoperability is 
restricted by security domain architectures. 
Poor Security Maintenance and 
Policies are not enforced 
Many enterprises rely on unsupported tools to conduct 
business and there is increasing user inability to find 
expertise to solve issues. 
Incomplete or immature 
protection services and security 
mechanisms 
Organizations generally rely on stovepipe solutions that 
monitor one or two information channels whilst their 
communication strategies use multiple media channels. 
External threats are perceived to 
be the greatest impact on business 
Business impact and consequential continuity planning is 
more exposed to system vulnerabilities, insider user faults 
and social engineering. Most systems are intolerant to 
intruders and malicious users. 
Data protection is a legal 
compliance issue. 
A Enterprise security focus has been on protecting 
organizations against malicious and inappropriate content 
rather than data protection 
Table 1: Security issues and non-compliance 
 
In spite of these potential problems with commercial systems, their advantages—rapid 
deployment  of  state-of-the-art  technology,  consequent  higher  performance  and  far 
lower cost (higher volume cost reductions)—make them extremely attractive. Thus, 
over  the  past  decade,  Defence  Acquisition  Reform  has  been  focused  on  developing 
processes to achieve both the high-performance and low-cost benefits that come from 
using commercial technology while still assuming the necessary mission objectives of 
high  reliability,  rugged  environmental  capability,  and  particularly  security  through 
compliance and accreditation.  
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The challenge for the transformed, assured military is to use information technologies 
to build a highly adaptive, high performance, and interoperable system infrastructure 
that is resilient, degrades slowly under attack, and reconstitutes itself in a secure mode 
while under attack. To accomplish this challenge, this transformed military needs a 
better understanding of the life cycle vulnerabilities of information technologies. At the 
same  time,  as  strategies  for  defence  in  the  post-modern  era  are  developed, 
consideration  must  be  given  to  changing  warfare  system  requirements  to  meet 
changing  enemy  threat  scenarios  so  we understand  how  new  threats  affect  system 
designs and vulnerabilities. As communication channels multiply, organizations are still 
relying  on  the  same  old  methodologies  and  stovepipe  solutions  to  secure 
communications. The resulting in either stymied mobility and collaboration or insecure 
communication,  neither  of  which  is  acceptable  to  the  MoD.  Enterprises  wanting  to 
increase collaboration but keep Information content under control have had to take a 
step back to address a wider communication challenge: these organizations need to 
continue  confronting  the  imminent  CDS  problems  and  ensure  that  today’s  security 
technology  choices  don’t  complicate  the  assurance  of  tomorrow’s  communications. 
Making decisions based on the information to hand has been a matter of professional 
judgement.  Are  the  sources  known,  is  the  information  believed  to  be  accurate  and 
dependable, is it timely or dated, is it complete and do we trust it? The elements of 
Fear,  Uncertainty  and  Doubt  (FUD)  will manifest  unless  we  do  something  about  it! 
Information Assurance (IA) is both a Science and an Art of removing the FUD contagion 
by managing the risks and providing a high degree of trust.  
 
An  important  issue  was  to  remove  the  desire  to  analyse  the  content  and  usage  of 
classified material in the operational theatre, to accept that there is a clear and present 
need  to  bridge  the  air  gaps.  This  restricted  the  research  qualitative  rather  than 
quantitative analysis of sensitive aspects of information management and exploitation 
in  the military  environment.  By  not  dwelling  on topical,  actual  but  highly  sensitive 
problems, has limited the research to generalist issues and the overall problems for 
cross  domain  solutions,  the  directed  research  was  to  more  contextual  modelling 
(Strang  &  Linnhoff-Popien,  2004;  Bettini,  et  al.,  2010)  than  construction  of  a  final 
engineered system or product. Researching Communication and Information Systems 
has moved away from technological to managerial and organizational issues through 
qualitative research methodologies (Kaplan & Maxwell, 1994; Kaplan, Truex, Wastell, 
Wood-Harper, & DeGross, 2004). The interpretive perspective and quantitative method 
provides  context-dependent  research  into  the  holistic  problems  of  Information 
Assurance and Bridging the Air Gap. Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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The Need to Know Principle 
The protection and security of Data, Information and Knowledge across the Internet, its 
services  and  multiple  domains,  telecommunication  networks,  inter-connecting 
corporate and government intra-networks, institutional networks, social networks and 
military  communication  and  information  systems  has  been  examined,  reviewed, 
articulated, sponsored and exploited by many different scholars, strategists, military 
doctrines, business analysts and security practitioners. Long before 1911 the security 
principle of “The Need to Know” was a key component to keeping secrets, secret and 
those  in  “The  Know”  perceived  to  have  gained  more  power,  emotional  Contempt 
(Ekman,  1999)  over  those  that  were  not  (Hollander  &  Offerman,  1990).    The 
introduction  of  the  UK’s  Official  Secrets  Act,  1911  was  a  legal  mechanism  that 
reinforced  morals  of  trust  and  loyalty  through  secrecy  (Williams  D.  G.,  1969).  The 
principle component of this legislation was the moral promise (honour and trust) from 
employees not to divulge information or intelligence without express permission from 
appropriate authorities (Frank & Eisen, 1982). The moral authority (Haidt & Joseph, 
2007)  underpins  the  principle  of  the  “Need  to  Know”  in  military  and  intelligence 
operations. This principle is pivotal on the idea that military personnel are only told 
what is necessary, what they need to know and thereby what level of trust (Lewicki & 
Wiethof,  2006a)  was  bestowed  upon  them  to  carry  out  their  task.  If  they  are 
subsequently captured or for some reason (the fear to) betray the operation, they are 
unable  to  divulge  any  other  operational  orders  or  secrets;  willingly  or  unwillingly. 
Essentially,  Nations,  Governments,  Departments  and  Operations  need  to  keep  its 
secrets, secret and are emotionally in fear of having these secrets exposed (Liebeskind, 
1997; Schneier B. , 2000; Colwill, 2010). 
 
Security  of  Information  was  proscribed  by  many  policies  and  articulated  by 
McCumber’s  Cube  (McCumber,  1991;  Price  S.  M.,  2008)  and  the  net-centricity  of 
Information Operations has focused early Assurance doctrines on Computer Network 
Defence  (Rathmell,  2003),  physical  security  devices  and  technologies,  policies, 
procedures, access control and people vetting to provide protection to the data and 
information flows (Alberts, Garstka, & Stein, 1999; DoD JP 3-13, 2006; MoD, 2006). 
However,  the  Cross-Domain  requirements  of  coalition  decision-making  and  other 
communities of interest imposes directives for the assurance of Information System 
Interoperability  as  well  as  providing  dependable  and  safe  Knowledge  Transfer 
Operations across these numerous systems to create a shared situational awareness 
(the Need to Share) and resilient and secure Information Exploitation. IA has become a Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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strategic  issue  to  the  modern  enterprise,  with  purpose  and  capabilities,  defining 
assured environment and cultural awareness as illustrated in Figure 7.  
 
Figure 7: Strategic Asset of Assurance to the Enterprise (Borland, 2008) 
This enterprise focus of Information Assurance had many declaring it a State of Mind 
(Boyce  &  Jennings,  2002;  Stahl,  2005;  Borland,  2008)  to  achieve  business  values 
through Enterprise Architecture and conceptual view of security towards net-centricity 
and increasing complexities of communication networking.  IA Architecture (IA2) has 
predominantly  developed  the  security  domains  of  Confidentiality,  Integrity, 
Availability,  Non-Reputation,  Access  Control  and  Authentication  (Willett,  2008)  and 
was promulgated without much research in linking IA (and its benefits) with human 
psychology, education and situational awareness. The Umbrella of Secrecy has help 
many military operations to succeed, however in a time of instant communications, 
surveillance, computational analysis and image processing, military activities are often 
observed and evaluated by opposing forces performing appropriate countermeasures, 
very  quickly.  Being  aware  of  this  rapid  transforming  environment,  the  shared 
situational awareness of what’s going on, and who is performing what task and what 
agile responses are being played out, the modern field commanders in the Command, 
Control, Communications, Computing, Intelligence and Information (C4II) Battlespace 
has become reliant on accurate and timely information, he needs to know! Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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Figure 8: Human Centricity of Information Assurance 
This raises the question of identifying and qualifying who needs to know. Furthermore 
who needs to know what? Conversely, how does a user in need of information “Know 
whom to ask”? These questions become a complex issue when you have millions of 
isolated  data  storages  to  single  systems,  and  potentially  millions  of  systems 
interconnected and having to become interoperable. The importance of being able to 
discover,  knowing  who  to  ask  for  what  and  rationalise  the  appropriate  information 
could  be  resolved  by  semantic  tagging  or  indexing  the  data  structures  (Allemang, 
2010).  However,  are  these  techniques  available  across  the  whole  interconnected 
domains? What motivates the interest of communities to move towards information 
sharing is the desire to improve the decision making process and achieving a shared 
situational  awareness,  ensuring  all  members  of  the  community  are  aware  of  the 
enterprise content that has otherwise been trapped by official denial, power politics, 
isolation and Air Gaps!. This new direction, as outlined and argued within this thesis, 
will fundamentally change assurance architecture doctrine and processes away from 
network defence and security mechanisms towards human factors and its centricity, as 
illustrated in Figure 8, of education, learning and developing cognitive processes and 
products  that  harmonised  alignment  and  interoperability  drawn  from  adaptive 
unconscious (Wilson T. D., 2002a; Wray, 2011).  The research models developed within 
this thesis integrate and align components of IA against the layering of cyberspace, the 
layers of interoperability and recent understanding of human psychology (expressed 
by Ekard and Hiadt) and life-long learning. Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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Environment 
The early 21st Century Cyber World is a many-to-many, globally connected; intrinsically 
ICT dependent, information rich; culturally diverse, data-to-knowledge transforming 
environment (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2000; Borg, 2005; Lane, Heus, & Mulcahy, 2008; 
Omand, 2010; Obama, 2011). This virtual space of human thoughts interfacing social-
technical networks, vast data processing, capture, store and forwarding cyber domains 
predicates individualistic empowerment that quantum shift paradigms to open new 
horizons  of  statehood;  commerce;  politics;  entertainment  and  human  relationships 
(Schmidt, 2008; Powell, 2009; Sommer & Brown, 2011).  
 
Where we are beginning to understand the neural networks and complexities of our 
brain we have created a greater network, bridging human minds through virtual planes 
(Zohar  &  Marshall,  1990;  Cole,  2005;  Krämer,  2008).  The  geopostion  of  nations 
becomes less important as state boundaries are lost in cyberspace (Fisher, 2001; Exon, 
2003;  Kücklich,  2009),  as  we  socially  engineer  new  communication  paths  and 
relationships  (Jones  &  Rafaeli,  2000;  Ghosh,  2004;  Anderson  &  Rainie,  2010).  The 
pervasive  nature  of  social-technical  internetworking  communities  (Kolb,  2008)  has 
generated these new horizons in cyberspace; complexities of connectivity; ubiquitous 
communications; the internet of things; the digital divide; cybercrime; Cyberwar; the 
realisation of virtualisation and clouds; illusions of reality and new (virtual) freedoms; 
innovations, digital creations,  quantum  computing,  subterfuge,  conflict,  privacy,  risk 
and trustworthiness.  These composite, conflicting, cognitive domains have become our 
interconnected, bridged society (Jensen, Danziger, & Venkatesh, 2004; Proctor & Van 
Zandt, 2008; BIS, 2009).   
 
The Research Engineering to Bridging the Air Gap is a discovery of where to assure  the 
critical  infrastructural  social  technology  challenges  of  trust,  trusted  and 
trustworthiness of the real and virtual planes of our societies and the Communication 
and Information Systems (CIS) we use and in particular establishing a strategic assured 
military  acceptance  to  cross  domain  interoperability,  robustness  and  dependability. 
Cyberspace  constitutes  a  pervasive,  ubiquitous,  survivable  domain  that  is  easily 
accessible, affordable, exploitative, evolutionary and expansive. It has been defined as: 
“The worldwide open IP-enabled network infrastructure for communications, commerce 
and  government,”  (Nain,  Donaghy,  &  Goodman,  2008).  With  the  increased  Internet 
usage at homes and businesses there were more asymmetric attacks being generated 
from malicious users, hackers, script kiddies and criminals (Saydjari, 2004).  The US Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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Defense  Advanced  Research  Projects  Agency  (DARPA)  study  (Weaver,  Paxson, 
Staniford,  &  Cunningham,  2003)  categorised  in  2003  five  worm  characteristics 
(Propagation carriers and distribution mechanisms; target discovery; code activation; 
payload and attacker motivation) and speculated that future worms could facilitate 
human surveillance, commercial advantage, the management of distributed malware, 
terrorist reconnaissance and the cyber-kinetic manipulation of system parameters to 
SCADA and CII.  
 
Modern electronic warfare is changing asymmetrically (Metz, 2000); changing radically 
(Richards, 2010); there are revolutions in concepts of running military affairs (Toffler 
& Toffler, 1980); an evolution of conducting network centric operations (Arquilla & 
Ronfeldt,  In  Athena's  Camp:  Preparing  for  Conflict  in  the  Information  Age,  1997; 
Alberts, Garstka, & Stein, 1999) doctrines to the conquest of cyberspace (Libicki M. C., 
2007) from Cyberspace to Cyberpower  (Kuehl, 2009; Starr, 2009) to the formation of 
USCYBERCOM  and  lately,  formal  recognition  that  there  are  now  five  domains  of 
Military, Political and Economic Affairs (Land, Sea, Air, Space and Cyberspace).  The 
Ministry  of  Defence’s  Network  Enabled  Capability  (MoD,  2006;  MoD,  2009)  and  its 
development  from  the  US  Netcentric7  models  has  developed  int rinsic  and  often 
complex transnational interdependencies, involving knowledge transfer, human factors 
and information interactions across virtual and real planes.  
 
People who have a communication agenda had, before the Internet, communicated 
their message via a few media channels: an occasional letter to “The Times Editorial”; a 
placard in a televised march; a stump speech in Hyde Park or a radio broadcast. Even 
those channels are still prevalent in the UK’s democratic society; there is a considerable 
movement  to  blogs,  wikis,  online  forums,  IRC’s  and  social  networks  (MySpace, 
Facebook  and  Twitter)  which  introduce  their  topics  to  a  larger,  more  globalised 
audience. Now their voice, their thoughts, bias and ideas can have a global impact upon 
willing and very receptive readers. This pervasive power of communication is widely 
recognised (Orbe, 1998; Estrin, Culler, Pister, & Sukhatme, 2002; Castells, 2009) and 
the relative ease of borderless access and anonymity constructs a security  dilemma 
                                                        
 
77 Netcentric refers to the participation to a continuously evolving, complex community of people, 
devices. Information and services interconnected by a communications network to optimize resource 
management and provide superior information on events and conditions needed to empower decision 
makers. Available at: https://www.ncoic.org/home (accessed 12 August 2010). Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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(Borg, 2005)that one person could potentially affect an entire nation’s security via a 
cyberspace attack is seen as a Clear and Present Danger (Liang & Xiangsui, 2002; Jain, 
2005; Harris, 2008; Marks, 2009). The two Chinese Colonels (Liang & Xiangsui, 2002) 
advocated the idea that a less-capable foe can employ asymmetry warfare principles to 
take on a military superior opponent. This aligns with Sun Tzu’s view that Stealth, 
Deception and Indirect attacks should be used to overcome a stronger opponent in 
battle.    The  US  Department  of  Defense  (DoD)  Directive8  leverage their net-centric 
capabilities with a technical cyberspace framework called the Global Information Grid 
(GIG)  incorporating  an  IP -based  infrastructure  linking  sensor,  surveillance  and 
reconnaissance  (SSR)  systems;  Com mand  and  Control  (C 2)  systems  and  weapon 
platforms  (fire  systems)  and  associated  services  necessary  to  achieve  Information 
Superiority. The DoD vision has six programmes9 to facilitates the Grid with an agile, 
robust,  interoperable  and  collaborative  comman d  structure  where  users  from 
Enterprise, the intelligence sector and the armed forces all share knowledge on a 
secure,  dependable  and  global  network  that  enables  superior  decision -making, 
effective  operations  and  network -centric  transformation.    Consequently,  the  US 
doctrine and principles of Network-Centric Warfare (NCW) has modified the doctrines 
of many military institutions, NATO has adopted NNEC 10  and Australia calls it the 
Ubiquitous Command and Control (UC2).  
 
NCW  offers  a  military  movement  towards  cohesive  operations;  where  knowledge 
transactions, Command & Control (C2) and coalition interoperability provides strategic, 
operational  and  tactical  Shared  Situation  Awareness  (SSA)  and  to  the  planning, 
execution and assessment of the comprehensive Effects Based Approach to Operations 
(EBAO) and ultimately to the UK’s National Security. The tempo and increased rate of 
change  of  operations  within  societies  is  a  significant  characteristic  of  the  Global 
environment  we  live  and  operate  in,  requiring  coalitions,  federated  collaborative 
partnerships and multinational user groups to exploit, contain and manage diverse, 
                                                        
 
8 Global Information Grid (GIG) Overarching Policy. DoD Directive NUMBER 8100; 19
th September 
2002. 
9 Four programmes  (Joint Tactical Radio Systems (JTRS); Transformational Satellite  
Communication System (TSAT) deal with communication networks , transportation and delivery of 
Data, Information and Knowledge, one with enterprise services and final one with Information 
Assurance. 
10 NATO Network Enabled Capability; http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_54644.htm Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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geographically  dispersed  elements  of  open,  loose,  closed  or  classified  Government, 
Military,  Commercial,  Criminal  Investigation  and  Community  operations.  The 
globalisation  of  political,  economic,  social-cultural,  technological,  environment  and 
legal (PESTEL) factors have contributed, manipulated and framed our physical world, 
but  institutions  are  finding  it  increasingly  difficult  to  encompass  and  capture  the 
dynamic, evolutionary, chaotic, turbulent domain of cyberspace (Cerf, 2007). Vested 
institutional bodies such as the UN; EU; ITU; ETSI; ANSI; police and law enforcement 
agencies; intergovernmental policymaking bodies; homeland security and other NGOs 
have been focused on outreach, general education and situational awareness although 
there  are  some  “also  pursuing  global  collaboration,  harmonization  of  statutory  and 
regulatory provisions, and the development of incident readiness and response programs” 
(Nain, Donaghy, & Goodman, 2008).  
 
Nunes (1995) stated: “Cyberspace no longer strictly refers to the fictional “matrix” in 
William Gibson’s novel Neuromancer; it has now entered into common speech on and off 
the Internet as shorthand for this conception of computer networks as a cybernetic space. 
From  a  Baudrillardian  perspective,  this  figuration  of  Internet  as  a  kind  of  cybernetic 
terrain works to undermine the symbolic distance between the metaphoric and the real. It 
abandons “the real” for the hyperreal by presenting an increasingly real simulation of a 
comprehensive  and  comprehendible  world.”  Taking  Nunes  (1995)  to  heart;  to 
understand risk and nature of Cyberspace we need to comprehend its transparency. 
More effort is needed to deconstruct, in conjunction, both the Real and Virtual planes of 
Cyberspace and its interface to society and individuals (Lessig, 2004). The biomedical 
reflection of natural science to cyberspace of bugs, virals, worms, Trojans, biometrics, 
agents, neural networking etc. provide physical views to the materiality of the real 
world to the virtualisation of cyberspace. The science relates the outlook nature of the 
Newtonian world as a veneer of day-to-day existence. Science exposes it as a kind of 
mirage as it establishes and describes the various microscopic and macroscopic realms 
driven by quantized complex forces. “It may very well be said that information is the 
irreducible  kernel  from  which  everything  else  flows,  hence  the  question  why  nature 
appears quantized is simply a consequence of the fact that information itself is quantized 
by necessity.” Zeilinger, 2002. Life sciences paint complexity as an outward simplistic 
vision of humanity, plants and animals as an evolving, self-generating, self-organising 
complex system of neural linking, DNA, cellular development and chemical interactions, 
which are helpfully, hidden from our everyday view. The virtual planes of the Internet, 
The Global Information Grid and Cyberspace are synonymous to this and its life blood 
is the mixture of data, information and knowledge. ”Historically, much of fundamental Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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physics has been concerned with discovering the fundamental particles of nature and the 
equations which describe their motions and interactions. It now appears that a different 
programme  may  be  equally  important:  to  discover  the  ways  that  nature  allows,  and 
prevents, information to be expressed and manipulated, rather than particles to move.”  
Steane, 1998. 
In effect, these natural science philosophies assert that matter, life, society, cultural 
creations and the mind are illusions and that we have built cyberspace as a structured 
mirrored reflection, a virtual illusion with its own complexities. Both the real (physical) 
and  virtual  (digital)  reality  are  composed  of  the  same  quantized  binary  bits  of 
information. As Jeremy Levine (Levine, 2010) stated: “Reality, regardless of its content, 
is nothing more than the information it communicates.” It is then not so much what 
visual  image  that  we  see,  the  true  reality  is  “below  the  surface  and  behind  the 
communication”,  which  consists  of  underlying  physical  components,  such  as  atoms, 
genes,  narrative  elements  and  drives,  as  well  as underlying  “mechanisms”  or  rules, 
which generate the surface structure of reality that are akin to the protocols, standards 
and domains that have been created to implement the Black and White11 (Ones and 
Zeroes) of cyberspace.    
Sanes (2008) said “When we see only the surface, it is said that we are victims of a kind of 
simulation confusion, taken in by false appearances.” He clarifies this falsehood as that of 
(1)  nature,  which  trick  us  because  of  our  limited  senses  and  knowledge;  (2)  self-
deceptions, the unconscious cover-ups that are described as forms of repression or 
defence  and  (3)  cover-ups,  deliberately  manipulated  appearances  and  outright  lies, 
such as those attributed to hidden agenda, criminal activities, politics, con artists, and 
by creation of deceptive simulations, entertainment and magic. The Information Age 
(Toffler  &  Toffler,  1980)  is  reliant  on  interconnected,  robust,  interoperable  systems  of 
systems, their information infrastructures and connecting communication networks requires 
more automation, controlling software applications and cyberspace connectivity to manage 
the increasingly complex interdependencies of the information services and the networks that 
host  them.  The  very  nature  of  this  complexity  introduces  vulnerabilities  and  simulation 
confusions  which  inflate  with  our  increasing  reliance  and  dependency.    The  GTISC 
Professor of Practice, Howard Schmidt (2008) stated: “Our critical infrastructure systems 
are  fundamentally  dependent  on  the  Internet  and  IP-based  technology,  and  there  are 
                                                        
 
11 The Tao Security is an image of Black “Hatted” Hacker and Cracker manipulators and White 
Knight (security practitioners) countermeasures. Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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interdependencies  between  them  that  our  enemies  will  seek  to  exploit.  Cyber  warfare 
completely evens the playing field as developing nations and large nations with a formidable 
military presence can both launch equally damaging attacks over the Web.” 
The need to maintain domain security is also essential to keep conflicts and intrusions 
to a minimum and access to information on a “Need to Know” basis. However, this silo 
culture but has become obsolete to the desires of exploitation and interoperability that 
frames the 21st century Information Age and its “Need to Share” Culture. In part this 
thesis conceptualises, contextualises and examines the necessary and highly influential 
and important gap, and the bridge, between these two cultures. This challenging, and 
alarming phenomenon of multifaceted risks, insecurities and ignorance needs to be 
understood, managed and assured. What is acceptable to certain communities may be 
seen as criminal in others, globalisation has created uncertainty (Cerf, 2007; Heller, 
2009) where we are beginning to doubt the effectiveness of security and protection of 
sensitive,  private  information  assets  and  where  we  fear  the  consequences  of  being 
terrorised, criminally exploited or socially subverted:- 
 
In Cyberspace there is a contagion of Fear, Uncertainty and Doubt (FUD).  
Richardson, C. J.  2011 
 
However,  Cyberspace  offers  a  plethora  of  opportunities  to  the  individuals, 
communities, organisations and governments. The ITU (2007) stated that: “there has 
been a steady expansion in digital opportunity, both in terms of more widespread access 
to basic Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) and the growth in high-
speed access to ICTs, on both fixed line and mobile networks. Ever greater numbers of 
people around the world are enjoying access to the benefits ICTs can bring. Already, the 
number  of  people  using  ICTs  around  the  world  has  doubled since  the  WSIS was  first 
proposed in 1998. By the start of 2008, there will be around three billion mobile phones 
and more than one billion fixed lines around the world.” The Internet World Stats (2010) 
indicates  that  “The  Internet  has  reached  29%  of  the  World’s  population,  some 
1,966,514,816  users.”  With  this  increasing  online  community  come  associated  risks: 
some risks are obvious, some intrinsic to the complexities of the environment, some are 
natural and some are manufactured to suit a particular intent. Intentional activity to 
harm, threaten and exploit vulnerabilities has spurn generations of increasing more 
sophisticated  cyber-warriors,  whether  legitimated  (government  sanctioned  military, 
intelligence,  business,  educational,  social-cultural),  terrorists,  hackers,  spies  or 
criminals (EU, 2005). Each has an agenda that might cultivate, educate, deny, subvert, Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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harm or exploit the array of services and assets presented by a cyber-portal (Bynum, 
2004; Bishop, Engle, Peiser, Whalen, & Gates, 2008).  
 
“Cybercrime cost the UK economy £27bn a year,” HM Government, 2010 
 
There  are  many  different  types  of  attack  vectors  and  the  security  threat  to  the 
legitimate users has diverse intent and motivation. Cybercriminals (Schjolberg, 2005; 
ITU, 2007 and EU, 2008) are committed attackers upon our information assets, having 
a desire, want and wish to inflict damage, loss, modification, subversion, control, power 
or  other  psychological  or  material  reward.  They  seek  to  gain  advantage,  financial 
benefit,  secrets,  political  hacktivism12,  intellectual  property  and  digital  rights  by 
conducting fraud, identity theft, social engineering and launching increasing  devious 
and  effective  malware.  Their  malware  if  often  self -propagating,  reusable,  self -
defending, sometimes coordinated, able to use decentralised Command and Control 
(C2) and is becoming worryingly more intelligent  (Ilachinski, 1997; Alberts & Papp, 
2001;  DCDC, 2010) .  These  viral  and malicious  software  applications, worms  and 
Trojans  have  morphed  rootkits,  distributed  denial  of  service  attacks,  Botnets, 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) specific attack ware (e.g. Stuxnet ) 
and lately the “Storm” malware.  However, the biggest insidious security risk to any 
institution is the threat from the “insider”. The concepts and value of trust (Madsen, 
1999; Sandhu, 2000; Day, 2004; Weckert, 2005; Goucher, 2009) is essential to society 
and in cyberspace it’s the keystone to all activities (OECD, 1986; OECD 2002; Jøsang, 
Keser  and Dimitrakos,  2005).  An  environment  that  is  assured  by  structure,  safety, 
security,  trusted  systems  and  vetted  individuals  is  deemed  trustworthy  (Alexander, 
Kimmel, & Burke, 2007).  
 
Individuals, employees or contractors with valid user profiles, clearances, logins and 
passwords operate with frequent, interactivity with the enterprise’s Communication 
and Information Systems (CIS) and consequently can initiate the greatest harm and 
explicit  risk  to  the  security  (Confidentiality,  Integrity  and  Availability)  and  asset  of 
those systems.  As figure 34 illustrates, the implicit risk to any organisation is from 
outside Computer Network Attacks (CNA) but there’s greater potential betrayal of a 
                                                        
 
12 Hacktivism is the fusion of hacking and activism; politics and technology. More specifically, 
hacktivism is described as hacking for a political cause. 
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loyal / trusted insider (denoted by Computer Network Exploitation – CNE); but it is 
also  the  ignorance  (denoted  by  Disclosure,  Abuse  and  Denial,  -  DAD)  and  non-
compliance of the user community (Lapke & Dhillon, 2005; Colwill, 2010). Failures to 
meet  security  policies,  poor  awareness,  lack  of  motivation  to  protect  the  assets, 
laziness, lack of understanding of risk, privacy and sensitivity all contribute and if often 
overlooked in many security risk assessments (Furnell & Thomson, 2009).  
 
We need mechanisms, doctrines and policies to support the trustworthiness of our 
Information Assets; Providing tested and compliant solutions, vetting, management and 
education that help, support and police the user communities, identifying the evolving 
threats, analyse and assess, defend, patch, recover, repair and control our operational 
cyber  domains.  Fundamentally,  we  all  need  to  understand  Assurance  and  take 
responsibility  of  our  actions  within  cyberspace.    It’s  a  big  ask.  To  understand 
cyberspace and the evolving risks needs a national programme of Education, Training 
and  Awareness,  a  cultural  shift  from  reliance  on  others  to  self-reliance  and 
accountability.    Users  need  to  take  ownership  (risk  manage)  and  citizens  need  to 
understand that this is a national threat (MoD, 2010). 
 
It is our social nature that we need to gain trust and in doing so we make ourselves 
more  vulnerable  (Nikander,  2001).  To  trust  (Minsky,  2003)  people,  systems  or 
processes takes time, however to lose trusts can take just a moment, and any attempt to 
regain  that  lost  trust  is  fraught  and  inconclusive  (Rogers,  1995).  Trustworthiness 
requires  us  to  assure  systems,  against  CNA,  CNE  and  DAD  threats,  with  their  user 
community. Information Assurance (IA) brings trustworthiness to the Enterprise; it 
allows human trust (Schneider, 1998) to exist in cyberspace and its components and 
provides a defence-in-depth (May, et al, 2006) to Information Operations (CNA, CNE) 
and Information Insecurity (DAD). It is the key to bridging the communication data 
train (Protocols, Transmission and Routing), through the information stack (IO/IX; IA, 
IM; IS & IT) to trusting, maintaining and developing the UK’s Defence Information and 
Knowledge  Infrastructures;  DEC  CCII13;  Enterprise  and  joint  venture  Knowledge 
Management Transfer (KTM), C4ISTARS14 projects; Information Operations (JDP 3-80, 
                                                        
 
13 MoD’s DEC(CCII) is tasked to deliver optimised, integrated, timely Command and Battle Management (CBM) and 
Global  Information  Infrastructure  (GII)  equipment  capabilities  that  meet    UK  stakeholder  requirements  within  a 
coherent, balanced and cost effective investment programme. 
14  Current  UK  Command,  Control,  Communications,  Computers,  Information/Intelligence,  Surveillance,  Target ing 
Acquisition and Reconnaissance (C 4ISTAR)  programmes  are  Collaborative  System  for  Air  Battlespace  Management Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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2007);  Electronic  Warfare  (EW);  Computer  Network  Operations  (CNO);  The  Global 
Information Grid (GIG) and Communication Networks capabilities (Rawlinson, 2005 
and MODIS, 2009).  These various systems are often required to perform seamlessly 
across  multi-functional,  federated,  lateral,  layered  and  partitioned  Information  and 
Communication domains. As we interact with systems and they in turn interact with 
others networks, the systems of systems become complex with their many interacting 
components, hierarchical layers and multi-lateral domains. Professor Jensen describes 
these systems as Complex “because it is impossible to reduce the overall behaviour of the 
system to a set of properties characterising the individual components. Interaction is able 
to  produce  properties  at  the  collective  level  that  simply  are  not  present  when  the 
components are considered individually,” Moffat, 2003 
 
Essentially, modern military interoperability and system capability (Alberts and Hayes, 
2006) requires bridging the domain air gaps of numerous classified systems within and 
external to the defence environment. To comprehend, structure, make safe, secure and 
ensure  trustworthiness  of  these  systems  of  systems,  networks  of  enterprise 
architecture,  information  infrastructures  with  their  real-time  system  orientated 
processes, applications (SOA) and software serviced engineering (SaaS); their integrity 
and dependability requires educated IA practitioners and security architects that can 
work in both the Horizontal15 and Vertical16 Domains (Hughes, 2001; Hayat, 2006 and 
Anderson, 2009).   
   
                                                                                                                                                             
 
(CSABM) and NATO’s Air Command and Control System (NATO ACCS), the Joint Force Air Component HQ (JFACHQ), the 
UK’s  Tactical  Air  Control  Centre  (TACC),  the  Transportable  JAPNMS  Facility  (TJF)  and  C4ISTAR  capabilities  being 
developed for the UK Army’s Ground Based Air Defence (GBAD), WATCHKEEPER and Future Rapid Effects System 
(FRES). 
15 Horizontal Working Security Domain is defined as working between information domains at the same Protective 
Marking (JSP 440, V3.8, 2010) but with different need to know criteria, e.g. UK SECRET and NATO SECRET. 
16  Vertical  Working  Security  Domain  is  defined  as  working  between  information  domains  at  different  Protective 
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Capability 
The  Joint  Force  will  operate  in  an  environment  that  is  increasingly  complicated, 
uncertain, and dynamic. Employment of asymmetric strategies by potential adversaries 
and  the  proliferation  of  advanced  weapons  and  information  technologies  will  create 
additional stresses on all elements of the force. Future operations will not only require 
increasing joint integration, but must also better integrate other federal agencies, state 
organizations,  and  coalition  partners.    The  current  state  of  human  and  technical 
connectivity and interoperability of the Joint Force, and the ability of the Joint Force to 
exploit  that  connectivity  and  interoperability,  are  inadequate  to  achieve  the  levels  of 
operational effectiveness and efficiency necessary for success in the emerging operational 
environment.   Net-Centric Environment Joint Functional Concept (2005). 
 
The Joint Functional Concept describes the Net-centric capabilities and attributes of the 
US Military and Intelligence Communities through a model consisting of three areas:   
 
a)  The Technical Area (physical aspects such as infrastructure, network connectivity, 
and environment). 
 
b)  The Information Area (the environment where information is created, 
manipulated, and shared); and 
 
c)  The Knowledge Area (cognitive and social interaction capabilities and attributes 
required to effectively function in the Net-Centric Environment); 
The Net-Centric Environment Joint Functional Concept (NCE JFC) model was developed 
to  examine  several  important  elements  of  the  functional  concept  and  their  inter-
relations.  Appropriate  and  accurate  Information  Sharing  is  created  by  the  NCE  JFC 
through its Knowledge and Technical networking and coupled to the collection force 
sensors  (ISTARS)  provides  unit  and  shared  situational  awareness.    General  Keith 
Alexander, the head of DoD’s Cyber Command said “Defense needs a common sharable, 
operating  picture  across  its  networks  and  to  enable  real-time  response…situational 
awareness  across  DOD’s  networks  is  now  often  based  on  forensics  generated  after  an 
incident has occurred.” The NEC benefit chain (MoD, 2006; MoD, 2009) clearly defines 
that better situational awareness (SA), as illustrated in  Figure 9, will allow units to 
interact, collaborate more effectively and bolster their ability to see and understand in 
real time what’s happening across its networks. Moreover, as: “they know more about 
what they need to know, where that information is likely to be found, and with what other Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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force  elements  their  capabilities  need  to  combine,  and  they  are  interacting  and 
collaborating  in  a  policy,  cultural,  and  technical  environment  suitable  for  that 
interaction,”  (DoD, 2005). 
 
Figure 9: Network and Information Enabled Situational Awareness 
The repeatability of this cyclic process further refines the SA, making a more coherent 
view and deeper cognitive understanding. This will further examine in Chapter 6; The 
IA Model and in particular modelling the entity relationships between the five Cyber 
Layers,  three  Information  States  and  the  eight  Assurance  Components  and  their 
attributes. The Net-Centric Environment Joint Functional Concept ultimate end state 
would  be:  “Where  there  are  ubiquitous  sensor  networks,  perfect  fusion  tools,  no 
restrictions  on  bandwidth  availability  and  high-resolution,  real-time,  3-dimensional 
visualization, where any collectable information in any force would be available to any 
force  element,  and  virtual  collaboration  environments  would  be  indistinguishable  in 
terms of quality from physical “same room” collaborations.”  (Alberts D. S., 2002). 
 
“In some respects, sharing information is a leap of faith that the recipient will 
treat the information properly, not abusing the implied trust.”       
(Crocker, 2007) 
 
The 4th Annual Unified Cross Domain Management Office (UCDMO) Conference, Boston 
(2010), theme was “From the Core to the Edge - Information on Demand.”  Where Net-
centricity  of  military  Cyber  network  capability  and  information  infrastructures,  the 
“Core to the Edge” spanned the Strategic, Operational and Tactical purposes of the NEC: 
The Global Information Infrastructures (GII), Critical Information Infrastructures (CII), 
corporate Defence Information Infrastructures (DII) and the Battlespace Information Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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Infrastructures  (BII).  The  Military  cyberspace  domain  is  a  networked  construct  of 
robust  headquarters’  environments  to  the  less  advantaged,  distant  reaches  of  our 
missions  and  tactical  linkage.    Cross  Domain  capabilities  are  vital  components  in 
today’s and tomorrow’s information sharing environments (Bailey, 2010).  The NEC is 
an  environment  of  linked  sensors,  a  lattice-work  of  communications  and  logistic 
networks, command and control (C2), intelligence gathering and Fires17 networks gains 
dominance. 
 
Within the NEC: “Warfighters can achieve efficiencies in the full spectrum of operations 
by sharing information in a common operating environment. This requires unity of effort 
across organizational, national, technical and spatial boundaries as necessary,” (Crocker, 
2007).  Whereas,  within  the  Cross-Domain  Solution  they  are:  “To  foster  seamless 
information sharing throughout a diverse user community; across the widest variety of 
domains.” (Jamka, 2009).   
 
The UCDMO was initiated by the US DoD CIO and the DNI CIO to develop a roadmap for 
the community and facilitate the development of a Cross Domain vision that includes all 
the stakeholders and their stated mission. The Cross-Domain (CD) Community goals 
are: 
 
  Ensure secure, robust and flexible CD capabilities are available and extensible 
to share information among a wide range of mission partners; 
 
  Ensure that CD technological developments are timely, responsive and aligned 
with transformational initiatives; 
 
  Ensure  CD  investments  fill  capability  gaps,  minimize  redundant  activities, 
increase efficiency and support the timely migration to the CD Baseline. 
 
                                                        
 
17 In the US Joint Publication 3-09, Doctrine for Joint Fire Support, joint fires are “fires produced 
during the employment of forces from two or more components in coordinated action toward a 
common objective.” The military distinguishes between operational and tactical fires: (a) Operational 
fires are lethal and non-lethal weapon effects that influence enemy operational forces, critical 
functions, and key facilities to accomplish operational objectives in support of either an operation or a 
campaign and (b) Tactical fires are lethal or non-lethal weapons effects that achieve tactical objectives 
in direct support of a major operation. Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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 Figure 10:  GIG Incremental phased approach for the Information Assurance Component 
The evolving, evolutionary nature of Cyberspace, its social-technical development to an 
increasing function orientated user groups has driven military net-centricity and the 
importance of information (its acquisition, protection, communication and persuasion).  
The centrality of Information Operations, articulated by US Joint Force doctrine (DoD, 
2000) declared it was the US Military’s goal to achieve dominance in the Information 
domain – Cyberspace. The “Need to Know” Security Domain18 (Hughes, 2002; Farroha, 
Whitfield, & Farroha, 2009) model has to evolve to the “Need to Share” Cross-Domain 
Solutions, assuring that information sharing can accommodate real-time information 
access  and  transfer  between  different  communities,  partners  and  security  domains 
(Kubic, 2009). The spirit of coalition sharing is the ability to give something and to gain 
something. CDS long-term strategy is cooperation based on trust enabling reciprocity, 
getting  along  with  other  communities  of  interest  (Kollock  &  Smith,  1996;  Axelrod, 
1997; Abraham, 2005).  
                                                        
 
18 The Security Domain models provides a means for specifying program state and state 
transitions, as well as security-related concepts such as subject, information flow, information 
access, and covert channel vulnerabilities.  The model supports formalization of a security policy 
by providing a framework in which to specify the underlying security properties that represent 
that policy. 
 Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
Engineering Doctorate  Page 45 
 
Convergence 
“What is inescapably clear, whatever we choose to believe, is that we are altering our 
infosphere fundamentally...we are adding a whole new stratum of communication to the 
social system. The emerging Third Wave infosphere makes that of the Second Wave era - 
dominated  by  its  mass  media,  the  post  office,  and  the  telephone  -  seem  hopelessly 
primitive by contrast.                  Toffler & Toffler, 1980 
 
The Need to Share information has three fundamental enablers that can be identified as 
follows: 
1)  Protocol Definition: specifying who can access what information under 
which conditions and across what boundaries. 
2)  Protocol Enforcement: ensuring that information dissemination 
conforms to an agreed IA policy. 
3)   Protocol Tolerance: ensuring that IA protocols are fault tolerant to the 
5 IA pillars, Information Security, Information Dependability, Risk 
Management, Trust and System Resilience 
The  State  of  Art  of  Information  falls  into  a  number  of  components,  a  strategic 
positioning of IA, an operational role of IA and how IA can impact on the Enterprise in 
both its processes and it ability to create a new culture of trustworthiness. This will be 
investigated in Chapter 3. Moreover and in part Information Assurance can be seen as 
an enabler to create organisation change through architecture, policies and education; 
to better risk manage that change and its on-going operations with skilled practitioners 
and to create two major paradigms, that of survivability (resilience, dependability and 
safety) and Cross-Domain Solutions (Security, Protection and Trust Management).  For 
Critical  Information  Infrastructures  there  has  become  a  greater  need  for  resilient 
systems, that are both fault and intruder tolerate, dependable, useable and safe for the 
operations  and  its  operators.  The  Cross  Domain  Solution  provides  access  control; 
information availability and authority to pull Information from one security domain to 
another  will  require  Transactional  Information  Protocols  that  are  derived  from  a 
combination  of  factors  including  mission,  nationality,  permissions,  vetting  and  the 
operational  situation.  Information  systems  that  support  the  UK’s  Network  Enabled 
Capability provide many differing varieties of intrinsic and often complex, interactions, 
transactions and dependencies.  Information is one of the most important assets of our 
business but do we really comprehend this? Without the timely and effective use of 
information  our  decisions  become  jaded,  inappropriate  or  suspect.  We  need  our 
information to be accurate, trusted and not compromised, lost, leaked, disseminated, Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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unauthorised publication or corrupted. The NEC doctrine of Information Superiority 
predicates the need for information security and its assurance, but little has been done 
to finance a national strategy to bring the skilled individuals (we need) into this new 
marketplace. How often is it heard in conversations what was perceived as a solution 
has been discarded because of security, or the lack of it? Or that security has imposed 
unacceptable additional costs to projects.  
 
Security  is  deemed  to  be  difficult,  intrusive  and  a  necessary  evil  to  protect  our 
information,  our  assets,  from  the  social  engineered,  hacked,  virus  invested,  virtual 
world of cyberspace. There is a culture that doesn’t want to understand security; it’s 
too  complex;  they  have no  appetite  for it,  they  see  it  as  a  horrible medicine  to  be 
administered.  Often  question  its  values  and  see  no  apparent  return  of  investment.  
Fundamentally, security is a compromise to influences, power and agenda and may be 
not  fit  for  purpose  (one  compromise  too  many).  Corporate  executives  have  seen 
security professional who don’t improve the situation as they further complicate or 
cause a degree of disbelieve when they present doomsday scenarios or forecast future 
major  failings.  Then  there  is  a  proliferation  of  guidance,  policies  and  security 
technologies  to  understand;  the  issues  of  management,  architecture,  assurance  and 
exploitation; and very little recognition of the skills, knowledge and education that is 
needed to communicate comprehend and provide necessary assurances.  The “Need to 
Share” is the first of many bridges (Richardson C. J., 2008) that this Thesis will argue 
towards creating a more holistic understandable and interoperable cyberspace that has 
its  infospheres19,  infrastructures.  Networks  and  Operations  assured.  Building  IA 
bridges across capability gaps in Corporate Strategies, their Information Process and 
Storage, Communication  internetworking and providing a framework to create well 
educated professionals are all considered to support and develop this new IA science 
well into the 21st Century.         
               
Building the Bridges across the Capability and Educational Gaps in our knowledge and 
understanding of Information Assurance and its effectiveness to help solve the complex 
                                                        
 
19 R.Z. Sheppard (1971), ”Rock Candy”, Time Magazine first introduced the notion of  
“Infosphere”  as he described: “In much the way that fish cannot conceptualize water or birds the 
air, man barely understands his infosphere, that encircling layer of electronic and typographical 
smog composed of clichés from journalism, entertainment, advertising and government.” 
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problems of (a) cross-domain security; (b) trusted system interoperability; (c) system 
survivability and tolerance to faults and intrusion; (d) providing for a better skilled 
based  practitioners  and  educated  cyber  warriors;  (e)  develops  the  contextual  and 
conceptual science of IA, its architecture (IA2) and doctrine;  and (f) it accomplishes the 
aforementioned by creating 5 key IA models which are: 
 
1)  Composite Model of Interoperability (Figure 21, p74) 
This 3-Dimensional model provides the alignment to harmonise business 
processes  within  the  organisation’s  social-technical  (Enterprise) 
architecture to the technical-organisational layers of interoperability.  
 
2)  The Assured Cyber Defence Architecture (Figure 40, p119) 
This provides a coherent overview of IA Architecture as a methodology to 
provide  Cyber  Network  Defence  and  a  platform  for  Shared  Situational 
Awareness and Superior Decision Making. 
 
3)  The Information Functional Concept Model (Figure 47, p133 ) 
The I-Stack Model provides a contextual overview of the Information flows 
from the Data Layer to the Knowledge Layer demonstrating the Human-
Computer  interactive  components  of  Information  Exploitation  and 
Information Operations. 
 
4)  The Information Assurance Cuboid Model (Figure 52, p153) 
5)  The thesis has structured 8-Dimensions of Information Assurance and these 
are mapped against the flow of information (Process, Storage and Transit) 
and  the  military’s  layers  of  Cyberspace  (Geographical,  Physical,  Logical, 
Persona and Cyber Persona). 
 
6)  The IA Skills Framework (Figure , p211) 
The skills framework was derived from the UK’s National Information 
Assurance Strategy (Cabinet Office, 2007) to develop the IA profession.  It is 
now incorporated in HMG’s Information Assurance Competency 
Framework and been developed for the National Occupational Standard for 
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CHAPTER 2:  
The Assured Position of Information 
 
The risks from Cyberspace (including the internet, wider telecommunications networks 
and computer systems) have been identified in the National Security Risk Assessment as a 
Tier One risk. This means that they are judged to be one of the highest priorities for UK 
national security over the next five years, taking into accounts both likelihood and impact.           
          HMG Fact Sheet 18: Cyber Security, 2011 
 
 ’I’m not convinced that lack of encryption is the primary problem [of vulnerability to 
network  attack].  The  problem  with  the  Internet is  that  it’s  meant for communication 
among non-friends.                              Whitfield Diffie, 2010 
 
Bridging the Air Gap20 (Bobbitt, 2000; Hurley, 2001; Morabito & Gatchel, 2001; Schou, 
Kuehl, & Armistead, 2005; Richardson, 2007) encompass social-technical (Enterprise), 
professional and Educational comp etencies and capabilities within the organisation 
and their system (of systems) interconnection to other organisations. Bridging the 
                                                        
 
20  In  Computer  Network  Operations  the  air  gap  is  defined  as  a  type  of  security  where  the 
network infrastructure (domain) is physically secured by keeping it separate and isolated from 
other domains and the Internet. While this provides security, it also electronically limits access 
and interoperability of networks (and VPNs) by authorised users and coalition partners.  
 Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
Engineering Doctorate  Page 49 
 
Domain  Gap  (linking  one  secure  domain  to  another) is of  operational  necessity  for 
system  interoperability  (the  Cross-Domain  Solution)as  is  the  Bridging  the 
Competencies Gap within the Information Assurance profession (Richardson, 2008); 
they  are,  and  have,  both  military  (MoD,  2009)  and  national  requirements  (Cabinet 
Office, 2007).  There is a great political urgency as well as military and cultural need for 
assured  Cyber  Situational  Awareness21  and  the  contextual  understanding  (and 
individual awareness) of the intrinsic properties of cyb erspace (Barbatsis and Fegan, 
1999). An important requirement for modern (and in particular military) information 
infrastructures is meeting its  definition as "a shared, evolving, open, standardized, and 
heterogeneous installed base" (Hanseth, 2002) that allows for the interoperability of 
classified  domains  and  robust  connectivity  to  other  coalition  partner’s  information 
domains. This need to share information across differently configured, classified and 
owned  networks  is  defining  the  new  cyber  landscape  and  creating  a  plethora  of 
security and data ownership problems.   
 
The Defense Information Infrastructure (DII)” is a shared or interconnected system of 
computers,  communications,  data  applications,  security,  people,  training,  and  other 
support structures serving Department of Defense (DOD) local, national, and worldwide 
information needs. The defense information infrastructure connects DOD mission support, 
command and control, and intelligence computers through voice, telecommunications, 
imagery, video, and multimedia services. It provides information processing and services 
to subscribers over the Defense Information Systems Network and includes command and 
control, tactical, intelligence, and commercial communications systems used to transmit 
DOD  information,”  U.S.  Department  of  Defense, Joint  Doctrine  Division,  2010.  The 
military development of Information Infrastructures within its own cyber environment 
has  created  many  security  anomalies,  accreditation  and  compliance  problems.  The 
complexity  and  often  insular  nature  of  the  military  Information  Domain  has  been 
exacerbated by the need to keep the confidentiality and integrity of information within 
many  different  layers  of  classifications  and  reader  sensitivities,  within  the  military 
organisation, across departments and ministries and to coalition partners, NGOs and 
corporate entities. Keeping our secrets, secret has been the watch words of military 
                                                        
 
21 Situational Awareness is the field of study concerned with perception of the surroundings and 
derivative implications critical to decision makers in complex, dynamic areas such as military 
command and security. 
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information security, but the need to share our classified information assets have now 
become an operational necessity. The Information Domain is a three-part concept for 
information  sharing,  independent  of,  and  across  information  systems  and  security 
domains that: 
1)  identifies information sharing participants as individual members,  
2)  contains shared information objects, and  
3)  provides a security policy that identifies the roles and privileges of the members 
and the protections required for the information objects. 
CNSS Instruction No. 4009, 2010 
 
CNSS  4009  (3)  generates  the  security  need  for  the  integrity  of  the data structures, 
dependability & safety of the information and resilience of the systems & services that 
support the Information flow; equally these interconnecting domains need to be risk 
managed, secure, protected and above all, trusted.   
 
Figure 11: The layers of Cyberspace (US PAM 525-7-8, 2010) 
 
The  Social  Persona  Layers  couples  human  computer  interfaces,  virtual  information 
infrastructures  and  virtualised  operating  environments  across  multiple  security 
domains. In this human engineered cyber world we have an evolving, expanding and 
emergent  collaborative  social-technical  and  pervasive  world  of  the  virtual  and  real 
space.  Wherein the virtual world we witness avatars representing us, software agents 
conducting  our  business,  digital  signatures  authenticating  our  digital  work  and 
digitised imaginary distorting or obfuscating the persona (Powell, 2009).   Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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2.1  The Cyber Landscape: Understanding the 
Need to Share  
 
The knowledge society requires people who can reach good decisions, cope with new 
environments and spot new rules—human and physical—as the world changes. 
     Sir Douglas Hague, Beyond Universities: A New Republic of the Intellect, 1991 
 
 
Figure 12: DARPA’s National Cyber Range (Shatchman, 2010) 
Composite layered models will allow for future research in determining the utilisation 
of ethics, standards, governance, policies, procedures and human behaviour across the 
9  layers  of  interoperability.  This  represents  a  new  approach  to  understanding  the 
interdependencies of identified attributes, Enterprise Architecture; Skills transfer and 
Information Assurance. Furthermore investigating the 378 composite model’s cuboids 
will  create  a  new  area  of  research  utilising  cyber  ranges  and  synthetic  system 
experimentation. Chapter 1 introduced the “need to share” information and the CNSS 
Instruction  4009  (2010)  has  defined  and  reinforces  these  requirements  These 
Information  Domain  elements  requires  data  and  networks  structures,  in-turn  these 
provide the Information Infrastructure (defined by Pironti, 2006) as “all of the people, 
processes, procedures, tools, facilities, and technology which supports the creation, use, 
transport,  storage,  and  destruction  of  information”  that    has  become  integral  to  the 
DoD’s Joint Doctrine (DoD, 2010). Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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The  data  networks  viva  intranets,  ad-hoc  networks,  C2,  C4I,  ISTARS  and  SCADA 
networks  have  become  an  organizational  form  for  structuring  human  activities 
supported  by  Information  and  Communication  Technologies  and  manifestly  by  the 
Internet - a communication pathway for non-friendly activities” (Diffie, 2010). System 
capabilities  such  as  IRC  (Text  Chat),  interactive  white-boarding,  IP  Voice,  IP  Video 
Teleconferencing  (VTC)  and  instant  messaging  have  rapidly  become  popular  in 
Information  Operations  and  have  proven  themselves  invaluable  to  the  military; 
disaster relief agencies and critical infrastructure real-time C2 activities. The use of 
these  technologies  goes beyond  their  original context  of  social  networks  (MySpace, 
Facebook,  MSN  Live  Messenger,  etc.)  that  are  associated  with  online  collaboration 
(Eovito, 2005). The emergence of social networking technologies and the evolution of 
digital  games  have  helped  shape  the  new  ways  in  which  people  are  communicating, 
collaborating,  operating,  and  forming  social  constructs.  In  fact,  recent  research  is 
showing  us  that  these  technologies  are  shaping  the  way  we  think,  work,  and  live 
(Klopfer, Osterweil, Groff, & Haas, 2009). 
 
Figure 13: Sailing the Cyber Sea (Stavridis & Parker, 2012) 
Figure  13  illustrates  a military cyber  operations  room  and  the  rapid  evolution  and 
deployment of Cyber Chat in operations across Defence Information Infrastructures. 
The  US  Navy's  5th  Fleet  experienced  the  rapid  deployment  of  Cyber  Chat  during 
Operation “Iraqi Freedom” (2003) and the subsequent Operation “Enduring Freedom” in 
Afghanistan where it became extensively used to support of the Navy’s interactivity 
with military intelligence and supporting agencies.  Initially, the US 5th Fleet began 
Operation Iraqi Freedom with only one chat server, averaging 300 concurrent users. As Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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the operation intensified, they installed a second server, averaging now 800 concurrent 
users and later implementing a total of four servers supporting over 2500 concurrent 
users and they were not unique in evolving, exploiting and expanding its adaptation to 
Military Cyber Operations (Armistead, 2004; Kuehl, 2009; Bieniek, 2011).  
 
Whilst  this  synchronous,  real-time  uplift  in  ICT  capability  was  essential,  its  rapid 
proliferation  across  the  navy  became  problematical;  coalition  partners’  Computer 
Network Operations (CNO) found that they could not interoperate with the 5th Fleet 
chat  as  they  (5th  fleet)  were  using  the  classified  Secret  US  Only  -  Secure  Internet 
Protocol Routed Network (SIPRNet). Furthermore, in Operation Enduring Freedom a 
dedicated coalition cross-domain chat solution was provided but many US personnel 
found “Coalition Chat” distracting or inefficient as they had to collaborate twice; once 
on SIPRNet and then a second time on the coalition CNO. Consequently, accessibility 
and the interoperability problems were further compounded with multiple coalition 
CNOs and other US CNOs trying to deliver the theatre Cyber Situational Awareness to 
operational commanders with stove-piped solutions (Thomas, 2009a).  
 
Engineers,  scientists  and  scholars  have  addressed  the  contexts  and  entropy  of 
computer  network  operations,  the  creation  of  network  of  networks  in  a  variety  of 
fields,  including  sociology,  informatics,  economics,  local  and  national  government, 
criminology and international security and derived many theories around Information 
(Shannon, 1948; Cover & Thomas, 2006; Gleick, 2011).  Some recent academic research 
is currently investigating and examining the similarities, differences, and connections 
between  network  forms  of  organization  across  different  academic  disciplines 
developing  a  new  topology  of  inter-group  networks  and  improvements  to  our 
understanding of how human behaviour is coordinated through networks  (Hejnova, 
2010).  Furthermore,  these  network  concepts  are  now  underpinned  by  Enterprise 
Architecture  and  system  of  systems  engineering    (Yeung,  2002;  Laudon  &  Laudon, 
2007; Levine J. , 2010). To provide assurance to these systems requires a detailed look 
at  the  complexities  and  theories  that  now  surround  Systems  and  Informatics.  
Conceptually, the structure of the Information Domain is now a combination of (a) the 
creation,  communication,  transference,  storage  and  deletion  of  data  and  (b)  the 
cognitive  use  and  understanding  of  knowledge  and  experience,  it  transference, 
storage and production of shared situational awareness (McNeal, 2004).  
 
Within  the  Information  Domain  we  can  identify  three  important  components, 
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provide  knowledge  transfer  and  intelligent  use  of  information  to  create  the  shared 
situational awareness for commanders and decision-makers.  The Assurance of these 
components provides the trustworthiness of the flow of information, the security of the 
service  provision  and  the  protection  of  the  supporting  systems  (of  systems)  as 
illustrated in figure 14.  
 
 
Figure 14: Assurance of Information Operations (Richardson C. J., 2008b) 
The  intelligence,  cognitive  and  knowledge  transfer  of  this  model  is  expanded,  with 
further details, in Chapter 5 which includes some more essential components of the 
Information Stack (the I-Stack Model); the flow of information from the data terminals 
to the Human-Computer Interfaces (HCI); Knowledge Transfer (KT) and the creation of 
shared  awareness.  The  tier  relationship  that  bridges  Assurance,  Security  and 
Protection within the Information Domain has become a pervasive process in which we 
now need to understand the influences  each layer affect each other and what their 
combined effects on business processes and operations are. This causative relationship 
is  further  developed  (and  exploited)  with  the  Information  Assurance  Model  (see 
chapter  6),  as  well  as  part  of  the  computer  network  operations  component  of 
Netcentric system as illustrated in Figure 15.  Here, the Information Domain is a virtual, 
non-physical domain that transverses the other 5 military operation domains (Land, 
Sea,  Air,  Space  and  Cyber)  and  this  concept  separates  it  from  the  convention  of 
analysing it as just a Cyber Domain (McNeal, 2004; Metz, Garrett, & Hutton, 2006; Halle, 
2009). Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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Information Operations 
Information Operations have five core capabilities: (i) Psychological Operations, (ii) 
Military Deception, (iii) Operational Security, (iv) Electronic Warfare and (v) Computer 
Network Operations (MoD, 2010c).  This thesis examines both Operational Security and 
a  further  four  principle  components  of  Computer  Network  Operations:  Computer 
Network  Attack  (CNA);  Computer  Network  Exploitation  (CNE),  Computer  Network 
Defence (CND) and Computer Network Management (CNM).  
 
 
 
Legend    
CNO – Computer Network Operations 
IX  Information Exploitation  IM  Information Management 
CNA  Computer Network Attack  CND  Computer Network Defence 
CNM  Computer Network Management  CNE  Computer Network Exploitation 
 
Figure 15: Elements of the Information Domain (Richardson C. J., 2009b) 
 
The  Enterprise  Architecture  (DODAF  and  MODAF)  element  provides  Operational 
structures and views to the domain; whilst Cyberspace and Information Infrastructures 
elements bridge the physical communication and data structures to the Cognitive space 
of  Knowledge  Management  and  Situational  Awareness.  As  information  is 
conventionally  seen  as  asset  of  military  power  the  military  community  needs  to 
understand  the  dynamism  of  these  element  interactions,  within  the  information 
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domain. Knowing the impact of their interactions is an important step to creating an 
assured  domain.  How  we  shape  them,  couple  them;  provide  appropriate  security 
metrics  that  align  to  the  business  processes  will  help  provide  a  more  harmonised 
assured cross-domain solution. 
 
The “need to share” tactical information among single services, joint forces, coalition 
partners, non-government organisation (NGOs) and other agencies  is critical to the 
providing a safe and successful operation. However, this need to share information is 
often odds with the “Need to Hold” where the sensitivity of the Cognitive, Information 
and  Physical  attacks,  as  illustrated  in  figure  46,  across  the  Battlespace’s  electro-
magnetic spectrum necessitates accredited heterogeneous channels amongst diverse 
groups.  These  tightly  regulated  channels  presents  significant  operational  security 
challenges often restricting business processes and operational expediency.  Bridging 
the Gaps requires successful negotiation of multilevel, interdependent and sometimes 
conflicting agencies, their protocols, policies, accreditation and doctrines as well as the 
interagency aims of governments. This is formally recognised by Joint Forces chain 
command  policies,  but  often  is  done  more  informally  between  pairs  of  agencies  as 
cultural and organisational norms. (Suri, et al., 2008; Feltovich, Bradshaw, & Bunch, 
2009). 
 
In  1969,  NATO  constituted  the  Committee  on  the  Challenges  of  Modern  Society22 
(CCMS), which argued for, and promulgated the introduction of a non -military focus 
within the Alliance to address increasing social -technical vulnerabilities from sources 
beyond the traditional security framework and this committee has cooperated with the 
US  Defence  Advanced  Research  Projects  Agency 23  (DARPA)  to  improve 
multidisciplinary information sharing, cyber security capabilities, crisis management, 
interdependencies among critical infrastructure and technologies (NATO, 2002).  
                                                        
 
22 The Committee provides a unique forum for the sharing of knowledge and experiences on social, 
health and environmental matters both in the civilian and military sectors among NATO and EAPC 
Partner countries. The work of the Committee is carried out on a decentralised basis and participation 
by nations to the pilot studies, projects, workshops and seminars, which are nationally funded, is 
voluntary. 
23 The  DARPA’s mission is to maintain the technological superiority  of the U.S. military and 
prevent technological surprise from harming our national security by sponsoring revolutionary, 
high-payoff research bridging the gap between fundamental discoveries and their military use.   Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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The 9/11 atrocity and the continued increase of the global threat of cyber-terrorism 
(NATO, 2007), the Estonia and Georgia cyber conflicts and information warfare has 
transformed the military landscape for NATO and its member nations (NATO, 2008). 
Their New Strategic Concepts presented at the Lisbon Summit (NATO, 2010) placed 
cyber  security  at  the  forefront  of  NATO’s  security  challenges  and  created  the  new 
Emerging Security Challenges Division (ESCD) to formulate Cyber Defence Strategies. 
Within a year, NATO’s Defence Ministers had agreed the framework Concept on Cyber 
Defence (Bieniek, 2011).  NATO’s CIS is beginning to transform from “stove-piped” silo 
platform-centric  to  federated  network-centric  force  structures  (Price,  Beltz,  & 
McKinnon, 2006).  
 
This transformation has made the reliance of the Information Infrastructures across all 
5  domains  an  operational  necessity  and  a  robust  cyberspace  has  become  the  most 
prominent  in  operational  planning  (Alberts,  Garstka,  &  Stein,  1999; Hobbins,  2005; 
Bieniek,  2011).  US  Air  force  (USAF,  2008)  demonstrates  the  IER  creation  of  3-
Dimensional Computer Network Operations within the physical confines of  Cyberspace 
and the Information Superiority platform provision for offensive capabilities of CNA 
(Bayles, 2001; Berenger, 2006); and CNE (Armistead, 2004; Krekel, 2009); but also 
ensure the CND (USN, 2010; CJCSI, 2011) of friendly decision cycles  (Burris, 2010); and 
the  military  usage  of  Computer  Network  Management  (CNM),  as  listed  in  Table  2, 
whose management activities include: 
 
Network Management  Capacity Management 
Incident Management  Availability Management 
Problem Management  Service Level Management 
Change Management  Continuity Management 
Release Management  Financial Management 
Configuration Management  Security Management 
 
Table 2: IO Computer Network Management 
 
The Military gains its Information Superiority in the Information Environment through 
the use of Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance to provide sensory data for the 
Joint  Operational  Picture  (JOP).  The  Information  Operations  can  use  Knowledge, 
Information  and  Data  (KID)  through  its  Cognitive,  Information  and  Physical  (CIP) 
dimensions to provide Direct and Indirect attack mechanisms (CNA and CNE), derived 
from its Superior Decision Making processes and the NEC benefit chain (Baber, Stanton, Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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Houghton, & Cassia, 2008), to target the opponent’s decision cycle (Alberts, Garstka, & 
Stein,  1999;  Berenger,  2006;  Armistead,  2010).    This  projection  of  Cyber  Power 
requires the Assured Friendly Information Stack (a defensive posture) to be also able to 
project an offence posture in all 3 dimensions (Physical, Information and Cognitive) to 
conduct  Information  Operations  (IO)  and  C2  functions.  This  model  becomes  more 
complex when the decision loops involves joint force actions across multiple coalition 
KID-CIP stacks.  
 
 
Figure 16: Gaining Information Superiority in the Information Environment (MoD, 2006) 
Consider a scenario where the Commander has determined a target and asked for a 
FIRES  (operational  use  of  munitions)  response,  the  FIRES  CNO  would  SMART-pull 
information from Navy, Air or Army forces’ operational management and databases, as 
illustrated in Figure 17, where there is a need to gather Knowledge, Information and 
Data on such issues as theatre actors, weapon availability, target acquisition, impact 
assessment  and  cost  to  delivery.  In  return  these  forces  will  need  to  have  target 
information, timing and a Shared Situational Awareness to order to provide the best 
solution for the offensive action. As the ISTAR Joint Operational Picture generates new 
data, all tasked forces will need updates, so these Real-Time processes become Time-
Sensitive with a need to be agile, reliable and accurate. The different aspects, actions 
and actors of the CNO conducting the FIRES are now rarely discrete operations; instead 
they interact and impact upon each other, generating a complex mesh of KID-CIP effects 
and events, providing support and being supported. As more targets are generated, Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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these operations will manifest the operational tempo and scheduling. Consequently, as 
operational resource struggle, complications may ensue within different decision cycles 
and their respective Information Operations, deployed assets and actors.  
 
Figure 17: Stacking and interconnecting the KID-CIP loops in a Coalition Network 
(Richardson, C.J., 2011) 
NATO’s Network Enabled Capability (NNEC) architects have expressed the importance 
for  military  Information  Exchange  Requirements  (IER)  in  the  tactical  environment 
(Tolk, 2001; Mittrick, Richardson, & Kaste, 2008).  They recognised that Warfighters 
must share information across organisational, system and spatial boundaries to achieve 
operational  goals  as illustrated in  Figure  50. NNEC  derives  Battlespace  Information 
from  critical  and  highly  classified  Intelligence,  Surveillance,  Target  Acquisition,  and 
Reconnaissance (ISTAR) systems which are often desperate sourced, macroscopically 
linking  several  multi-national  battlefield  functions  together  from  reconnaissance 
missions  (Aircraft  sorties,  UAVs,  Special  Forces,  etc.);  unmanned  sensors  (Remote 
CCTV,  Spy  Satellites,  Electronic  Surveillance  Devices,  etc.);  human  intelligence 
networks; the Internet and the Global Positioning System (Tolk, 2003; Dorion & Boury-
Brisset, 2005; Tolk & Kunde, 2010). 
 
IER  Interoperability  is  the  key  attribute  for  coalition  operations,  it  is  not  just  the 
physical connectivity between military forces and it’s their ability to share information, 
it’s the harmonised contribution to a common operational picture, and building up of 
shared situational awareness in order to collaborate and produce effective missions 
(Alberts & Hayes, 2006; Suzić & Yi, 2008). 
 
Force A
•Navy IO
• Coaltion Force B
•Coalition Force C
Force B
•Air IO
•Coalition Force A
•Coalition Force C
Force C
•Land IO
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•Coalition Force BBridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
Engineering Doctorate  Page 60 
 
 
Figure 18: Unmanned Aircraft Systems Control Segment Architecture (DoD, 2010) 
This  agility  (robustness,  resilience,  responsiveness,  flexibility,  innovation,  and 
adaptation)  is  the  fundamental  component  of  network  centricity  and  the  military 
adoption and development of cyberspace. However the very nature of an assured, agile, 
responsive ICT has become the security dilemma. The multiple, rich, multi-user, multi-
national  orientated  Cognitive,  Information  and  Physical  dimensions  needs  to  be 
protected in near real-time for military Intelligence and Information Operations. This 
time-sensitive,  assured  cyber  environment  can  be  geographically  dispersed  as  a 
virtually spatial distributed environment which must also allow the transference of 
routine and classified data in certain, if not most situations.  
 
The military information exchange process is a prime example of the need to exchange 
technical  information  which  can  be  “sensitive  but  perishable  cross  the  boundaries” 
between various domains, e.g. the mission timetable would be highly sensitive until the 
operation delivers (Army Research Laboratory, 2009). Ideally the message exchanges 
should  be  automated  such  that  the  messages  objects  files  can  flow  securely  cross 
boundaries  with  minimal  human  intervention;  however  is  important  that  the 
Information  Exchange  supports  an  appropriate  degree  of  human  oversight  and 
intervention. The sharing of Blue Force (Friendly Coalition Forces) tracking data (this 
information concerns location nature and movement of friendly forces) requires an IER 
system to precisely identify and tag the type of perishable tactical data that needs to be 
shared among multiple cooperating organisation such as US forces; UK forces; NGOs, Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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local police, Intelligence communities, enforcement agencies and emergency response 
units. The known location of friendly forces and non-combatants is critical to avoiding 
potential fratricide situations and minimising civilian casualties, thus all participating 
nations are therefore motivated to share such tracking information and are dependent 
upon its integrity. 
Assuring Information Superiority 
Increasingly, military decision makers have to rely on information provided by 
other actors within a highly dynamic and distributed Battlespace,” 
 (Keller, Carrigan, Atkinson, Clarkson, & Johnson, 2008). 
 
The  persistent  problem of  Blue  Force interoperations is  that  each  organisation  has 
regulations governing the kind of data that may be shared, and services offered, with 
other members. Cross-domain information sharing policy requirements and associated 
Service Level Agreements (SLAs) can be complex and require rich language (often open 
to  interpretation)  to  scope  many  different  aspects  of  the  data  sets;  its  modes  and 
channels of communications; service provision as well as context in which the data will 
be shared. Military organisations are specifically concerned with situations where the 
inflexibility of IER contracts and insensitive applications of Information Management 
(IM)  policies  may  endanger  life:  e.g.  when  special  operations  group  unexpectedly 
moves into close proximity of another group; then this normally undisclosed activity 
may temporary require disclosure to reduce the risk of friendly fire. 
 
The  Strategic  Positioning  of  Security  Model  (Richardson,  2008)  describes  the 
Assurance of Information Superiority as the exploitive emergence of tolerant, resilient 
and trusted Human-Computer inter-exchanging systems and Knowledge Transfer. This 
secure flow of Knowledge, Information and Data (KID) across platforms has become a 
key component of modern warfare and the military decision cycle.  NATO’s Network 
Enabled  Capability  (NNEC)  has  irrevocably  aligned  member  nations  to  coalition 
interoperability  with  most  activities  operating  under  a  single  Information  Domain 
(NATO, 2007a) where they identified the need to develop information assurance in 
NNEC CNO and deduce its implications across coalition environments and was required 
to improve the accuracy, timeliness as well as both the spatial and temporal coverage of 
mission  decisions  through  synergistic  employment  of  sensors,  decision  makers  and 
effectors  within  an  assured  information  network    (McIntyre  &  Flemming,  2001).  
Assuring the Information flow and services provides the platform for military decision 
advantage. Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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Rear Admiral Bill Rowley, USN, (1995) wrote that “knowledge is the resource of the 
future - land, natural resources, factories and workers are no longer the measure of a 
country’s  wealth  because  multinational  businesses  can  easily  obtain  these  things 
anywhere in the world. It is the application of knowledge that now offers the competitive 
advantage in the world economy. The Knowledge Worker is the true asset because of the 
knowledge and abilities he or she possesses. In the twenty-first century at least 35 percent 
of the workforce will be knowledge workers. They must have formal education, possess 
specific  knowledge  and  skills,  have  the  ability  to  acquire  and  apply  theoretical  and 
analytical knowledge, and continue to learn throughout their lives. They will work in 
teams because no one person can know enough to do it all. Because they are the true 
assets and are highly mobile, companies will work hard to keep them.” (Rowley, 1995).   
 
The Knowledge workers in the US Director of National Intelligence (DNI) 2015 Vision 
are clearly those who are mission focussed. The military concepts of Cross Domain 
Solutions24 (Kennedy & Soligan, 2010) precipitate an array of  Information Assurance 
risks: risk of bias and erroneous intelligence, of users’ ability to fuse data and ideas into 
operational concepts, or in adequate assessment of alternative interpretations, of faulty 
and  catastrophic  decision-making  (Burgoon,  George,  Adkins,  Kruse,  Biros,  & 
Nunamaker, 2007).  
   
                                                        
 
24  Wikipedia  describes  Cross-Domain  Solutions (CDS)  as  solutions  for information 
assurance that provides the ability to manually or automatically access or transfer between two 
or more differing security domains. They are integrated systems of hardware and software that 
enable transfer of information among incompatible security domains or levels of classification. 
Because modern military, intelligence, and law enforcement operations critically depend on a 
timely  sharing  of  information,  and  because  of  the  cost  and  forethought  required  for  more 
rigorous approaches, CDS are often considered a “necessary evil”. CDS is distinct from the more 
rigorous  approaches,  because  it  supports  transfer  that  would  otherwise  be  precluded  by 
established  models  of computer/network/data  security (e.g. Bell-LaPadula and Clark-Wilson). 
CDS  development,  assessment,  and  deployment  are  based  on  risk  management.  Sharing 
information with CDS exposes the sharer to greater risk that his secrets may be unintentionally 
revealed.  Available  at:  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross_Domain_Solutions  (Accessed  20  March 
2011). Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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The FUD Contagion 
“The U.S. government, if confronted in a cyber-war today, would not come out on 
top… If the nation went to war today, in a cyber-war, we would lose. We’re the 
most vulnerable. We’re the most connected. We have the most to lose.” US Director 
of Intelligence, Mike McConnell to the US Senate Committee, Feb 2010 
 
There are real threats, vulnerabilities and Operational Impact with these risks, as they 
will  impose,  constrain  or  damage  operations  (The  FUD  Contagion)  if  CDS 
implementation is not accompanied by a deeper understanding, training and adopting 
new tools (such as those envisaged by the next generation of emergency help services 
to mitigate them. This paradigm shift in the nature of the military enterprises from the 
“Need to Know” (Security Domain) to the “Need to Share” (Cross-Domain Solutions) 
creates OPSEC problems. Increasingly, military and civilian organizations implementing 
information  systems  are  discovering  a  greater  need  for  secure,  reliable 
interconnections  between  existing  systems  than  for  systems  that  provide  new 
capabilities (Vietmeyer, 2004). Recent media articles for command25 options such as 
National  Cyber-guards,  Cyber-militia,  Cyber-Police  and  harking  for  social  Cyber -
defence force and more Cyber warriors can be construed as  the previous century 3D-
mentality and mobilisation that will fail to redress the very real need to control and 
provide trust in this multi -lateral, multi-layered, multi-dimensional chaos. This new 
space has opened new opportunities to the way we think, com municate, socialise, 
emphasise  and  innovate   (ISTAG,  2009).  It’s  a  domain  of  chaos,  complexity  and 
evolution of technology and exploitative of human desires, wants and needs (greed, 
control and power) and where for many users there is Fear, Uncertainty and Doubt 
(FUD).  The many ways that we choose to interacts with globalize instant responses, 
has  both  tangible  and  intangible  actors  who  have  their  own  agenda  (Dalal,  2006); 
where system and infrastructures activities react to our demands (or other controls) 
and often vary greatly from individuals, enterprises and governments which makes it 
an  impossible  place  to  police,  legislate  or  even  place  and  maintain  rudimentary 
controls. Cyberspace needs to have social trust as an enduring value to the conscious of 
all its communities, an assurance that is global and empowered by practitioners and 
users (Collins & Mansell, 2003). 
                                                        
 
25 The activation on 1 October 2009 of the US Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) brought 
together computer network attack (CNA) and computer network defense (CND) activities of the 
US DoD Joint Functional Component Command for Network Warfare (JFCC-NW) and the Joint 
Task Force for Global Network Operations (JTF-GNO) under the USCYBERCOM. Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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Operational issues through the Cyber operators’ lens have become abstract or process 
orientated as: online game scenarios; e-commerce utilities; web paging; torrents, social 
networking create their own perceived realities and where they might also find new 
and  vibrant  virtual  realities  to  distract  or  augment.  The  real  concepts  of  war,  a 
declaration to fight an adversary for political, economic or military supremacy, usually 
involving  nation  states,  population  participation  and  the  loss  of  lives,  possessions, 
prestige, wealth or influence is ingrained in our conscious, but  Cyber War doesn’t 
invoked the same FUD feeling within the social conscious, its abstraction obscures its 
potential devastating effects. The continuing likelihood of inter-state conflict coupled to 
the  increasingly  decline  of  state  social  cohesion,  through  Globalisation,  suggests  a 
posterity  of  Information  Warfare.,  Cyber  hostilities,  malicious  viral  attacks  and  an 
increased global crime wave  (Schwartau, 1996a; Boyd C. G., 1999; Anderson K. , 2005; 
Kierkegaard, 2005; Knapp, 2009). Globally, many people don’t realise the true extent of 
the controls that these virtual (soft) systems have over their lives or the near-future 
repercussions of these virtual systems that generates and stores vast quantities of data 
per  millisecond;  the  risk  impact  of  freely  evolving  knowledge  transfers  and  social 
networking are engineered to provide empowerment to the individuals who are not 
aware  of  its  consequences  thereby  providing  possible  manipulation  or  control  by 
individuals, corporations or States: gained, whether legally or not! Realisation and data 
protection failure becomes media events that expose and sensationalise the impact of 
malware to critical information infrastructures and the consequential losses that may 
be exploited and cascaded into a society meltdown.   
 
Cyber-attacks are menacing, but it’s the erosion of trust in the digital economy where 
the true risk lies and the consistent, advance persistent threats may be generating a 
societal backlash to the digital economy. These governmental, corporate and individual 
failures  further  degrade  trust  and  assurance  as  they  focus  on  intolerances,  fear, 
uncertainty and doubt. The contagion is ignorance and the strategic objective should be 
to  inform  communities,  provide  intelligence  and  shared  situational  awareness  to 
combat this ignorance. Experience say this should be expedited, especially by providing 
more assurance practitioners; to educate CSA as illustrated in Figure 54 (this is further 
developed in Chapter 7). It is essential, to culturally change our approach; to facilitate 
enterprise vision and social online responsibilities to assure cyberspace, not to train 
cyber  warriors  to  war  within  it,  but  make  everyone  a  cyber-citizen  who  wants  to 
embrace security for their own privacy (United Nations, 2004; Bauwens, 2005; Obama, 
2009a). Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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Figure 19: Persistent Threats and Emerging Missions (Richardson, C.J., 2010) 
 
“Over the last 20 years, the Intelligence Community has been challenged to keep pace with rapidly 
evolving information technology. Although a less-than-agile acquisition and procurement system 
has been part of the problem, the Intelligence Community is also undermined by its basic approach. 
If  we  are  to  maintain  a  technology  edge,  we  must  adopt  an  enterprise  wide,  service-oriented 
architecture  that  is  interoperable  with  systems  in  other  federal  departments,  and  can  share 
information  with  non-traditional  partners.  A  service-oriented  architecture provides  a  proven 
means to adapt new technologies while responding to changing user needs. By creating “software 
as a service,” this architecture reduces system complexity and deployment risks through a shared 
development style, uniform standards, and common interfaces. These services will enable a user-
defined analytic environment through the use of composite applications – discrete services that can 
be pulled from a central library and dropped into a user-defined workspace.”  (McConnell, 2008). 
 
Toffler’s (1980) RMA identified how to the conduct military operations in the 21st-
century  with  interoperable,  federated  coalition  networks  that  would  offer  military 
commanders  unprecedented  capacities  for  rapid,  real-time,  global  exchange  of 
messages and complex information needed for success in the Battlespace, Information 
That commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) based CIS and military deployment of Service-
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Oriented Architecture (SOA) portends profound changes to CIS Human Computer Inter-
exchange with the sheer volume, complexity and speed of information transmission 
and communication diversity (McConnell, 2008).  The Exploitation (IX), Information 
Superiority and Cyber Situational Awareness (CSA) can be, in turn, exploited and attack 
from Enemy CIS platforms from many different attack planes as illustrated by Figure 
53.  However,  the  Insider  threat  and  CNE  causes  the  most  fear  and  uncertainty  to 
military operations (DoD, 2011). 
 
The complex net-centricity of CDS, to provide assurance and negate FUD has created 
many emergent properties (Norman & Lucas, 2000) and an unprecedented growth of 
interdependent, chaotic flows of data, and ever increasing information and knowledge 
transfers across system boundaries which has been described as Information Overload 
(Johnson, 2006). This Overload has also permeated a greater lack of understanding of 
the  unintended,  as  well  as  intended  capabilities  (Fink,  2003;  Tullao,  2003;  Burris, 
2010).  Furthermore, Enterprise Integration, Net-Centric Information Enterprise and 
Service Orientated Architecture (SOA) have produced enhanced capabilities of newly 
adaptive  tools  and  systems  which  coupled  to  Cross-Domain  Solutions  (CDS)  pose 
considerable opportunities as well as accompanying risk.  
 
 CDS is further complicated with Protective Marking of Information and their security 
domains.  The  Bridging  of  these  domains  is  an  important  aspect  of  the  KID  Cross-
Domain Solution and the speed and effectiveness of interoperable, dependable CNOs 
will  greatly  contribute  to  the  overall  Information  Superiority,  providing  the 
commander both freedom of action and force projection. Information Assurance has to 
create and maintain safe interoperability; structured dependability and security of its 
enterprise  architectures  at  different  business  impact  levels:  ensuring  trusted 
boundaries, accurate and integral information sharing and reliable flows across multi-
layered  boundaries  in  dynamic  multi-tiered,  multi-regional  coalition  network 
environments (Phillips, Ting, & Demurjian, 2002).  The NNEC Enterprise perspective is 
of system of systems engineering that requires comprehensive high level assurance to 
system survivability and intrusion tolerance for wireless networks, tactical networks, 
ad-hoc networking, network engineering and infrastructure management, as well as 
the implications of using commercial-off-the-shelf equipment (NATO, 2007b). 
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2.2  Shared Situational Awareness  
 
“While  information  assurance  and  information-based  security  is  a  difficult 
problem within any given nation or infrastructure, the additional technological, 
organizational  and  cultural  dimensions  within  NATO  make implementing NEC 
security  very  complex.  Nevertheless,  progress  toward  a  unified  vision  for 
implementing a robust and flexible NEC Security solution is imperative” NATO, 
2007 
 
The contextual Battlespace domains of military operations are land, sea, air and outer 
space;  the  5th  Battlespace  domain,  what  Gibson’s  Neuromancer  (1984) 
ichnographically  described as Cyberspace has over a very short time created many 
new dimensions within it (Schoder, 1999; Jog, 2001; Kramer, Starr, Wentz, & Zimet, 
2007), as it fuses, exploits and controls the other 4 Battlespaces (Corum, 2009; van den 
Berg, 2010). That we need holistic initiatives to maintain, explore, expand, expose and 
control  Cyberspace  (Alberts  D.  S.,  1997;  Armistead,  2004;  Alberts  &  Hayes,  2006; 
Libicki  M.  C.,  2007)  and  its  many  Information  Infrastructures  that  are  prevalent, 
evident and necessary to the National Defence (Cabinet Office, 2009b; MoD, 2010). We 
also need to define what is Cyberspace and where it differs to the Information Domain, 
which is pervasive across all 5 Battlespaces (Halle, 2009; Kuehl, 2009). 
 
“In the twenty-first century, the Internet and other interconnected networks (cyberspace) 
have become critical to human wellbeing and the political independence and territorial 
integrity of nation states.  The danger is that the world has become so interconnected and 
the risks and threats so sophisticated and pervasive that they have grown exponentially in 
comparison to the ability to counter them.  There is now the capability for nation states or 
rogue actors to significantly disrupt life and society in all countries; cybercrime and its 
offspring, cyber conflict, threatens peaceful existence of mankind and the beneficial use of 
cyberspace.” The World Federation of Scientists, 2009. 
 
This  century has  created  many  new  paradigms  of  human  evolution  (Schulur  2004; 
Bauwens 2005 and Arquilla, 2008) as our societies migrate from an Industrial Age to 
much  the  herald  Information  Age  (Toffler,  1980);  the  need  to  revolutionize  our 
contextual and conceptual thoughts of society evolution and introducing control of this 
virtual space can still be contextually placed on Maslow’s (1943) “Hierarchy of Needs” 
as  illustrated  in  Figure  55.  People  are  curious,  innovative  and  self-actualising  in Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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cyberspace but now without much linkage to real citizenship of nation states and its 
tax26 gathering agencies (Lukas, 2000; WFS, 2009).  
  
 
Figure 20 Real and Virtual Communities to Maslow’s Hierarchy 
 
                                                        
 
26 According to the US Trade Commission the Internet Economy has become the largest industry 
in the country who have stated that “The Internet is inherently susceptible to multiple and 
discriminatory taxation in a way that commerce conducted in more traditional ways is not. With 
approximately 30,000 taxing jurisdictions, compliance becomes a significant obstacle. Double 
taxation would be inevitable because the borderless nature of the Internet makes taxation very 
tricky.”  Address to the ASome Policy Perspectives on the Taxation of Cyberspace, Palo Alto, CA. 
November 1999. Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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2.3  Assurance:  From Machine to Organisation 
 
Creating  an  operational  picture  and  shared  situational  awareness  (SSA)  of  the 
progression  of  the  operation  takes  considerable  skill,  experience,  training  and 
supportive  tools.  The  engineering  of  the  processes  behind  a  military  Information 
Operation stems from its initial requirements (IERs) and availability of resources.  Field 
Commander wants to make firm C2 decisions based on all available facts to achieve 
Battlespace Awareness (as tabulated in Table 4).  
 
Command and Control  Battlespace Awareness 
The ability to conduct collaborative, planning, 
execution, and information sharing among US 
civil-military agencies and coalition partners 
from the operational to tactical levels. 
The ability to achieve a persistent situational 
awareness and shared understanding in a joint, 
multi-agency, and multinational context in order 
to know the operational environment and the 
interrelationship among ourselves, our 
adversaries, and the local population. 
The ability to achieve multi-agency coherency 
of action during planning, coordination, and 
execution by creating a joint, and combined 
when necessary, multiagency planning and 
execution organization empowered to facilitate 
integrated civil - military operation. 
 
The ability to use an operational net assessment 
to support stability operations and to reflect that 
information in the integrated civil-military 
common relevant operating picture. 
The ability to enhance rapid information 
sharing with coalition members, multiagency 
players, and non-governmental organizations 
through information sharing technologies and 
policies. 
 
The ability to provide persistent intelligence, 
surveillance and reconnaissance that integrates all 
intelligence capabilities, including human 
intelligence assets, into the overall intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance architecture. 
The ability to field a command and control 
system with reach back capability and 
connectivity to facilitate other agency 
participation. 
 
 
Table 3: Stability Operations – Joint Operating Concept Capability (DoD, 2006) 
From a CND perspective the Commander must be able to understand the causation of 
his operations (DIME); to perceive the current situation (situation perception) using 
his intelligence, recognition, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities; assess the 
impact  of  any  attack  and  tracking;  to  predict  any  future  attacks  and  their  possible 
vectors;  determine  the  adversary’s  behaviour  and  capabilities;  be  able  to  predict 
plausible future assaults and be acquainted with the quality and trustworthiness of his 
information flow and the ability of his adversary affecting his OODA loops. For the 
Commander to achieve Battlespace Awareness he needs perception, comprehension 
and projection of his assets, capabilities and vulnerabilities and those of his adversary.  
In  order  to  achieve  this,  he  must  manage  his  assets  (Devices,  Networks,  Systems, Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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Software and Services – Machines) and mould his environment (People, Nationality, 
Languages  and  Culture  -  Organisation).  The  physical  Shared  Situational  Awareness 
(SSA)  picture  is  built  up  from  many  differently  owned,  operated  and  organised 
(Protocols, Transmission and Presentation) sensory data apparatus, signal processing 
and interception devices. These ISR system outputs are then synthesised and analysed 
using appropriate tools which generate the Geo-Physical picture. Intelligence, previous 
knowledge and other resources apply a logical framework to create a real-time picture. 
However  this  interactivity,  connectivity  and  operability  of  many  different  types 
machines and joint force organisations has a recognised flawed, in that there is still a 
gap  between  human  analytical  mental  models  (intuition,  experience  and  lateral 
thinking) and the automated capabilities of C8ISR. 
Assuring Layers of Interoperability 
In particular, the gap created with the interoperability of systems to other systems and 
the  networking  the  people  and  organisations  that  use  them.    These  layers  of 
interoperability  expose  assurance  issues  and  explain  why  the  interconnection  of 
physical  devices  through  interface  specifications,  although  an  important  enabler  of 
system  of  systems  engineering  hasn’t  resolved  the  social-technical  processes  and 
assurance components related to military operations where IO usage of Information 
and Knowledge Transfer are equally as important as the Geo-Physical Data collected 
from ISTARs and the interchanging of these information flows to the decision making 
cycle and creation of the SSA. Creating a quantifiable quality assured SSA requires the 
harmonisation and alignment of all layers of system interoperability, from the technical 
issues upwards and the organisational/ enterprise issues downwards. 
 
Assuring  Cross-Domain  Solutions  for  multi-layered,  multi-functional,  multi-national 
(often  geographical  disperse)  systems  of  systems  is an international  task,  involving 
many Enterprises, Government Agencies, Standards Bodies and Academia. The scale of 
the problem has been recognised (NECSI, 2004; Alberts & Nissen, 2009), as well as 
identifying  many  of  the  key  components  (from  Technologies  to  Organizational 
developments)  that  require  research,  development  and  implementation  (Morris, 
Levine, Meyers, Place, & Plakosh, 2004). These Systems of Systems display a number of 
common characteristics that cause technical and organisational challenges; in that they: 
 
  Operated under different ownership and protocols 
  Are decentralised and geographical disperse Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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  Are heterogeneous with little compliance and configuration management 
  Have unknown Scalability and Emergent Properties 
  Conform to different IERs and other diverse requirements 
  Have dynamic composition with unknown system interactions 
  Are in a state of change: continually evolving, expanding and been redeployed 
  Are inconsistent in Architecture and Functionality 
  Are  eroding  the  Human-Computer  Boundaries  –  complex  interactivities  and 
controls 
  Are intolerant to system and intrusion failures 
The  usability  of  interoperable  systems  is  reliant  upon  a  robust  architecture  that  is 
coherent  (having  multiple  interdependencies)  across  the  interconnection  of 
Organisations, Services and Networks and supports cross-domain management of the 
information flows from the physical data networks to Enterprise Knowledge Transfer, 
Superior Decision Making and creation of a Shared Situational Awareness. International 
Standards  Organisation  ISO-14258  (ISO,  1999)  has  stated  that  “Two  systems  are 
considered  as  ‘integrated’  if  there  is  a  detailed  standard  format  for  all  constituent 
components.”  Integrating systems has proved to be technically difficult especially the 
large scale heterogeneous, geographically disperse architectures.  
These autonomous systems have become federated with various degrees of coupling. 
These systems are “tightly-coupled” when the network components and services are 
dependent  upon  each  other’s  resources  (and  technically  inseparable);  whereas  the 
more common “loosely coupled” systems are bridged by communication channels that 
allows  for  interoperability  of  data  and  services  whilst  maintaining  their  own  local 
(often  unique)  Business  Process  Operations.  The  Human-Computer  and  other 
technological interfaces between the machines and the organisation is the social hybrid 
system of a business Enterprise. Where the Humans (modelled as objects or resources) 
in the enterprise have a different behaviour (e. g., learning and problem solving) from 
machines (e.g., acting and reacting) and therefore need a different kind of information 
(ISO, 1999).  The Enterprises create a dynamic environment undergoing constant stress 
and  change  owing  to  market  conditions,  operational  requirements,  fiscal  controls, 
technological advances, service applications and new transferred knowledge.  
Many  enterprises  have  devolved  power  to  the  individual  away  from  hierarchical 
organisational structures and C2 chain of command (unlike most military organisations 
which rely on rank to influence command and control). This distributive control of Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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machine to organisation interactivity has evolved where the communities of interest 
cooperate,  communicate  and  share  in  both  problem  solving  and  action.  This 
cooperation requires greater cohesion such as building an Enterprise Architecture27, 
ISO 15704, (see figure 63), integration of functions and services such creating  Service 
Orientated Architectures, ISO/IEC DTR 30102 and effective management and assurance 
of Information flows: within the Enterprise and within the interoperability between 
Enterprises, Operations and Systems. 
Maintaining the layers Interoperability transforms the capability of communities of 
interest to  run business processes seamlessly across organizational and technical 
boundaries. The ISO has defined a framework of 5 different layers of interoperability  
(as Communities of Interest in their Political Context (the explicit and implicit reasons 
for  cooperation),  the  alignment  of  legislative  requirements,  constraints  and 
reconciliation producing Legal Interoperability; the alignment and harmonisation of 
organisational interoperability which NATO NEC has formulated in its  NATO C3 
Technical  Architecture  (NATO,  2003),  the  universal  understanding  of  processes, 
procedures,  protocols  and  language  providing  Semantic  interoperability  and  th e 
technical interoperability defining the syntax, integration, transmission and interfacing 
computer network operations and its Information Infrastructures and Cyber networks. 
These 5 layers achieve Enterprise interoperability by ensuring that the communit ies 
understand how the business processes of different organizations can interconnect; by 
developing standards to support these business processes efficiently; and by specifying the 
semantics  of  messages  exchanged  between  organizations  to  support  these  business 
processes  in  a  scalable  way  (Potgieser,  2012).  The  framework  provides  a  useful 
standard  for  these  Enterprise  Information  Exchange  Requirements.  Interoperability 
enables coalition IERs and the NEC benefit chain, presenting information in a consistent 
manner across  business boundaries  and  between  systems  regardless  of  technology, 
application or platform. Aligning the Interoperable attributes provides Enterprises with 
the ability to process, store and transfer, information across multiple domains, services 
and technologies.  
                                                        
 
27 Enterprise Architecture (EA) is a comprehensive view of an enterprise. EA shows the primary 
components of an enterprise and depicts how these components interact with or relate to each other. 
EA typically encompasses an overview of the entire information system in an enterprise; including the 
software,  hardware,  and  information  architectures.  In  this  sense,  EA  is  a  meta-architecture.  As 
regards,  EA  contains  different  views  of  an  enterprise,  including,  work,  function,  process,  and 
information, it is at the highest level in the architecture pyramid (Ostadzadeh & Shams, 2011) Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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The DoD through its Global Information Grid (GIG) architecture has formulated these 
attributes  (Procedure,  Application,  Infrastructure  and  Data)  to  create  cross  domain 
interconnectivity and coalition operability to an unified approach. The DoD’s 5-Levels 
of  Information  System  Interoperability  (LISI)  model  provides  a  dynamically 
accommodating  meta-level  structure.    The  model  reflects  the  nature  of  the  cross-
domain  where  the  relation  between  technical  and  operational  interoperability  is 
neither proportional nor linear (Chen, Doumeingts, & Vernadat, 2008). 
 
It is possible that two commanders, who share the same command and control facilities, 
in  particular  having  the  same  C4ISR  system  support,  make  decisions  that  are 
contradictive or sub-optimal. It is also possible that two commanders supported by C4ISR 
systems that are not interoperable on the technical level are fighting very well together. 
(Tolk & Muguira, 2003). This inability within the Defence realm to provide coherent 
and  optimised  cross-domain  solutions  has  cost  billions  of  US  dollars  and  there’s  a 
further  increase  in  future  expenditure  to  ensure  interoperability  brings  specific 
benefits and reducing the plethora of challenges currently beholding the technical and 
operational  perspectives.    The  military  have  recognised  that  their  CDS  ability  to 
simulate and emulate disparate systems of systems, producing laboratories that create 
synthetic  environments  of  Red  (CNA  &  CNE),  Blue  (CNM  &  CND),  White  (Digital 
Analysis and Forensics) and Green (Command and Control) cyber facilities (such the 
ranges created at DSTL and DCCIS) promote the current train as you fight philosophy 
and improved CDS alignment. The expansion of individual activities to collaborative 
working environments through System Simulation, Systems-in-the-Loop and Modelling 
is an important step to understanding real and virtual (as per Figure 20) attributes that 
effect the layers of interoperability and the Human-Computer Interfaces and how they 
work  within  Enterprises.  Bournemouth  University,  its  2018  Strategic  Plans 
incorporates the building of such a cluster of Cyber laboratories that will enables fusion 
of research, education and practical /kinetic learning to investigate the social-technical 
impact  of  CDS  to  large  –scaled  systems.  The  use  of  standards  and  enterprise 
architecture as illustrated in figure 66 provided a Joint Action Concept of the Layers of 
Coalition Interoperability (LCI) and formulated MoD’s Information Strategy linking EA, 
Skills  and  IA  as  the  main  pillars  of  its  Information  Domain  (MoD,  2009).  The  LCI 
framework defines Enterprise Architecture as adaptive and innovative methodology for 
interoperability (Smith D. B., 2005) as it identified architectural mechanisms that could 
accommodate  Enterprise  changes  with  minimal impact  as  it  deals  with  the  various 
layers of semantic interoperability in coalition operations.  
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The  System  of  Systems  Interoperability  (SOSI)  model  developed  by  Software 
Engineering Institute at Carnegie Mellon University (Morris, Levine, Meyers, Place, & 
Plakosh, 2004) had addressed technical and operational interoperability of the DoD 
and  NATO  layered  models  and  further  progressed  the  challenges  of  organizations 
building  and  maintaining  interoperable  systems.  SOSI  introduces  three  types  of 
interoperability: (1) Programmatic, interoperability between different program offices. 
(2) Constructive, interoperability between the organizations that are responsible for 
the  construction  (and  maintenance)  of  a  system.  (3)  Operational,  interoperability 
between  the  systems.  Taking  the  Zachman  Enterprise  the  NCIOC  model  and  the 
additional SOSI concepts a matrix of the layers of interoperability across a business 
process can be represented as illustrated in Figure 21.  
 
 
Figure 21: Composite Model of Interoperability (Richardson, C.J., 2010) 
The  contents  of  interoperations  is  represented  by  the  2-dimensional  Enterprise 
Architectural  matrix  (abstract  ×  perspective)  produced  by  Zachman.    This  matrix 
defines what can take place in various levels of the Enterprise perspectives. The 3rd 
dimension enables the analyst to capture the structure and type of interoperation from 
the NCIOC 9-levels. The cross-domain solutions can now be analysed as a Functioning 
Enterprise  within  composite  cuboids  (P-S-D  =  Physical  –  Scope-  Data,  etc.)  as 
highlighted in the above model. There are 378 composite cuboids within the model; 
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each  one  can  be  used  to  define  the  contents  of  Enterprise  interoperations.  The 
Alignment  and  Harmonisation  of  technical  to  operational  issues  is  construed  from 
matching each Enterprise’s Composite Cuboid to their respective counter-parts within 
the coalition. 
Cyber Network Operations 
Conventional  architecture  has  developed  Information  Operations  around  Computer 
Science and the employment of Computer Network Operations. In the 21st Century, 
Computing is subservient to Cyber (networking of computing devices, routers switches, 
firewalls and applications). Hence Figure 3 (earlier introduced in Chapter 1, p55) has a 
new legend: 
 
Legend  Proposed New Convention 
CNO  Cyber Network Operations     
CNA  Cyber Network Attacks  CNE  Cyber Network Exploitation 
CNM  Cyber Network Management  CND  Cyber Network Defence 
IX  Information Exploitation  IM  Information Management 
 
Cyberspace can be structured by Enterprise Architecture and cyber network manage 
(CNM) to exploit the Information assets (IX) for the business whilst been designed to 
reduce  vulnerabilities  and  prevent  threats  by  adopting  robust  and  resilient  IA 
architecture  to  develop  appropriate  defences  (CND).    The  Information  Assurance 
policies and practices will manage (IM) the Information Services across the deployed 
systems and Information Infrastructures. Its trust and risk management will reduce the 
threats  from  Cyber-attacks  (CNA)  and  insider  exploitation  and  privacy  violations 
(CNE). )ur systems require new software monitoring tools, more Network Management 
integration,  automated  traffic  analysis  and  building  greater  trust  through  our 
Assurance  Practitioners  working  and  controlling  security  mechanisms  across  other 
coalition  networks.  These  practitioners  (which  we  need  more off)  will  also  require 
better education and increased transferable skills and this is examined in chapter 4 
(Education and Profession). 
 
We need competent, educated professionals to run our systems, secure the information 
infrastructures;  men  who  understand  the  complexities  of  interoperability  from  a 
strategic, operational and tactical level, from the technical issues of data interfacing and 
security  devices  to  the  more  intricate  problems  of  sensitive  information  flows  and Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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organisational responsibilities. Cross-Domain Solutions needs new initiatives, finance 
and better strategy to secure Cyberspace as stated in the revised US Comprehensive 
National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI) (Obama, 2010).  The CNCI was launched by 
President  George  W.  Bush  in  National  Security  Presidential  Directive  54/Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive 23 (NSPD-54/ HSPD-23) in January 2008 and stated that 
it was a mutually reinforcing initiative: 
 
  To establish a front line of defense against today’s immediate threats by 
creating or enhancing shared situational awareness of network vulnerabilities, 
threats, and events within the Federal Government—and ultimately with state, 
local, and tribal governments and private sector partners—and the ability to 
act quickly to reduce our current vulnerabilities and prevent intrusions. 
  To defend against the full spectrum of threats by enhancing U.S. 
counterintelligence capabilities and increasing the security of the supply chain 
for key information technologies. 
  To strengthen the future cyber security environment by expanding cyber 
education; coordinating and redirecting research and development efforts 
across the Federal Government; and working to define and develop strategies 
to deter hostile or malicious activity in cyberspace. 
In  2007  the  UK  issued  its  National  Information  Assurance  Strategy  (Cabinet  Office, 
2007) to manage the risk involved in social-technical systems. Information Assurance 
offers a panacea to the interoperability, providing a new methodology and better way 
of ensuring safe operations of systems of systems and an its architecture provides an 
understanding required culturally change our use of information, its processes, storage 
and its transition from one domain to another .In managing the Enterprise risks, we 
need to understand the advancement and agility of the threats (as illustrated in the 
timeline in Figure 22). 
 
The residue of countless scripted attacks, trojans, viruses, worms and the growth of 
Advanced Persistent Threat Attacks (spear fishing and social engineering) with their 
various APT attack vectors ( advanced evasion techniques - AETs) and zero-day attacks 
(e.g.  Flame,  Stuxnet  and  Duqu)  At  present  the  cyber-defence  countermeasures 
(firewalls, IDS, Anti-virus, etc.) provide reasonable protection to most attacks, but these 
systems are also regularly penetrated (externally and internally) and we have to resign 
ourselves to the likelihood that our systems are compromised and we have intruders 
(Abadi, 2000; Carr, 2005; Schiller, et al., 2007; Vidanage, 2009; Cabinet Office, 2011). Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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Figure 22: A timeline of Computing and Cyber Insecurity (Richardson C. J., 2011) 
The strategic issues surrounding the need to defend our human-cyber interfaces, the 
applications  and  services,  the  systems,  networks  and  our  social-technical 
infrastructures are investigated. To bridge the capability gap to creating robust and 
resilient  Communication  and  Information  systems  requires  strategic  (international) 
initiatives to secure cyberspace. These initiatives should include: 
 
  A strategic doctrine for assured Information handling and storage 
  The effectively control the DIME usage of Cyber Power 
  The provision of trust and risk management across coalition interconnections – 
cross domain solutions. 
  Enhanced operational capabilities to create cyber-shared situational awareness 
and cyber defence. 
  The development of intrusion tolerant and prevention systems 
  Targeted funding of Cyber Defence Research and Development  
  Creation of an Information Assurance Profession with a Code of Practice 
  Provision of IA education and skills training 
These initiatives are evolutionary and revolutionary in nature, stemming from the early 
strategic military thinking of Network Centric Warfare and NATO’s Network Enabled 
Capability  (NNEC)  and  the  technical  advances  in  CPU  capabilities,  communication 
media,  storage  &  retrieval  systems,  data  (and  knowledge)  mining,  hosted  services, 
mash-ups,  architecture  and  cloud  computing  allow  for  increased  efficiencies, 
complexities,  emergent  capabilities,  revolutionising  operations  and  how  they  are 
conducted, resourced, financed, generated and expanded. Where processes enhanced Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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with  techniques  such  as  SaaS,  SOA,  Virtualisation,  Geospatial  identification  and 
Business Intelligence generate emergent behaviours with a plethora of new businesses, 
Knowledge  and  Information  exploitations.  The  holistic  complexities  and  risk  of 
interoperability, managing, maintaining, and utilising these unified technologies and 
system architectures contribute to an increasing chaotic Information Infrastructure of 
an  evolving  cyberspace  that  presents  many  unpredictable  obstacles  to  effective 
operations  and  their  assurance  as  well  as  exposing  gaps  in  our  knowledge  and 
understanding. 
 
“A  competency  is  more than  just  knowledge  and skills.  It  involves  the  ability  to  meet 
complex demands, by drawing on and mobilising psychosocial resources (including skills 
and attitudes) in a particular context. For example, the ability to communicate effectively 
is a competency that may draw on an individual’s knowledge of language, practical IT 
skills and attitudes towards those with whom he or she is communicating,” OECD, 2005. 
 
With our increasing national dependence of cyber domain operations, the competency 
of our Cyber Defence Communities, Security Industries and Governing bodies such as 
the UN’s International Telecommunication Union (ITU); US Department of Homeland 
Defence; European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) and the UK’s 
new National Crime Agency (NCA) is both tested and exposed.  It is estimated that, 
worldwide,  more  than  one  million  people  become  victims  of  cybercrime  every  day 
(Europa, 2012). These organisations need to demonstrate and provide national (and 
international)  leadership  to  combat  advance  persistent  threats;  attacks;  cyber 
(malicious) network exploitation and the inappropriate use of Cyber Power.  
 
There  is  nothing  more  difficult  to  take  in  hand,  more  perilous  to  conduct,  or  more 
uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of things. 
Because  the  innovator  has  for  enemies  all  those  who  have  done  well  under  the  old 
conditions and lukewarm defenders in those who may do well under the new.    
                Machiavelli, The Prince 
Machiavelli understood the apparatus of state power, but do our states understand the 
uses, consequences and global effectiveness of Cyber Power (see annex 4).  The Cyber 
domain has new and emergent properties that we do not fully understand nor able to 
produce  a  satisfactory  risk  assessment.  Consequently  these  State  Actors,  Corporate 
Executives and Academic leaders need to become more agile, engaged, educated and 
coherent  in  their  resolution  to  defend  the  Cyber  Information  Age  and  shape  their 
organisations to meet this tier-1 national security risk (Edwards, 2007). These same Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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communities of interest also need to generate greater awareness of how cyber risks are 
causing  fear,  uncertainty  and  doubt  (the  FUD  Contagion,  p158)  with  their  citizens, 
workforce  and  militaries.  The  global  population  requirements  for  the  Cyber 
Information  Age  call  for  (a)  better  comprehension  of  cyberspace;  (b)  greater 
understanding the consequences of interconnectivity; (c) recognising their own limited 
knowledge and competencies and (d) have greater access to better information and 
better education. Furthermore, with 68% of Europeans believing that online personal 
information has not been kept secure by public bodies as demonstrated in figure 74 
and  59%  of  EU  citizens  do  not  feel  very  or  at  all  well  informed  about  the  risks  of 
cybercrime and that these needs have become matters of grave concern  (European 
Commission, 2012). This public perception of insecurity and lack of confidence with 
authorities to provide adequate protection is often exploited by the media  Most EU 
citizens say they have seen or heard something about cybercrime in the last 12 months 
(73%),  and  this  is  most likely  to  have  been from television,    (European  Commission, 
2012), as well as more insidious individuals, organisations and state actors.   
 
This EU report also stated that:  
12% of internet users across the EU have experienced online fraud, and 8% have 
experienced  identity  theft.  13%  have  not  been  able  to  access  online  services 
because of cyber-attacks. In addition: 
  More than a third (38%) say they have received a scam email, including 
10% who say that this is something that has happened to them often; 
  15%  of  internet  users  say  that  they  have  accidentally  encountered 
material which promotes racial hatred or religious extremism. 
Internet users express high levels of concern about cyber security: 
  89% agree that they avoid disclosing personal information online; 
  74% agree that the risk of becoming a victim of cybercrime has increased 
in the past year; 
  72% agree that they are concerned that their online personal information 
is not kept secure by websites; 
  66% agree that they are concerned that information is not kept secure by 
public authorities. 
The majority of internet users in the EU (61%) are concerned about experiencing identity 
theft. Around half of internet users are concerned about: accidentally discovering child 
pornography online (51%); online fraud (49%); and scam emails (48%). In addition, 43% Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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are concerned about not being able to access online services because of cyber-attacks, and 
41%  are  concerned  about  accidentally  encountering  material  which  promotes  racial 
hatred or religious extremism.    (European Commission, 2012). 
 
Despite  widespread  media  attention  and  warnings  around  Flame,  Stuxnet,  Duqu 
viruses and other APT attacks; many EU CERT advice organizations relying on Critical 
Information  Infrastructures  (CII),  supervisory control  and  data  acquisition  (SCADA) 
and other industrial control system (ICS) networks to be vigilant against conventional 
network threats. These threats pose a far greater threat to Enterprise network security, 
and  include  gaps in security  infrastructure, social  engineering  exploits  (Insider  and 
other actors), advanced evasion techniques and simple denial of service (DOS) attacks. 
The  social-technical  cyber  environment  is  constantly  threatened  from  the  growing 
dangers of cyber-hooliganism, cyber-crime, cyber-terrorism and cyber-war. Corporate 
Enterprise, especially those that own considerable CIS assets in our Critical Information 
Infrastructures are beginning to understand that this digital environment facilitates 
considerable scepticism, insecurity and distrust, particularly at their inability to defend 
and secure digital assets (Kramer F. D., Starr, Wentz, & Zimet, 2007; Cabinet Office, 
2010; Anderson & Rainie, 2010). 
 
The Information Age has created a new paradigm for human competency evolution 
with the globalisation of societies, communities of interests and enterprises through 
the medium of the virtual space. The creation of the man-made Cyberspace domain has 
many  opportunities  (exploitive  and  complex)  for  the  UK’s  and  global  Economy 
(enterprise  and  products),  Knowledge  Transfer  (artificial  and  real  Intelligence, 
Knowledge,  Experience  and  Wisdom),  Social  Informatics  and  Engineering 
(communities and alternate societies) and Individual Competencies (skills, creation and 
innovation)  generating  new  ways  we  can  exploit  Knowledge,  Information  and  Data 
(KID) sources within existing systems and the emerging cyberspace with it diverse and 
expanding  applications  and  services.    Four  distinct  environmental  drivers  can  be 
identified that propels this paradigm, Expansion, Evolution, Expense and Exploitation.  
Our  cyber  defence  communities  need  to  create  and  provide  better  strategic 
understanding  of  the  cyber  environment  across  these  networks  of  networks  that: 
evolve  (new  technologies,  services  and  applications),  expand  (interconnections, 
multiplexing, virtual domains and new deployments), exploit (data mining, business 
intelligence  and  knowledge  transfer)  and  expend  (financial,  technical  and  human 
resources). The Cyber Domain needs better Assurance! Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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Cyber War, Cyber Crime 
In  understanding  the  Digital  Domain,  the  thesis  methodology  identified  the  Threat 
Domain (Threat Agenda, Attack Profiles and Security Compromises) as a key avenue of 
discovery (Figure 24, page 78). Strategically the United Nations  have created a Cyber 
Security  Alliance  to  address  the  Cyber Threat  Agenda.  Headquartered in Cyberjaya, 
Malaysia, The International Multilateral Partnership Against Cyber Threats (IMPACT) 
agency is administered through the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and 
was  the  first  comprehensive  global  ITU  public-private  partnership  (Governments, 
Industry  and  Academia)  against  cyber  threats.  IMPACT  addresses  the  ITU’s  Global 
Cybersecurity Agenda (GCA) which is the UN’s framework for international cooperation 
to enhance global confidence and security in the information society (ITU, 2008) 
 
“Cyber criminals are an ever present menace in every country connected to the Internet. 
Organized crime has been on the rise because the Internet has proved a low risk, lucrative 
business.  This is due to the fact that loopholes in national and regional legislation still 
remain, making it difficult to effectively track down criminals.  The main problem is the 
lack of international harmonization regarding cybercrime legislation.  Investigation and 
prosecution are difficult if the categorization of crimes differs from country to country. 
 Some efforts to address this challenge have been undertaken, and although very valuable, 
they  are  still  insufficient.  The  Internet  is  an  international  communication  tool  and 
consequently, any solution to secure it must be sought at the global level.” (ITU, 2008) 
 
There are a plethora of attack vectors to our fragile (and some say often defenceless) 
critical Information infrastructure as illustrated Figure 23. These vectors range from a 
Cyber  Pearl  Harbour  attack  (possible  weapon  of  mass  destruction),  with  total 
meltdown of systems and societies heading towards anarchy; to Cyber Terrorism (anti-
establishment  motivated  attacks);  to  organised  Cyber  Crime  and  its  risk  to  e-
commerce;  to  the  insidious  nature  of  cyber  harassment  and  bullying  (destroying 
confidence and trust in our children): to the simple failures of ignorance and not been 
aware of the threats within this domain of domains (Colonel Kelley, US Army, 2008).  
These multi-layered, multilateral, multidimensional domains (Held and McGrew, 2010) 
are  often  without  boundaries,  easily  migrating  and  superimposing  on  each  other, 
influencing and determining different outcomes which requires complex analysis to 
find any resolution in this chaos (Vitas, 2001; Gordon, 2007 and Majoris, 2010). The 
ease  of  moving  from  one  domain  characterised  by  the  lack  understanding  and  the 
vulnerabilities of a Botnet client; to the risks of all out Cyberwar or some terrorist Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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codifying some catastrophic event is just a mouse click, buts the effects are often global, 
instant and often ruinous (Lewis, 2002 and Bracken, 2007).   
 
Figure 23: The Plethora of Attack Vectors to Cyberspace (Richardson C. J., 2008b) 
 
Figure 23 provides a framework to understanding the linkages between the different 
threat profiles. These differences create components of the threat agenda within the 
Thesis methodology and briefly discussed as follows: 
 
The Cyber Pearl Habor is a State on State Cyber Attack, launched by a hostile state (or a 
state sponsored organisation) who have the capability to wield a massive debilitating 
cyber-attack  that  would  effectively  paralyze  a  country  and  constitutes  a  Clear  and 
Present Danger that potentially (according to the recent testimonial from US Secretary 
of Defence, Leon Panetta at the Department of Defense (DOD) budget hearing held by 
the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense) “shutting down financial systems, 
releasing  chemicals  from  chemical  plants,  releasing  water  from  dams,  shutting  down 
power systems that can affect the very survival of a nation,” (Mora, 2012). 
 
The Catastrophic Cyber Event is an exploitable national disaster (such as Hurricane 
Katrina) where people leave their systems unlocked owing to an immediate threat to 
themselves  or  their  families.  A  hostile  State  (or  organisation)  may  then  launch  a 
clandestine first strike upon the Critical Information Infrastructure to exacerbate the 
situation to cause further economic and social damage. The military would also argue Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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that  chemical,  Biological,  Radiological  and  Nuclear  (CBRN)  would  also  cause  a 
Catastrophic  Cyber  Event.  US  Senator  Whitehouse  described  the  consequences  of 
failure  in  protecting  the  US  Critical  Infrastructure  could  be  catastrophic  –  “We  all 
recognize this as a profound threat to this country, to its future, to its economy, to its very 
being,” (US Congress, 2012). 
 
The concepts of Cyber War have made considerable impact on DIME strategic thinking. 
The book Cyber War (Clarke & Knake, 2010) defines "cyber warfare" as "actions by a 
nation-state to penetrate another nation's computers or networks for the purposes of 
causing damage or disruption.” The Economist article entitled Cyberwar: It is time for 
countries  to  start  talking  about  arms  control  on  the  internet  (2010) 
describes cyberspace as "the fifth domain of warfare," and the US Deputy Secretary of 
Defense, (Lynn, 2010) had stated that "as a doctrinal matter, the Pentagon has formally 
recognized cyberspace as a new domain in warfare… [which] has become just as critical 
to  military  operations  as  land,  sea,  air,  and  space.  HMG has  developed  weapons  to 
counter the cyber threat and “will strike first to protect itself…We will defend ourselves in 
every way we can, not only to deflect but to prevent attacks that we know are taking 
place”  according  to  the  UK’s  Foreign  Secretary  William  Hague  (Dunn  T.  N.,  2011). 
However, studies are incredulous to the possibility of successful deterrence against 
cyber-attacks, in particular to the requirements for success: the existence of capability 
(weapons),  the  credibility  of  the  threat,  and  the  ability  to  convey  the  threatening 
message to the potential challenger (Lupovici, 2011). 
 
Cyber Operations is about actively (or passively) operating in your adversary’s OODA 
loop (as discussed in Chapter 3, p 149).  NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of 
Excellence (NATO CCD COE) stated that “Strategists must be aware that part of every 
political  and  military  conflict  will  take  place  on  the  internet”  (Geers,  2008)  and 
conducting  cyber  network  operations  (CNO)  facilitates  espionage,  cyber  network 
attacks (CNA) and cyber network exploitation (CNE) attacks to disrupt, compromise or 
undermine  the  adversary’s  decision  cycles  and  Information  Operations  (Alberts  & 
Papp, 2001; Armistead, Information Operations Matters: Best Practices, 2010). 
 
Cyber  Terrorism  and  caused-based hackavist groups  have  become  an  increasing 
international  problem as  the motivation,  expertise,  tools  and  techniques needed  for 
cyber-attacks have  become  more  widely  available.  “Darknets,  which  enable  users  to 
share content anonymously, are also likely to become more popular. Cloud computing will 
enable terrorists to store and distribute material in a more robust way, which can then be Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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encrypted and configured to work with smartphones”. Al-Qa'ida has explicitly called for 
"cyber-jihad” and Jonathan Evans, the UK’s MI5 Director has stated that the “Criminals 
and  rival  states  are  using  cyber  terrorism  on  an  'industrial  scale'  to  attack  Britain's 
Government and its biggest businesses, (revealing that) one company lost £800 Million 
Sterling as a result of state-sponsored espionage. Terror groups (such as) al Qaida will 
use hacking to steal secrets and damage systems,” (Robinson M. , 2012) 
 
Cyber motivated by money and the lack of law enforcement “cybercrime has become 
more  profit-driven  and  is  shifting  away  from  Windows-based  PCs  to  other  operating 
systems and platforms, including smart phones, tablet computers and mobile platforms in 
general,” (Shinder,  2011)  The  cost  of  cybercrime  to  individuals,  corporations, 
governments and society in general will continue to climb. According to a 2011 study 
by the UK’s Office of Cyber Security and Information Assurance (Holden, 2011), the 
British economy lost £27 billion pounds sterling attributed to cyber-crime, with most of 
that being shouldered by UK business. 
 
Cyber Harassment, Cyber Bullying, Cyber-stalking and Cyber Grooming are the most 
insidious of all the types of cyber-attacks, being highly targeted upon an individual 
(often  people  with  inexperience  and/or  mental  or  physical  disabilities)  in  the 
workplace, at schools or in the home. Online perpetrators, predators and stalkers often 
pretend  to  be  children  or  friends  and start  online  conversations  with  their  victims 
through  social  sites.  They  may  try  to  continue  the  relationship  in  personal 
conversations on mobile phones (sometimes known as whispering), via private chat 
rooms or produce negative, derogative and harmful images, videos and text across the 
social sites such as YouTube, Facebook or Instant Messaging channels (Cyber Smart, 
2009). 
 
Cyber Intrusion and privacy is about the easy accessibility of data and information held 
on systems about individuals.  There is a lot of information on individuals that can be 
gleamed  /  gathered  unobtrusively  from  the  Internet  which  could  be  used  to  the 
individual’s  disadvantage  or  for  some  criminal  exploit  or  social  engineering  attack. 
Often seen as passive attacks, these intrusions, ghosting and data mining activities build 
up considerable intelligence on enterprises, their employees and personal lives. 
 
Cyber Awareness attributes the lack of understanding, poor skills or the ignorance of 
people  operating  applications,  services  and  infrastructure  devices  in  cyberspace. 
Governments need to educate their citizens on the potential harm that cyberspace has, Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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as  well  as  its  benefits  of  social  and  e-commerce  applications.  The  OECD  (2005) 
identified that a nation can gain a collective return from cyber awareness as illustrated 
in figure 24. 
 
Figure 24: OECD framework relating individual competencies (OECD, 2005) 
 
Underpinning the attack profile components in figure 23 is the duplicity of benefits/ 
disbenefits (a benefit becoming an opportunity as well as a threat) to cyberspace that 
was illustrated by the Cyber-Janus28 (capturing the nature of Janus) and coupling it to 
the Black and White Hat communities of cybercrime and prevention. These Black Hat / 
White Hat communities represents the two main perspective to cyberspace; the first 
face presenting the ubiquitous nature of cyber-space and how it affects our lives in a 
positive manner; the sharing environment of our work and workplace; the electronic 
global commerce and its interconnections of communities and government; and then 
the second face, the shady and shadow side of spamming, threats, hostilities, malware, 
crime, terrorism and warfare. That Cyberspace represents information and knowledge 
systems as strategic national assets and also has become a tier -1 strategic national 
threat (Cabinet Office, 2010). 
   
                                                        
 
28 Janus of Roman Mythology was the god of doorways and time. Representing him in the 21st 
Century as Cyber-Janus symbolizes change and transitions, the Good (White) and Evil (Black) 
within the Cyber Domain, of one condition to another across many virtual domains. Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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Strategic Direction for Cyberspace 
The internet is the digital global community and a coherent international strategy for is 
use and security is essential. The emerging international landscape can be seen through 
a European Union (EU) or United Nations (UN) perspective /lens where the physicality 
and pervasiveness of cyberspace across the world’s societies has given this man-made 
domain  considerable  depth  (Technological,  Social,  Economic  and  Psychological)  as 
illustrated by the EU’s concepts in Figure 25.  Surprisingly the EU study into the future 
shaping of the Internet (European Commission, 2010) found that Technology wasn’t a 
key  driver  and  although  Economic  and  Social  issues  had  an  impact,  it  was  the 
psychology of trust and at its the core was are the Information Assurance issues of 
privacy, protection, security and reliability. The United Nations has sought to control 
the Power of Cyberspace through its own technical authority. The UN’s International 
Telegraph Union (ITU) is the only UN agency with partnerships between government 
and industry and its activities towards cyber security has been to establish and follow a 
set of fundamental rules formulated at by the WSIS and the 2006 ITU Plenipotentiary 
Conference (ITU, 2006).  
 
 
Figure 25: Fundamental principles by overlapping domains                                    
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The ITU was tasked to build confidence and security in the use of Communication and 
Information  Systems,  facilitate  cooperation  among  public and  private  organisations, 
and  to  foster  education  and  training  initiatives.  Global  leaders,  communities  and 
institutions  participating  in  the  WSIS  and  its  own  member  states  representatives 
further  entrusted  the  ITU  to  take  concrete  steps  towards  curbing  the  threats  and 
vulnerabilities related to information society resulting in resolution 130. Whereby, the 
ITU (ITU, 2006) was requested to give high priority to building confidence and security 
in the use of information and communication technologies, and in Resolution 149 to 
clarify definitions and terminology relating to building confidence and security in the 
use of CIS.  In order to raise awareness the ITU (ITU-D & ITU-T) has since organised a 
succession of workshops to establish their framework of cyber security and critical 
information infrastructure protection and these workshop’s purpose were defined as: 
 
  Identify changes faced by countries and develop frameworks for cyber security 
and Critical Information infrastructures (CII), share experience and considered 
the best practices. 
 
  Disseminate  information  on  the  ITU  cyber  security  work  program  to  assist 
developing  countries  and  the  ITU-D  study  group  question  22/1:  securing 
information and communication networks: Best practices for developing a culture 
of cyber security. 
 
  Disseminate  information  on  unrelated  technical  security  standards  activities 
developing/being developed by standardisation organisations, and in particular 
related to ITU at-T activities; 
 
  And  review  the  roles  of  various  actors  (e.g.  governments,  service  providers, 
academia, city since, etc) in promoting a culture of cyber security. 
(ITU, 2007) 
 
At  the  national  level,  the  ITU  categorises  it  as  a  shared  responsibility  requiring 
coordinated action related to the prevention, preparation, response, and recovery from 
incidents on the part of government authorities, the private sector and citizens. At the 
regional and international level, the ITU has sought cooperation and coordination with 
relevant partners to formularise and implement national frameworks for cyber security 
and critical information infrastructure protection through a comprehensive approach 
(ITU,  2011).  However,  even  this  global  cooperation  has  rooted  misconceptions, 
misgivings, resistance and denial. 
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The urgency to control emergent cyber technologies, to manage access to sensitive and 
critical information infrastructures may be beyond the reach of the United Nations. 
NATO, as a military organisation has now taken a more prominent role (although not 
inclusive  of  many  of  the  global  players  such  as  China,  Russia,  India  and  Brazil)  in 
creating the direction and purpose of Cyber Power. However the US and UK (and many 
EU  countries  are  beginning  to)  have  made  it  their  national  priority.  There  are  a 
plethora of Cyber Strategy Initiatives been produced by authorities, but only the US 
White House directives (Obama, The Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative, 
2010) have had the considerable financial resources to implement the strategies. The 
UK Government has shown a willingness to develop a comprehensive cyber strategy 
(Cabinet Office, 2010), it now needs to find the finance to fund its development and in 
particular  in  the  research  of  new  assurance  techniques,  trust  management  and  IA 
Education to promote and sustain a new Assurance Culture.  
 
2.4  Positioning Information Assurance at the 
Heart of Cyber Operations  
 
 
Figure 26: Strategic Positioning of Information Assurance in the Business Process 
The strategic purpose of employing Information Assurance to the Enterprise’s Business 
Process (in particular to the processes of Information Asset Management, IAM) is to 
enable trusted transactions, storage (and retrieval) and CIS operations; harmonising 
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to  ensure  the  protection  of  its  intellectual  and  knowledge  capital.  Failure  in 
inappropriate  usage,  deployment  or  implementation  of  employing  Information 
Assurance Architectures (IA2) can result in serious financial loss, reputational damage 
and stakeholder’s value to the Enterprise, as illustrated in figure 26. Four components 
of the Thesis Methodology (Purpose, Environment, Capability and Culture) were based 
on the Johnson and Scholes’ Exploring Corporate Strategy Model (Johnson, Scholes, & 
Whittington, 2008). The positioning of Information Assurance at the heart of Cyber 
(Information) Operations is this Thesis’s business model and in particular how assured 
services, information and other assets flow between interoperating partners. 
 
Understanding the needs of the User Community to seamessly transfer knowledge to 
provide  Situation Awareness (SA) and Superior Decision making requires recipicol 
cognitation  and  understanding  of  the  Information  and  Knowledge  flows,  content, 
structure  and  timeliness.  Cyberspace  provides  a  3-Dimensional  bridge  (Visual, 
Innovation and Virtual) between the REAL and VIRTUAL Domains of Information flow, 
acting as the continuum between these two domain  and transforming operations from 
a good to an assured state. 
 
The  desired  future  state  of  cyber  operational  security  and  the  aspiration  of  most 
security organisations is  the maintainance  of  their  systems in  a  good state,  fault  & 
intrusion  tolerant  and  resilient  to  purposeful  attacks,  natural  events  and  fault 
conditions (error, fault, failure). The positioning IA strategy is to transform the system 
surviability  (  organisational  responsiveness,  agility  and  continuity,  robust  system 
architecture and tolerances, data dependability and operational / system safety) and its 
ability  to  provide  Human-cyber  interexchange  (tusted,  risked  managed,  secure  and 
with  appropriate  protection)  into    an  Assured  State.    The  overriding  purpose  of 
positioning  IA  (as  illustrated  in  Figure  27)  at  the  heart  of  strategic  plans  for 
Information  (Doctrines,  Strategies  and  Operational  policies)  is  to  provide  the 
Enterprise  (its  social-technical  environment)  the  capability  to  withstand  fault 
conditions whilst maintaining operational efficiency and value. Information Assurance 
has  to  meet  the  expectations  of  the  DIME  communities  of  interest  and  the  greater 
global population that is becoming increasing reliant on cyberspace and the Internet of 
Things. In part this Thesis is attempting to create a culture change through its argued 
methodology, to adopt and develop its models. 
 
The strategic position of Information Assurance and its Security Mechanisms within the 
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Policy (2010). The Government data structures, Information stacks, the knowledge and 
understandings  that  are  exploited,  the  needs  for,  and  keeping,  qualified  cyber 
operatives  and  the  ability  to  achieve  cyber  situational  awareness  have  now  been 
recognised as Strategic Assets. These cyber structures and silos should be trusted and 
made safe, secure and available and where the failure to protect these assets would 
significantly impact on individual’s lives, society and government functionality within 
the UK (CESG, 2007).  
 
To qualify the significance of the Economic, Political and Military Values of the strategic 
value of the Information Assets (that we hold and use) we need to understand the 
benefits  of the decision making process that enables Situational Awareness and the 
impact it has to our future.   
 
Figure 27 Strategic Goal of Information Assurance (Richardson C. J., 2008b) 
We  need  to  determine  the  impact  of  policies,  doctrine  and  working  environment, 
securing  the  department’s  strategic  capability  (offence,  defence,  resource  and 
competences) and the expectation of politicians and the general public.  Toffler (1991) 
expressed this as part of this Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA); however such a 
revolution  incurs  Enterprise  risk.  Risk  Assessment,  Analysis,  Management  and 
Exploitation should be directed, reassessed and processed throughout the revolving 
and  evolving  delivery  of  strategic,  operational  and  tactical  change  (the  changing 
Environment,  Capability  and  Culture).  Adapting  the  Johnson  and  Scholes  (2008) 
Strategic Position Model. 
Purpose
Environment
Capability and 
Culture Change
• Assuring the Right Information, to 
the Right People at the Right Time!
•The Need to Share across security 
domains dependable, safe , secure, 
and trusted Information
•Resilient
•Safe
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•Risked Managed
•Agile
•Dependable
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IA 
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The Strategic Positioning of Information 
Assurance  within  cyber  policy  and 
doctrine can be derived from the many 
attributes  (Technology,  Institutions  and 
Culture) of the interdisciplinary study of 
Social  Informatics29  (Kling, Rosenbaum, 
&  Sawyer,  2005) .    Applying  assurance 
processes  to  design  of  information 
exchange  (policy,  economic  or  social 
context, education, media and electronic) 
in society and to the system functions 
(management, administration, economic, 
political  and  operational)  of  how 
information is used.    The key concept 
of  Social  Informatics  is  that  the  social 
scientist view ICTs as a socio-technical network of artefacts, social contexts, and their 
relationships (Markus & Robey, 1988; Orlikowski & Iacono, 2001).  
 
The  Social  Informatics  Venn  (see  Figure  28)  combines  the  Information  Systems 
Theory30  where  every  system  is  composed  of  information,  processes  and  stores 
information, regardless of its media form (electronic  files, quantum of light rays, 
wireless etc.) to the Theory of Social Systems and Theory of Socio -Technical Systems.  
This combination, incorporating system theory, information theory, quantum theory 
and a system theoretic metaphysics has developed the System Matrix Notation which 
reifies the concept of cyberspace as a tangible coherent space with a deep metaphysical 
structure  and  the  d evelopment  of  Ogdoadic  Concept  Map  (or  Glyph)  of  the 
computational paradigm of systems and Cyberspace.  The image of an ogdoadic system 
comprising elements of Information, Interaction, External, Metric Space, Idiom, State 
Space Internal and Experience as i llustrated in Figure 29 has reposition segments in 
each inward iteration with the four model elements  - information, idiom, internal and 
external  -  forming a conceptual foundation within which the inner squares arise 
                                                        
 
29 Social informatics is the interdisciplinary study of the design, uses and consequences of 
information technologies that takes into account their interaction with institutional and cultural 
contexts. 
30 System Theory posits that everything is a system in the sense that the concept system can be 
applied to everything in a meaningful and practical sense. Every thing is a system that is 
composed of sub systems that interact to create that system and so too for each of these sub 
systems down to some ground of being. 
Theory of 
Socio-technical 
Systems
Theory of 
Social 
Systems
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Systems 
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(Anandavala, 2005). Professor Toshizumi Ohta (1999) suggested that following from 
Computational  Theory  (Carley  &  Prietula,  1994)  that  Social  Informatics  employs  an 
operational  organization  as  a  fundamental  methodology.  This  is  revisited  with  the 
development of the Assurance Model in chapter 3. 
 
The  strategic  alignment  of  the  Ogdoadic  Concept  of  Informatics  to  the  Corporate 
Strategy  Model  (Johnson,  Scholes,  &  Whittington,  2008)  encompasses  Purpose, 
Environment (external and internal), Capability (and idioms) and Culture. Moreover, an 
important  observation  of  Professor  Ohta,  as  illustrated  in  Figure  30  that  the  auto-
genesis paradigm, a phenomenon with respect to human behaviour and social systems, 
helps to describe the organizing mode in a society (Ohta T. , 1999b; Ohta, Kazunari, & 
Isamu, 2001). Internet enabled actors can submit and receive multimedia, information 
and knowledge in ever greater quantities, generating shared situational awareness and 
cyber  awareness.  The  methodology  of  operational  organization  provides  visibility, 
connectivity and the development of the Information Stack.  
 
 
Figure 29: The Ogdoadic Concept Map of the Computational Paradigm 
 
That the IA strategy model will require action (Processes, Resourcing, Practice, Changes 
and Organising) and that there are Strategic Choices (Enterprise, Foreign, Evaluation, 
Innovation  and  Departmental)  will  determine  how  expansive,  economically, 
evolutionary and exploitive the assets can be processed securely. However, with the 
growing reliance of public sector organisations on information comes an increase in the Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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impact of the post-delivery failure of the operational information infrastructure and 
elements of cyberspace.  Information Assurance has to tackle many of the threat issues. 
The first component of the Thesis Methodology and the Johnson & Scholes Model is the 
concept  of  Strategic  Purpose  which  encapsulates  the  organisations’  vision,  mission, 
governance and values.  The roles and responsibilities of the corporate managers need 
to align to new business processes and assurance of the information flows and this will 
raise  issues  of  corporate  social  responsibility  and  ethics,  (Johnson,  Scholes,  & 
Whittington, 2008) . 
 
Figure 30: A Framework of Social Information Systems (Ohta & Yamamoto, 1995) 
As an asset, information has 4 qualities: 
•  Information is about something  (e.g. a passenger timetable)  
•  Information is seen as something  (e.g. DNA or fingerprints)  
•  Information is used for something  (e.g. algorithms or instructions)  
•  Information is placed in something  (e.g. patterns or videos)  
 
The  flow  of  the  military  information  assets  across  its  5  complex  and  inter-aligned 
domains (Land, Sea, Air, Space and Cyberspace) has to be first class service. Without 
the timely and effective use of information our commander’s decisions may be become 
jaded, inappropriate or suspect.  Consequently the IA purpose is that information has to 
be  clear,  accurate,  trusted  and  not  compromised,  lost,  leaked,  disseminated, 
unauthorised, published or corrupted. In positioning IA, the strategic purpose is to: 
provide an Information Assurance Capability that will facilitate Cross –Domain Solutions. 
This  capability  will  need  a  framework  that  formulates  the  assurance  implications  of 
interoperability  within  cyberspace,  human  factors,  protection  of  networks  and  secure Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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data  content,  alignment  of  enterprise  architecture,  any  organisation  culture  changes, 
information exploitation, management and service dependability from bridging the air 
gap  between  highly  classified  networks  and  possible  interaction  with  lower  classified 
networks and the Internet and how it might be done.   
 
Information Assurance manages the risks to Government, Enterprise and Individual 
information and its security component (its 3 tenets of Confidentiality, Integrity and 
Availability- CIA) provides the necessary purpose and confidence that our information 
systems will protect the data, information and knowledge that they handle and will 
function as they need to, when they need to, under the control of legitimate users. This 
confidence is becoming increasingly important and IA is an essential enabler of the 
Transformational  Government  vision,  as  recognised  by  the  UK  National  IA  Strategy 
(2007).  The  contextual  strategic  environment  for  the  positioning  of  IA  within  the 
organisation  is  under  constant  change  owing  to  the  complex  Diplomatic  (political), 
Intelligence, Military and Economic (DIME) usage of Information around the social-
technical changes of the Enterprise, its mission and its legal framework. Furthermore 
has  skills  and  awareness  changes  in  the  workforce,  these  will  result  in  emergent 
changes to the environment and its system domains. These inter-aligned domains have 
a  complex  PESTEL31  context to a risky world of expansive utilization of the assets, 
infrastructures and the many pervasive technologies  and application. There is ever 
increasing, explosive usage of Internet PESTEL activities and associated e -business 
applications. The rate of change, its evolution has major impact on the structure and 
new direction of the MoD (Strategic Defence and Security Review, 2010)  
 
IA Capability has two main components: 
1.  System Survivability, and 
2.  Cross-Domain Solutions 
The  greater  part  of  the  strategic  capability  of  Information  Assurance  has  been 
discussed within Chapter 3 and the cross-domain solutions for system interoperability. 
One  of  the  four  Engineering  Aims  was  to  create  a  contextual  framework  for  the 
strategic  positioning  of  Information  Assurance  that  will  provide  an  assured  CIS 
environment  (see  figure  89)  and  a  capability  to  provide  resilient  and  dependable 
services  across  a  secure  and  protected  (critical)  information  infrastructures.  These 
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capability requirements are discussed as elements of a Defence Jigsaw, which when 
combined provide an integrated model for the strategic positioning of IA for System 
Survivability and Cross Domain Solutions (System Interoperability). Culture change is 
necessary,  since  the  publication  of  the  National  Information  Assurance  Strategy 
(Cabinet Office, 2007) there has been significant strategic drift and a failure to create 
necessary changes. The National Security Policy Framework (Cabinet Office, 2011) has 
produced  a  correction  to  this  drift  but  the  initiative  is  under  resourced  (there  is 
insufficient skilled practitioners working in the UK) and underfunded. The process of 
cultural change is not a primary focus of this thesis; however its paradigm influences 
every aspect of information assurance, from an historical, organisational, ethical and 
psychological  perspective.  The  impact  of  culture  needs  to  assessed  in  any  assured 
environment and the Johnson and Scholes model provides a useful methodology to 
examining  and  analysing  the  effects  of  cultural  change  using  a  Culture  Web.  By 
analysing the factors in each Venn sector as illustrated the analysis can see what is 
working, what isn't working, and what needs to be changed.   
 
The Cyber Defence Jigsaw 
The  four  methodical  components  (Purpose,  Environment,  Capability  and  Culture) 
provide a firm foundation to build a conceptual Strategic Information Assurance model 
and the established corporate cases that used the Johnson & Scholes contextual model 
has  created  additional  credibility  and  capability  for  the  IA  model’s  development. 
However, to make the positioning model more specific, manageable and utilitarian, the 
conceptual model needs to encapsulate the social-technical issues of an assured CIS 
environment. 
 
Securing Cyberspace with technology and policies to provide Cross Domain Solutions 
requires  a  practical  development  of  the  Information  Assurance  Model  and 
methodologies that will provide assurance both to the IX and IO components of the 
Information Stack (as discussed in chapter 3). For the MoD, the Information Security 
element of model also needs to meet the define roles and responsibilities of its Security 
Officers  and  the  accredited  system  security  policy  (JSP  440).  The  influence  of  the 
Assurance components (Structured, Dependable, Secure and Trusted attributes) can be 
mapped  to  the  four  elements  of  the  CIS  environment  (Communities  of  Interest, 
Systems, Networks and Facilities) as illustrated in Figure 31. The four anchoring pivots 
(Data  Security  and  Access Security  Mechanisms,  and  the  roles  and  System  Security 
Officer  and  Network  Security  Officer)  of  this  assured  model  provide  a  chain  of Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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responsibilities and activities across the 4 domains (System, Network, Facilities and 
Communities  of  Interest).  Over  layering  these  4  domains  are  the  8  components  of 
Information  assurance  (Architecture,  Resilience,  Dependability,  Safety,  Security, 
Protection, Trust and Risk Management).  
 
 
Figure 31: The Alignment of the Information Assurance across the CIS Domain 
The alignment of the information assurance can be interpreted from the observation of 
the four lines of interoperability. For example the interaction of Data across the System 
Domain is managed by the System Security Officer who is responsible for the system 
architecture (its compliance and accreditation), its resilience (the system tolerances 
and continuity) to ensure data dependability and operational safety. This operation 
manages the flow of data through the information stack (the Information Technologies 
deployed,  the  supporting  Information  Infrastructure,  the  Services  allocated,  the 
conformity and compliance Management procedures and practices and the exploitation Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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of the information for knowledge transfer and shared situational awareness. The logical 
and  risk  conditions  of  the  model  needs  to  be  tested  within  a  cyber-range  using 
corporate  simulations  and  exercised  by  some  penetration  and  fault  testing.  The 
conceptual component of this model is examined in chapter 3. 
The Perceived Risk to the Assured CIS Domain 
The Technological revolution that has radically changed the worlds of Communication, 
information-processing, health and transportation has eroded borders, altered migration 
and allowed individuals the world over to share information at a speed inconceivable two 
decades ago.                            United Nations, 2004 
 
Another  component  of  the  Cyber  Jigsaw  is  the  perceived  cyber  risk  (degrees  of 
expected and real Threats, Vulnerabilities and Impact to information systems and their 
provided services and data storage) and its effect on Government, Business, Society and 
the Military (Vatis, 2001; Whitman, 2004; and Jakobsson & Zulfikar, 2008) masks the 
actual risk (Schneier, 2006, Robert, 2006 and Jaquith, 2007). Cyber threats and the risk 
to  information  infrastructures  cause  Fears,  Uncertainties  and  Doubts  (FUD)  in 
Governments and the Online Communities. Until recently (Estonia, 2007 and Georgia, 
2008),  there  have  been  few  explicit  public  examples  of  network  catastrophes  or 
national infrastructure exposures which can be easily attributed to Cyber War (Puran, 
2003 and Baker, Waterman, and Ivanov, 2009). Analysis of cyber threats and cyber 
security  appears  to  over  emphasise  the  smart  (but  limited)  impact  of  Cyber  War 
(Paquet and Saxe, 2005) in attacking national (information) infrastructures (Jackson et 
al, 2007 and Jaquith, 2007), describing most incidents as simple criminal activities that 
intimidate citizens and e-commerce. Furthermore most nations are more robust and 
resilient to these threats: 
 
To understand the vulnerability of critical infrastructures to cyber-attack, we would need 
for each target infrastructure a much more detailed assessment of redundancy, normal 
rates of failure and response, the degree to which critical functions are accessible from 
public networks and the level of human control, monitoring and intervention in critical 
operations.                                              (Lewis, 2002) 
 
However, in 2010 Western Governments and the United Nations have escalated the 
potential damage to society of these Cyber Threats and have started to expose critical 
Infrastructure damage, cyber  war  and  cyber  terrorism  scenarios  (President  Obama, 
2010  and  Fowlie  2010).  The  US  Defence  Department  has  investigated  about  250 
‘‘serious, sophisticated’’ cyber intrusions into government networks and have concluded Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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that  these  threats  were  so  severe  that  they  now  designating  cyberspace  as  a  fifth 
domain of warfare. The US Attorney-General, Robert McClelland, said that ‘‘It’s very 
difficult to identify the source of attacks; often they can be routed through other countries 
or other players.’’ In April 2010, China Telecom briefly rerouted Internet traffic destined 
to  some  highly  sensitive  US  websites,  effectively  hijacking  the  Internet.  This  was 
reported by the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission who stated that 
the  Chinese  Telecom  Company  sent  incorrect  routing  information  destined  for  the 
websites  of  the  US  Senate,  the  Office  of  the  Secretary  of  Defence,  NASA  and  the 
Commerce Department, but they were not clear whether it was unintentional or had 
intent. The US Defence Secretary Robert Gates warned that cyber-attacks posed a huge 
future threat and urged more joined-up efforts between the US military and civilian 
agencies (BBC, 2010).  
 
The UK’s National Security Strategy (Cabinet Office, 2010) has stated that Cyber Attacks 
to be one of the biggest security threats facing the nation and has categorised it as a 
Tier  1  threat,  paring  international  terrorism  and  major  accidents.  HMG’s  Technical 
Authority  to  Cyber  Defence  and  Information  Assurance,  The  UK’s  Communications 
Intelligence  Agency  GCHQ,  indicated  the  scale  of  the  problem  to  the  National 
Information Infrastructure (NII) when its Director, Iain Lobben, revealed “that each 
month more than 20,000 “malicious” e-mails were sent to government networks, of which 
1,000 were deliberately targeted at them.” Lewis (2002) argues that: The lines between 
domestic and foreign, private and public, or police and military are blurring, and the 
nature and requirements of national security are changing rapidly. The most important 
implications of these changes for cyber security may well be that national policies must 
adjust  to  growing  interdependence  among  economies  and  emphasize  the  need  for 
cooperation  among  nations  to  defeat  cyber  threats.  The  World  Summit  on  the 
Information Society (WSIS 2003) recognized the real and significant threat posed by 
inadequate confidence and security in the use of ICTs and the proliferation of cybercrime. 
This universal recognition of the ubiquity of Information, its pervasiveness in society, 
the failing to protect the privacy of this asset has led the UN to produce the Global 
Cyber security Agenda (GCA) as a framework for international cooperation on cyber 
security32.    The  Vulnerability  (and  hence  the  risk)  of  the  National  Information 
                                                        
 
32 UN General Assembly has outlined elements for creating a global culture of cyber security 
through several resolutions, including: resolution 64/L.8 (2009)’Creation of a Global Culture of 
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Infrastructures has increased with the ubiquitous computing environment; the internet 
of things; cloud computing and mobile data mash ups that are constantly being exposed 
and threaten with the plethora of daily online activities that have become automated.  
 
The (embedded) microprocessor and Hybrid market is far greater than the PC market 
and possible Cyber-attacks like chipping (King, et al, 2008 and Adee, 2008) in this space 
are  causing  great  concerns  to  businesses,  critical  infrastructure  providers  and 
Governments. The UK’s Foreign Secretary William Hague said that, unless addressed, 
this could threaten the UK’s “economic welfare”. The risk is greater where there has 
been a vast growth and reliance to remote computer networks access, particularly by 
the mobile phone networks and other wireless systems (WiFi, WiMax, LTE, etc.) and is 
of particular concern to military authorities who have service NGO VPNs. Furthermore 
with  the  malware  such  as  the  smart  targeted  Stuxnet  Virus  there  is  an  increased 
worldwide  hacking  vulnerability  to  industrial  and  infrastructure  applications  as 
illustrated,  especially  those  used  for  SCADA  (Supervisory  Control  and  Data 
Acquisition). The global shift from proprietary networks to using the insecure open 
access TCP/IP Internet based operations has over the past 25 years created extensive 
avenues  of  inappropriate  access.  Information  Assurance  and  network  security;  law 
enforcement and cyber defences have to become more effective to ensure that critical 
and national infrastructures are robust and resilient. Modern threats are more blended 
attacks as figure 32 illustrates from its first wave hacking of individual PCs to mass 
attacks on the mobiles and the internet of things. Assuring the Internet will be a long 
and  probably  impossible  process,  but  the  first  steps  are  being  made  and  if  more 
national resources become available, just maybe we might start closing some doors. 
 
Information  Assurance  is  defined  in  HMG  IA  Standard  No  2  Risk  Management  and 
Accreditation  of  Information  Systems  (v  3.1  October  2008)  as  ‘the  confidence  that 
information systems will protect the information they handle and will function as they 
need  to,  when  they  need  to,  under  the  control  of  legitimate  users’.  The  definition’s 
language was derived from a CESG’s security perspective (the tenets of security are 
Confidentiality,  Integrity  and  Availability)  rather  from  a  more  (a)  purposeful  and 
holistic perspective of applying (b) trustworthy capabilities to Information Operations 
and  Information  Asset  Control,  (c)  creating  a  trusted  environment  to  operate  and 
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maintain the critical information infrastructures and the business processes that rely 
upon these infrastructures and (d) to change the culture of the enterprise to become 
more efficient, compliant and risk mitigating. Building the necessary architecture to 
mitigate the risks to the vulnerabilities and potential threats to the Enterprise, its CIS 
domains and Information Operations will require a number of integrated analytical and 
evaluation processes. 
 
 
 
The above figure 32 illustrates the enabling activities (Environment, People & Process 
and ICT) that surround the management, control and usage of Enterprise Information 
and the constant pressure on Assurance practitioners, employees and executives to 
mitigate the threats and risk to the Enterprise. The figure illustrates the complexity of 
the task involved in Assuring the Enterprise Information owing the numerous issues 
highlighted  that  are  often  loosely  coupled  creating  further  emergent  (and  often 
unknown) properties.  Understanding what to align within the Assurance process is 
critical to the success of its implementation. Any failure, omission or delay may result in 
a vulnerability that can readily assaulted by CNA and CNE.  The purpose of the strategic 
IA model is to give direction, governance and maturity to the Enterprise, its board 
members and employees. Its mission is to provide a structured; resilient; dependable; 
safe; secure; protected; risk managed and trusted usage of its CIS domain. 
 
  Figure 32: The HCI of Assurance and Potential Threats (Richardson & Sinderberry, 2008) Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
Engineering Doctorate  Page 101 
 
The Strategic IA Model 
"Information  is  a  significant  component  of  most  organizations’  competitive  strategy 
either by the direct collection, management, and interpretation of business information or 
the retention of information for day-to-day business processing. Some of the more obvious 
results  of  IS  failures  include  reputational  damage,  placing  the  organization  at  a 
competitive disadvantage, and contractual noncompliance. These impacts should not be 
underestimated."                                                     The IIA Research Foundation 
 
The military have many strategies, and those centred on Information Superiority and 
Information Operations (IO) are fluid at best. Information Operations is essential for 
the successful execution and efficiency of military (joint) operations. The US Military 
have drafted a new Information Operations Doctrine which emphasises its pillars (the 
domains  that  IO  owns)  and  its  core  capabilities  of  electronic  warfare,  computer 
network  operations,  psychological  operations,  military  deception,  and  operations 
security as illustrated in figure 99. The strategic importance of Information Assurance 
is  that  these  operations  are  conducted  with  trustworthy  devices,  technologies, 
networks, infrastructures, systems, services, applications, data storage and retrieval, 
architectures,  policies,  procedures  and  good  practice.  IA  has  complex  and  daunting 
requirements to fulfil. The UK’s military domain security framework (MoD, 2010) has 
structured  Information  Assurance  to  provide  trustworthiness  to  (almost)  all 
components  (except  CIS  Resilience  and  Document  Security)  of  its  CIS  Security 
Framework. Resiliency is the ability to avoid, minimize, withstand, and recover from 
the effects of adversity, whether natural or manmade, under all circumstances of use 
and  consequently  when  it  is  applied  to  the  Cyberspace,  it  becomes  a  constituent 
component  of  Information  Assurance.  Critical  Information  Infrastructures  (CII) 
requires resilient and tolerant architectures which are trustworthy under operational 
stress  and  assures  high  availability,  continuous  operations,  and  disaster  recovery.  
Information  operations  within  the  Government,  Industry  and  Military  sectors  are 
diverse and complex. These CII operations have independently expanded into loosely 
couple arrangements (often with controls or strategic architecture) and evolved into 
large  systems  of  systems  with  many  producing  (and  often  unknown)  emergent 
properties; creating new vulnerabilities and attack vectors.  Normally these integrating 
operations have operated satisfactorily in loosely coupled arrangements. However, for 
these operations to be resilient under stress, more than loosely coupled arrangements 
are needed.   The strategic positioning of Information Assurance will need to define the 
engineering  challenges  of  resilient,  fault  and  intrusion  tolerant  socio-technical Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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Enterprises.  Operational recovery time (a service objectives) to adverse effects among 
the  DIME  sectors  must  be  coordinated,  interoperability  of  information  sharing  and 
platform operations must be assured, distributed supervisory control protocols must 
be  in  place,  and  operation  sensing  and  monitoring  must  be  embedded.    These 
capabilities cannot be expected to evolve in a loosely coupled environment. They must 
be holistically specified, architected, designed, implemented, and tested if they are to 
operate with resilience under stress. A management, process, and engineering maturity 
framework  is  necessary  to  advance  the  assurance  of  software  security,  business 
continuity, system survivability, and system of system resiliency capabilities.  From a 
strategic IA point-of-view, HMG needs to impose a maturity framework for guiding CII 
operations and interoperability. Such a framework should develop the future evolution 
of  our Critical  Information  Infrastructures  along  the  lines  of  common management, 
process, and engineering dimensions whose collective result would be a harmonious 
operation and resilience even under stress among these systems. Assuring resilient CIS 
domains under stress should be organized as a 5 level maturity model (as illustrated in 
Table 4).  The objective is to drive the business case of CII operations and produce an 
enterprise commitment to achieve the goals of each level (2 to 5) and build upon them 
as indicated: 
 
Level 1  Ad Hoc- State of Affairs: Inability to advance and exhibiting evidence of apathy, 
denial, management inaction, and lack of IA engineering know how 
Level 2 
Enterprise  Assurance  Commitment  Management-  Goal:  Demonstrate 
commitment  to  Information  Assurance  through  strategic  management, 
harmonised interoperability, internal processes, and defence in depth. 
Level 3 
Enterprise Business Continuity Process Maturity- Goal: Demonstrate business 
continuity  assurance  through  compliance  and  configuration  management, 
accreditation, external standards and product engineering.  
Level 4 
System Survivability Engineering- Goal: Demonstrate the achievement of system 
survivability  through  the  management  of  faults  and  failures,  sustainability 
processes, aligned CDS and IA best practices. 
Level 5 
System of Systems Resiliency Engineering- Goal: Demonstrate the achievement 
of cross-domain resiliency through the management of external interactions and 
dependencies, the control of distributed supervisory processes, and the practice 
of Next Generation, High Assurance software engineering. 
Table 4: IA Resiliency Maturity Model 
Information is both an asset and potential liability to its owners.  HMG’s Information 
Governance  policies  have  established  that  (Government)  Departmental  Accounting 
Officers  (AOs),  through  their  Senior  Information  Risk  Owners  (SIROs)  and  their 
Information  Asset  Owners  (IAOs)  are  to  become  accountable  for  the  adequate 
protection  of  their  information  (collected,  processed  and  stored)  within  their Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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Departments.    Consequently  these  AOs  will  need  to  introduce  holistic  Information 
Assurance policies, procedures and practices that include effective Business Continuity 
Plans,  Information  Risk  Management  (IRM),  Security  Information  and  Event 
Management (SIEM) and a culture change programme of IA awareness, adaptation and 
compliance.  This introduction to IA and its compliance has been encapsulated in the 
CESG Information Assurance Maturity Model (IAMM) as illustrated in table 5. 
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Leadership 
& 
Governance 
Board recognition that 
information is a vital 
business asset and IA is 
an integral requirement 
of corporate governance. 
Board members 
understand and 
accept their 
responsibility for IA 
implementation 
Board exercising 
due diligence 
to the effective 
discharge of IA 
Board monitors 
progress towards 
embedding IA policy 
across the Dept. 
Assured Department’s 
Information and its 
external stakeholder’s 
key business asset are 
fully embedded within 
the Dept’s culture and 
are subject to a regime 
of continuous 
improvement. 
Awareness 
Training, & 
Education 
A programme of annual 
information risk 
awareness training is 
instituted 
Dept. personnel 
undergo annual risk 
awareness training 
A programme of 
pre-appointment 
training is instituted 
for all  staff 
Accurate details of 
training received by 
all staff are collated 
and reported 
Information 
Risk 
Management 
A comprehensive 
information risk policy is 
in place. 
The Accreditation 
status of all existing 
CIS is determined 
and the information 
risks are identified 
within risk registers 
All CIS that are 
critical to the 
business have 
been subject to 
Accreditation 
Residual risks are to 
be tolerated and 
quantified. The Main 
Board is fully aware 
of the total level of 
risk involved. 
Risk exposure of the 
Department is within 
Its risk appetite 
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Through-
Life IA 
Measures 
Required to take a 
coordinated and 
systematic approach to 
through-life IA measures. 
The status of the 
through-life IA 
measures 
employed across 
the Department is 
determined and 
gaps are identified 
Systematic, 
through-life 
processes are in 
place to assure all 
IS which are critical 
to the Dept.’s 
business. 
Level 3 processes 
are extended to 
embrace all of the 
Department’s IS. 
Incident and problem 
management processes 
adapt to new risks and 
problems. 
Assured 
Information 
Sharing 
Required  to define and 
manage how information 
is shared across the 
Department’s boundaries 
Network 
boundaries are 
defined and policies 
for sharing and 
managing 
information across 
these boundaries 
A comprehensive 
protective 
monitoring regime 
is implemented to 
provide situational 
awareness and 
enable essential 
information flows to 
be maintained. 
Level 3 measures 
are extended so that 
incident mgt. moves 
from being reactive 
to proactive. 
Network boundaries and 
the associated 
protective monitoring 
regime is continually 
improved to reduce the 
departmental and 
collective, shared 
exposure to information 
risk. 
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Compliance 
Established compliance 
regime to confirm the 
effectiveness of IRM 
against mandated 
(minimum) standards.  
 
Annual Reporting 
The Dept. has a 
comprehensive 
IRM compliance 
regime.  
 
They have an 
External IA Review 
Critical IA Review 
and internal audit 
Recommendations 
are actioned and 
progress tracked. 
IA incident mgt. 
processes are fully 
assured by internal 
audit. The Main 
Board is aware of 
the significant areas 
of the Department’s 
non-compliance 
There are no critical or 
significant IA audit 
issues. Independent 
assessment of the 
Department’s approach 
to IA shows that it is 
aligned with the National 
IA Strategy. 
Table 5: Abridged CESG Information Assurance Maturity Model (Cabinet Office, 2010) 
These AOs need to assure their arrangements sufficiently reveal any business impact 
upon  the  on-going  programmes  in  Transformational  Government  (Cabinet  Office, 
2005) and their Department’s information risk as directed under the HMG Security 
Policy  Framework  (HMG  SPF,  2010).  CESG  had  also  imposed  an  Information 
Management  Maturity  Model  (IMMM)  to  measure  compliance  by  Department  Chief 
Information  Officers  (CIOs).  However  a  number  of  the  IMMM  objectives  have  been 
swept up by the current IAMM and the publication of Good Practices such as the MoD’s 
JSP  747.  Although  the  IAMM  (Version  4.0)  has  a  considerable  list  of  Departmental 
requirements and compliances, many of its practitioners will find evidence for upwards 
grading with little oversight from its auditors, the National Audit Office. Consequently Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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the current maturity model is probably flawed, as it is a top down approach and juniors 
always want to paint a positive picture to please their seniors (a very common problem 
within the military where Captains are established as ITSOs in establishments with 
many  senior  officers  flaunting  or  ignoring  best  practice)  and  can  be  considered  as 
nothing more than a check list. Information assurance is everybody’s responsibility and 
therefore a non-hierarchical approach must be used for its compliance.   
 
One of the most significant transformations in the State of Art of Cyberspace has been 
the blurring of the lines of demarcation across network boundaries in joint actions, 
coalition  partnership  and  the  Internet  of  Things.  Consequently  these  IA  maturity 
models need to evolve, but this requires agile movement of the goal post which is often 
counter-productive  (most  people  resist  change,  in  particular  any  change  to  their 
normal operations) in most organisations. Information Assurance has to establish a 
new cultural awareness that promotes change. Future internet and System of Systems 
research will require a much wider remit than just for networks and transportation 
(ISO Model Layers 1 to 4). It will need to encompass domains previously seen as purely 
application areas, for example, like information access, processing and human-cyber 
interfacing (layers 5 to 7). Models work when their user community engage in their 
usage…getting them to engage is a priority! 
 
Human Factors of Assurance 
“The internet has the potential to become a ubiquitous and universal channel for 
socializing and creative expression”                      (European Commission, 2010) 
 
The  Internet  is  both  Diverse  and  Inclusive,  just  about  anyone  with  network 
connectivity  can  “surf  the  net”  but  there  still  is  a  social  divide  with  those  without 
connectivity (or with those who refuse to connect). This globally homogenous network 
of networks has expanded and evolved with technology advances, organisational needs 
and user demands. The semantics of the socio-technical domain has changed with the 
each  iteration  of  the  world-wide-web,  (Spivack, 2007).  However,  greater  inclusivity 
also constitutes a greater risk to the online community and it’s Assurance 
 
One  of  the  most  important  Human  Factors  in  the  socio-technical  Enterprise  is  the 
concept  of Trust.  Psychologists  have  had  difficulties  to  precisely  define  Trust in  its 
social context, but as an Assurance Dimension it has become an increasing important 
design  issue  and  an  operational  necessity  (Michael,  Hestad,  &  Pedersen,  2002).  Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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Research has shown, “if trust is not present, if there is no confidence, expectation, belief 
and faith in an information system, then there will be no willingness to rely on any such 
system,” (Chopra & Wallace, 2003). 
 
 In developing trust in Cyberspace the human factors involved are both contributionary 
to the society and also can become anti-social, criminal or offensive. The moral and 
ethical conduct of individuals online has little policing and little political will to police 
the internet (Jewkes, 2003). As the internet expands more criminal activity is noted; as 
it evolves, a new conjunction of criminal opportunities arise and as it becomes more 
exploited,  more  online  crimes  are  committed.  We  need  to  examine  features  of  the 
components  of  cyberspace  to  determine  the  extent  to  which  people  will  have  greater 
predispositions to crime, new resources available to them to commit crime and many 
other factors. At the same time, we need to assess the extent to which those who develop 
the new cyberspace systems have incentives to adopt measures that will make cyberspace 
less attractive for criminals and crime promoters (those who make crimes more likely, for 
example,  by  providing  ‘inside  information’,  passwords,  tools,  incentives  and 
encouragement, etc., or merely by being careless with their own security) wherever they 
are found.      (Collins & Mansell, 2003) 
 
As  figure  33  illustrates, a  key consideration  from  the IA  perspective  are  the causal 
relationships between the components of cyber trust and e-crime prevention, and in 
particular the development of an understanding of the causes of crime in the Cyber 
Domain (Collins & Mansell, 2003).  The Social Values of the Communities of Interest 
(COIs) place considerable influence and expectations to the equality and diversity of 
the IA Trust Dimension, entrusting the integrity of the services, security of transactions 
and the privacy of the information used, stored or transmitted.  The figure depicts some 
of  the  key  components  and  issue  areas  in  the  cyberspace  system.  Each  of  these  is 
recursively related to the others, forming a highly complex system that is populated by 
many different agents, both human and non-human.   
 
The local social relationships have been expanded by the process of Globalisation and 
international  virtual  communities  that  have  reshaped  DIME  strategies  and  linked 
individuals to a common cause, event or culture.  Technical innovation of Information 
Technologies  and  IT  Services  have  open  new  inclusive  communities  for  collective 
thinking, sharing and knowledge transfer creating new requirements and paradigms 
for online social morality and ethics. Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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Figure 33: Cyber Trust and Crime Prevention-Web of Components (Collins & Mansell, 2003) 
These new standards require better models, interpretation and an inclusive code of 
good practices that can be championed by all online users. In many aspects we are just 
beginning  to  learn  what  our  trusted  socio-technical  enterprises  are  capable  of  and 
these emergent properties acquire further research and development. To entrust the 
Information Domain, the communities and enterprises have to understand the risks 
involved in the virtual environment and the processes it supports. Risk Mitigation and 
Enterprise  Risk  Management  (ERM)  are  other  important  aspects  of  Information 
Assurance  which  requires  awareness,  training  and  education.  In  particular, 
understanding the problems of residue risk, perceived risk and actual risk is necessary 
to all users. Too many enterprises are either complaisant to regulatory standards or 
ignorant to their vulnerabilities as risk assessments have become automated to the 
compliance of check boxes rather than investigating and understanding the actual risks 
involved, (Grossack, 2012). 
 
Creating Trustworthy networks, the system designers and equipment manufacturers 
are implementing the need of enterprises through technologies and infrastructures. 
However,  very  little  has  been  done  in  creating  an  assured  architecture  in  the 
engineering of theses system; in particular in the research of IA Architecture in System 
Engineering and experiments of assured system of systems designs on cyber ranges. 
More research is required in understanding the system vulnerabilities, the emergence 
of complex behaviours and a better understanding of system and human normative Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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behaviour  whilst  online.  This  research  will  help  provided  a  more  trustworthy 
environment, innovative assured technologies and secure our digital identities. 
 
To  create  trust  in  Cyberspace,  Information  Assurance  has  to  provide  strategies, 
governance,  policies  and  mechanisms  that  can  detect  e-Crimes,  cyber-attacks  and 
malicious  cyber  network  exploitation.  The  IA  Models  and  implementation  need  to 
provide  the  authorities  preventive  and  tolerant  capabilities,  the  ability  to  gain  and 
analysis  digital  evidence  and  create  secure  operating  domains  within  the  current 
regulatory  and  legislative  environment.  Trust  in  Cyberspace  shouldn’t  be  taken  for 
granted;  it  requires  Assurance  to  make  it  trustworthy  and  commitment  to  make  it 
resilient, dependable, safe and secure.  
 
The  Model has  a cyclic activity  rotating  the  roles  of  Assurance  Practitioners  to  the 
System, Network, Facilities and Communities of Interest domains and the interspersing 
(Purpose to Systems; Capability to Networks; Environment to Facilities and Culture to 
Communities);  interrelationship  of  the  Human-Cyber  Interexchanges  (IERs  and 
Essential  Elements  of  Friendly  Information  –  EEFI);  interdisciplinary  (Engineering, 
Psychology, Social Science, Law and Business) domains of strategic management.  This 
rotational  process  recognises  the  dependencies  (and  interdependencies)  between 
systems and critical information infrastructures and the importance to achieving (and 
/or  undermining)  cross-domain  solutions  for  resilient  safe,  secure  and  dependable 
operations.  This is an important strategic component of Information Assurance and 
there are considerable research avenues (in particular those conducted by Professors 
Robin Bloomfield and Kevin Jones at the Centre for Software Reliability, City University 
London)  been  explored  to  determine  the  consequences  and  complexities  of 
dependability between cyber domains and the cascading effects that occur as systems 
fail (Al-Kuwaiti, Kyriakopoulos, & Hussein, 2009; Bloomfield, Buzna, Popov, Salako, & 
Wright, 2010). Having safe (available, useable, maintainable and scalable) operational 
processes that the user communities can rely upon (trusted, secure and protected) is a 
further dimension of Assurance that needs to be researched, in particular to system 
functionality that can gracefully collapse (rather than crash)  to error, fault and failure 
conditions, becoming resilient and tolerant to cyber-attacks and intrusions and having 
robust critical infrastructures that survive and provide business continuity. Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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Figure 34: The Composite Strategic Information Assurance Model 
The current IA maturity model is highly focus on Information Risk Management (IRM) 
and largely misses the more important elements of Trust Management and this thesis 
recommends an improvement to the model as illustrated in Table 10.  The IAMM does 
however  recognise  the  equally  important  measures  required  for  people  awareness, 
training and education. The Government now needs to quantify and qualify what are 
acceptable Training and Educational Standards and publish the National Occupational 
Standard  (NOS)  for  Information  Assurance.  The  jigsaw  has  many  important 
components to cover the capability gaps we have in our systems. In particular to the 
alignment of the 8-Dimensions of IA  is need to find Cross-Domain Solutions, System 
Tolerance,  Risk  Mitigation,  Compliance  and  maintenance  of  Shared  Situational 
Awareness. This creates additional, but necessary, complexity to a highly integrated, 
relational concept.  Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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Table 6: The Extended Enterprise Information Assurance Maturity Model 
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exercising due 
diligence 
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embedding IA policy 
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Assured Enterprise 
Information and its 
external stakeholder’s 
key business asset are 
fully embedded within 
the Dept’s culture and 
are subject to a regime 
of continuous 
improvement.  Awareness 
Training, & 
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A programme of 
annual information 
risk awareness 
training is instituted 
Enterprise 
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annual risk 
awareness training 
A programme of 
pre-appointment 
training is instituted 
for all  staff 
Accurate details of 
training received by 
all staff are collated 
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Management 
(IRM) 
A comprehensive 
information risk 
policy is in place. 
The Accreditation 
status of all existing 
CIS is determined 
and the information 
risks are identified 
within risk registers 
All CIS that are 
critical to the 
business have 
been subject to 
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be tolerated and 
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aware of the total 
level of risk 
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Enterprise 
Information 
Management 
(EIM) 
Enterprises attains 
some awareness 
about information 
management 
 
Establish and 
redefine its current 
Service Level 
Agreements. 
 
Enterprise and IT 
leaders react 
favourably to the 
demand for 
consistent, 
accurate and faster 
information across 
key business units.  
Enterprises 
perceive and 
qualify information 
as necessary for 
improved business 
performance and 
optimisation. 
 
Monitor Service 
Level Agreements. 
Enterprises perceive 
information as 
critical for business. 
The organization 
has implemented 
significant portions 
of EIM, including a 
consistent 
information 
infrastructure 
Enterprises exploit 
information across the 
entire information 
supply chain, with 
service-level 
agreements that are 
continuously reviewed 
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Communication 
protocols exist 
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common IERs. 
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technical IS systems. 
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IA Measures 
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coordinated and 
systematic 
approach to 
through-life IA 
measures. 
The status of the 
through-life IA 
measures 
employed across 
the Department is 
determined and 
gaps are identified 
Systematic, 
through-life 
processes are in 
place to assure all 
IS which are critical 
to the Dept.’s 
business. 
Level 3 processes 
are extended to 
embrace all of the 
Department’s IS. 
Incident and problem 
management processes 
adapt to new risks and 
problems. 
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Sustainability 
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and design a 
resiliency and 
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Enterprise  IA 
Commitment 
Established and 
tested Enterprise 
Business Continuity 
Process Maturity 
System Survivability 
Demonstrate the 
achievement of 
system survivability 
through the mgt. of 
faults and failures, 
sustainability 
processes, aligned 
CDS and IA best 
practices. 
System of Systems 
Resiliency Engineering- 
Demonstrate the 
achievement of cross-
domain resiliency. 
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Information 
Sharing 
Required  to define 
and manage how 
information is 
shared across the 
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boundaries 
Network 
boundaries are 
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these boundaries 
A comprehensive 
protective 
monitoring regime 
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awareness and 
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information flows to 
be maintained. 
Level 3 measures 
are extended so that 
incident mgt. moves 
from being reactive 
to proactive. 
Network boundaries and 
the associated 
protective monitoring 
regime is continually 
improved to reduce the 
departmental and 
collective, shared 
exposure to information 
risk. 
Trust 
Management 
Identification 
 
Access-
Controlled 
 
Authentication 
 
User-Profiled 
Reputational 
 
Client-centric 
Vetted 
 
Federated 
Valued 
 
Collaborative 
E
f
f
e
c
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i
v
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n
e
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Compliance 
Established 
compliance regime 
to confirm the 
effectiveness of 
IRM against 
mandated 
standards.  
 
Annual Reporting 
The Dept. has a 
comprehensive 
IRM compliance 
regime.  
 
They have an 
External IA Review 
Critical IA Review 
and internal audit 
Recommendations 
are actioned and 
progress tracked. 
IA incident mgt. 
processes are fully 
assured by internal 
audit. The Main 
Board is aware of 
the significant areas 
of the Enterprise 
non-compliance 
There are no critical or 
significant IA audit 
issues. Independent 
assessment of the 
Enterprise approach to 
IA shows that it is 
aligned with the 
National IA Strategy. 
T
r
u
s
t
w
o
r
t
h
y
 
Assurance 
Establishing an IA 
Strategy and Audit. 
 
Implementing an 
Information 
Security 
Management 
System (ISMS) 
Fault Tolerant 
System of Systems 
with graceful 
degradation of 
services and 
functionality 
 
SIEM implemented 
Adherence to the 
ISO/IEC 27001 
standard and the 
ISF Best Practices 
 
Implementing a 
Culture Change to 
Information Asset 
Management. 
Automated IA 
Auditing and Risk 
Assessment. 
 
Cyber Power and 
Shared Awareness 
Monitored and 
Controlled 
Aligned and harmonised 
Cross-Domain 
interconnectivity and 
operations. Full 
Business Continuity and 
Recovery Planning 
 
Agile Shared Situational 
Awareness  
 Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
Engineering Doctorate  Page 110 
 
CHAPTER 3:  
Modelling the Assurance Component 
 
 
Information  assurance (IA)  is  defined  as  "information  operations  that  protect  and 
defend  information  and  information  systems  by  ensuring  their  availability,  integrity, 
authentication,  confidentiality,  and  non-repudiation.  This  includes  providing  for 
restoration of information systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction 
capabilities.         Taxonomy of Information Assurance, 2003 
Information Assurance (IA) is delivered through the assessment of information in 
relation to:- 
  Confidentiality - The property that information is not made available or disclosed 
to unauthorised individuals, entities, or processes 
  Integrity - The property of safeguarding the accuracy and completeness of assets. 
This may include the ability to prove an action or event has taken place, such that 
it cannot be repudiated later 
  Availability - The property of being accessible and usable upon demand by an 
authorised entity.                   Ministry of Defence, 2011 
These two definitions provide a clear indication that the institutional establishment has 
formulated that Information Assurance is the risk adjusted reasoning behind the usage 
of Information Security and its Protection mechanisms. In this chapter, that narrow 
definition  is  redefined  and  expanded  with  arguments  that  Information  Assurance Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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should  be  about  the  empowerment  of  the  Social-Technical  Enterprise  to  create  a 
trustworthy environment based on trusted communities of interests. Trust is a very 
difficult virtue and is often considered the most noble of mankind; we want to trust 
people, services and enterprises; and most often our trust is reciprocated providing the 
bond to human society.  However, we also fear being let down, used or our trust being 
abused.  Information  Assurance  is  about  bringing  trust  into  Cyberspace,  across 
heterogeneous systems, in our exploitation and reliance of shared Information and the 
ability  to  trust  another  person  whom  we  have  never  met,  but  who  shares  our 
community of interest. “Economic life is pervaded by culture and depends on moral bonds 
of  social  trust.  This  is  the  unspoken,  unwritten  bond  between  fellow  citizens  that 
facilitates  transactions,  empowers  individual creativity,  and  justifies collective  action,” 
(Fukuyama, 1995). Trust is the foundation of the Socio-Technical Enterprise and the 
very  basis  of  this  real  and  virtual  global  economy.  “The  speed  at  which  Trust  is 
established with clients, employees and constituents—is the essential ingredient for any 
high–performance, successful organization,”  (Covey, Covey , & Merrill, 2008).   
 
Chapter 1 argued for the need and purpose for Enterprise assurance is to provide a 
resilient, dependable and safe environment that will change and shape the Enterprise 
culture to become a trusted, sustainable operation capable of delivering its strategic 
goals and mission. This strategic positioning of IA (Chapter 2.4) provides a framework 
for the assurance of Knowledge, Information and Data process, storage and transit; 
thereby providing the architecture of the interoperability of technology to the human-
cyber  interexchange  and  the  organisation  structures  which  form  from  its  business 
processes.  The  IA  component  of  the  Information  Domain  is  in  fact  based  on  8-
Dimensions:  Structure  (Organisational  and  Architecture),  Resilience,  Dependability, 
Safety, Security, Protection, Risk Management and Trust. 
 
Assuring the Information Domain has progressed from the idea that it’s a function of 
security  (confidentiality, integrity,  availability,  access  control;  authentication;  privacy, 
non-repudiation and communication security as declared by the ITU-T X.805) to this 
thesis declaration that it’s a function of a Socio-Technical Enterprise where Enterprise 
defines the scope of industrious, systematic activity that creates a (profitable) business 
organization  which  will  return  value  to  its  stakeholders  through  their  readiness  to 
embark on new ventures (with a high degree of boldness and energy), cross-domain 
interaction  and  their  contribution  to  the  business  processes.  Creating  a  technology 
intensive  enterprise  requires  purpose;  an  engaging  environment;  harmonised  and 
aligned  capability  across  agile  human-cyber  inter-exchanges  and  superior  decision Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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making in a shared situation and culture. Since enterprises are complex socio-technical 
systems, the effective use Information Exploitation (IX) and Information Operations 
(IO) in the enterprise decision making process can be structured and analysed through 
the adoption of Enterprise Architecture (Ross, Weill, & Robertson, 2006). Nightingale 
and Rhodes (2007) define Enterprise Architecture (EA) as a set of views (Strategic, 
Policy  Process,  Organisational,  Knowledge,  IT,  Product  and  Service)  which  by: 
"Applying holistic thinking to design, will evaluate and select a preferred structure for a 
future state enterprise to realize its value proposition and desired behaviours." 
 
 
 
Figure 35: The Information Pyramid Reference Model to Socio-Technical Enterprises 
The  Data  Reference  Component  represents  the  transformation  of  Enterprise  Data 
across service platforms and IT infrastructures; technical services; data sensors; data 
monitors;  data  processing;  (hardware  and  software)  product  outputs  and  the 
interfacing  of  communication  and  data  networks  (protocols,  standards  and  data 
structures).  The  US  Government  Data  Reference  Model  (DRM)  describes  this 
collaboration process as that “enables agencies to describe the types of interaction and 
exchanges  that  occur  between  the  Federal  Government  and  citizens”  through  the 
categorisation,  structure  and  exchange  of  Data,  (FEA,  2005).  The  Information 
Exploitation component of the pyramid reference model is discussed in detail in sub-Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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chapters 3.3 and 3.4 where it examines the transformation of data into Information 
Flows across the operational cyber processes (Information Operations), Information 
Archiving  and  the  Human-Cyber  Interexchanges  (Information  Technologies, 
Infrastructures, Services, Management, Assurance and Exploitation). The Knowledge 
Transfer component of this pyramid reference model exhibits the Business Processes of 
the Socio-Technical Enterprise which spontaneously reorganize the Enterprise Open 
Systems to states of greater heterogeneity and complexity whilst achieving a "steady 
state" at  which it can perform  Cognitive  Processing,  Knowledge  Management  (KM), 
Knowledge Transfer and Decision Making across the Human-Cyber divide.  
 
The Collective Wisdom of the Socio-Technical Enterprise, its ability to learn, be selective 
and, within limits, self-regulating are the hallmarks of an Open System (Trist, 1981). 
Although  not  parts  of  this  thesis  remit,  Open  System  Architecture  is  an  important 
component of an Enterprise as it contributes to Enterprise Actualisation which exists 
through its interoperability with the products and services of other Enterprises and the 
evolving social interconnectivity. The creation of Shared Situational Awareness is the 
goal of Enterprise Coalition and Partnership which is underpinned by a culture of Trust 
and an understanding of the risk appetite of the Enterprise. 
 
3.1  Assured Knowledge Transfer 
 
Coalition military partners, and in particular the US and UK (and more recently UK-
France) have recognised the importance of transnational alliances for the conduct of 
joint action operations and the need to create Cyber Environments that can Assure 
Knowledge Transfer and dissemination of Information. This recognition has not been 
lost with Governments, Businesses, NGOs and Charities (Brown, Khagram, Moore, & 
Frumkin, 2000; Sogge, 2011; The White House, 2011).   
 
The UK military vision of the “coalitions of the willing” (MoD, 2003) is that joint action 
will  be  across  all  levels  of  the  operational  spectrum  (from  policing  actions, 
humanitarian assistance to theatre operations) and will require its Network Enabled 
Capability  (NEC)  to  provide  close  interoperability  across  the  multi-lateral  force 
deployment.  “This  interoperability  will  bring  its  own  set  of technological,  ideological, 
organisational,  procedural  and  cultural  idiosyncrasies  to  the  theatre  operations…The 
rapid, opportunistic exploitation of situational contingencies, the need to self-synchronize 
and the requirements to synergistically marshal diverse military assets in the context of 
agile force structures, require the ability to exploit and share information in ways that Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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transcend  the  traditional  boundaries  of  national  affiliation  and  operational 
environment;” (Smart & Shadbolt, 2007) 
 
The  DIME  evolution  in  Cyberspace  has  generated  many  challenges  for  the  Socio-
Technical  Enterprise  at  all  levels  (Government,  NGOs,  Military,  Multi-nationals  and 
SMEs). The US Centre for Strategic and International Studies CSIS paper “Cybersecurity, 
Two Years Later” (CSIS, 2011) commented that after their previous report to the 44th US 
President (CSIS, 2008) when “cyber-security was not a major issue for public policy” that 
the  overriding  problem  of  security  was  intrinsically  complex  involving  commercial 
interests, concerns for privacy and the insecurity of systems to worms like Stuxnet. “We 
thought  then  (2008)  that  securing  cyberspace  had  become  a  critical  challenge  for 
national security, which our nation was not prepared to meet. In our view, we are still 
unprepared;” (CSIS, 2011). Enterprise Architecture provides a methodology to examine 
these challenges and the US Federal EA has created a common approach to this analysis 
as illustrated in figure 36. 
 
 
Figure 36: The Common Approach to the US Federal Enterprise Architecture 
Social-Technical Enterprise exists through regular commerce in Service and Product 
Delivery, Functional Integration, Resource Optimisation and Information Interexchange 
with other Enterprises, Institutions, and persons that has been created in its external 
social environment (as scoped by the FEA’s 8 Levels -  International; National; Federal; Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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Sector;  Agency;  Segment;  System  and  Application).  The  Enterprise  requires  physical 
supports  for  its  activities  -  a  workplace,  materials,  tools,  and  machines  -  a  stable 
organization of people able and willing to modify the material throughput or provide the 
requisite services; (Trist, 1981). The Cycle-Rubik nature of the FEA Common Approach 
Framework segments the organisation’s line of business as a current view (Governance 
and  Domain)  and  the  shared  services  as  a  future  view  using  eight  basic  elements 
(Governance; Principles; Method; Tools; Standards; Use; Reporting and Audit).  
Enabling Architecture 
Driving EA into an organisation requires a cultural change as it require alignment and 
integration  of  its  shared  services  across  the  5  Domain  (6  if  you  include  the  cross 
threading domain of security) from Strategy, through Business Activities, Information 
Exchange, Systems and Infrastructure.  
 
 
Figure 37: The Enabling Architecture of the Socio-Technical Enterprise  (Richardson C. J., 2012) 
This alignment requires us to rethink the common approach as the current model fails 
to visualise the effects of (cross-thread) security and in particular a cyber-architecture 
view of the information flow and it’s Information Assurance across the Socio-Technical Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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Enterprise. Figure 37 illustrates further cross-threading of the Enterprise Views as an 
enabling architecture for the Socio-Technical Enterprise (Richardson C. J., 2012). 
 
The model enabling architecture maps the Enterprise view that these interationships 
are both multi-lateral and multi-layered.  Both stacks (The Enterprise and Cyber Views) 
are founded upon the common “real world” of network of networks (e.g. the Internet). 
This physical world of data collection, process, transit and storage has been regulated 
by international law and consensus from its online communities of interest where the 
Internet  Corporation  for  Assigned  Names  and  Numbers  (ICANN)  manages  Internet 
domain  names  and  IP  addresses;  The  Triangle  of  Cyber  Governance  (Mayer-
Schonberger, 2002) create  Free Markets for Internet Commerce (Winn, 1997) and the 
memorandum Request for Comments (RFC) administered by the Internet Engineering 
Task Force (IETF), on behalf of the Internet Society, describes the behaviours, methods, 
research  and  innovations  applicable  to  the  interworking’s  of  Internet-connected 
systems (IEFT, 2012). 
 
Whilst Enterprises create, develop and maintain the computer and IT products that 
build these networks, it’s the usage of these IT networks as information infrastructures 
that has created Cyberspace and this is encapsulated in the stack of the Enterprise 
Architecture Views. The service that hosted on these cyber platforms are the starting 
points for most Human-Cyber interconnectivity, whether it is the software routing table 
of a network switch or the next Application on a Smart Phone these products bridge the 
divide between the Real and Virtual Worlds. The business processes that drive the 
creation of the products are operation decisions of the Enterprise management that are 
reflected in their policies, procedures and practice. These views generate the corporate 
knowledge  and  the  organisational  hierarchy,  reporting  chains,  roles  and 
responsibilities.  The  strategic  direction  of  the  Enterprise  is  generated  from  an 
understanding of its capabilities and the missions it intends to pursue. 
 
Whereas, the Information-Stack (I-Stack), in the Cyber Architecture is concerned with 
flow of information from the structuring, processing, transmission and storage of data 
as  information  across  its  virtual  logical  infrastructures  and  upwards  to  create  an 
Information resource capable for exploitation, decision making and building of a shared 
situational awareness.   Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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Organisation’s Inherent Inabilities 
“Knowledge about something  is  called  declarative  knowledge.  A  shared,  explicit 
understanding of concepts, categories, and descriptors lays the foundation for effective 
communication and knowledge sharing in organizations. Knowledge of how something 
occurs  or  is  performed  is  called  procedural  knowledge.  Shared  explicit  procedural 
knowledge  lays  a  foundation  for  efficiently  coordinated  action  in  organizations. 
Knowledge why something  occurs  is  called  causal  knowledge.  Shared  explicit  causal 
knowledge,  often  in  the  form  of  organizational  stories,  enables  organizations  to 
coordinate strategy for achieving goals or outcomes;”  (Zack, 1999). 
 
In  the  creation  of  the  Knowledge  Economy,  the  interoperability  of  socio-technical 
enterprises has becoming a unifying feature. The tacit or explicit nature of Knowledge 
requires it to be managed as both as an object (a thing to be stored and manipulated) 
and process (of simultaneously knowing 
and  acting;  i.e.  applying  expertise). 
Within  this  new  economy  there  is  an 
increasing  role  for  Explicit  Knowledge 
(corporate wisdom, procedure manuals, 
product  literature,  or  computer 
software). 
 
Figure  38:  System  Security  Failings: 
Insecurity  in  the  Enterprise  and  its 
operations 
 
 The assurances to the social element of the Enterprise Knowledge Transfer, Memory 
Archiving,  Expertise  and  Knowledge  Management  are  far  more  complex  than  the 
technical  protective  solutions  of  encryption,  physical  isolation  and  alternate  site 
storage, business continuity training, redundant system provision and the use of RAID 
and Cloud technologies. Inter-exchanging Enterprises must efficiently and effectively 
capture and share their knowhow, expertise and business products whilst protecting 
their intellectual property rights and knowledge assets. It’s their ability to bring their 
shared knowledge that will bring new opportunities and reduce the threats. Corporate 
knowledge has intangible components rarely exhibited in technological systems but are 
readily identified and have become vulnerable to threats and attacks within the Socio-
Technical  Enterprise.  If  these  threats  manifest  themselves  into  attacks  and  their Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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security fails, These Enterprises could degrade to a sequence of deleterious debilitating 
and disaffecting socio-technical event which could equally lead to irrefutable damage to 
the Enterprise. Too few Enterprises have appropriate Knowledge Management policies 
and  capabilities  to  leverage  and  protect  their  Knowledge  Capital.  The  agile  socio-
technical environment has a complexity of rapid changes to their share awareness with 
technological discontinuity; emergent properties, insidious exploitation and malicious 
cyber-attacks  as  well  as  time  sensitivity  of  their  information  flows  and  the  use  of 
obsolete data. Collective and critical decisions are made from the Knowledge, Expertise 
and Information available.  This environment has to be resilient, robust and trusted. 
Introducing Information Assurance to the Enterprise 
Bringing  Trust  into  the  Socio-Technical  System  to  safeguard  operations  and  risk 
manage the threats is the strategic purpose of Enterprise Information Assurance as 
illustrated in figure 39. 
 
Figure 39: The Assured Space – Structured, Dependable, Secure and Trusted 
The key attributes that assured space offers to the Socio-Technical Enterprise are: 
1.  Information Assurance provides effective and timely exploitation of information 
through  the  provision  of  dependable,  resilient  operations  and  mitigates  the 
contagion of fear, uncertainty and doubt within Cyberspace. 
2.  Information Assurance is fundamental to all aspects of the Enterprises business 
processes  from  the  successful  conduct  of  its  Information  operations  to  the 
management of its Knowledge and Information assets. Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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3.  Information  Assurance  ensures  stakeholder  confidence  that  Information 
Systems Risks are managed pragmatically, appropriately, and in a cost-effective 
manner that maintains the value of the Enterprise. 
 
These attributes can be mapped across the components of cyberspace as illustrated in 
figure 40.  The defensive nature of this map illustrates the key issues of an Assured 
Enterprise: (1) its physical systems are made safe and protected by a (2) cyclic array of 
functions  (deterrence,  restoration,  removal,  detection  and  attribution)  under  the 
control of (3) the CND Operations; (4)the resilient system architecture and awareness 
of  the  human  factors  involved  allows  for  greater  understanding  of  motivation  and 
intent  which allows for (5) better risk and trust management of (6) the Information 
Flows that provide better decision making, knowledge transfer and creation of a Cyber-
based Shared Situational Awareness for the protected communities of interest. 
 
 
Figure 40: Mapping the Defensive Components of a Socio-Technical Enterprise   (Richardson C. J., 2012) 
 
1 
2 
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The 3-Layers of Understanding 
Cyberspace interfaces the real and virtual world of our human endeavours. It’s a real 
domain of computers, switches, storage area networks, data protocols, communication 
devices and network of networks whilst the virtual world expands our mind, cognitive 
powers and imagination. A domain of computer generated art, games, programmes, 
animated objects and massive computational power. Cyberspace is a creative domain 
rich in adaptability, opportunities and innovation, but also a complex, vulnerable state 
of human exploitation, crime and hostility. The project of Cyber Power by the Socio-
Technical  Enterprises  is  a  dichotomy  of  Taoism,  the  white  domain  of  trustworthy 
endeavours and the black domain of hackers and malice. However, as in the real world 
of human interaction, the contextual continuum of cyberspace has many shades of grey 
in  its Tao  world  and  this  is  reflected  in figure  120  with its 3 stack  components of 
understanding: Knowledge, Information and Data. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The first layer is the Data Stack (D-Stack) that provides for networked devices, entities 
and  sensors  to  collect,  disseminate,  process  and  store  digital  material.  The  rate  of 
growth and exchange of data across these networks of networks places many demands 
on network and traffic engineering: increased bandwidth; dense multiplexing; faster 
computing  (increasing  the  CPU’s  million  instructions  per  second  rate-  MIPS)  and 
Data Stack  Knowledge Stack  Information Stack 
REAL  VIRTUAL 
Networks 
and Data 
Highways
Cyberspace
Knowledge 
Transfer 
Repositories
Figure 41:  The Contextual Continuum of Real and Virtual Space 
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greater  use  of  fibre-optic  switching  networks.  The  ease  with  which  these  demands 
increases with the escalation of data, data services and data storage overwhelms the 
physical  infrastructures  and  has  created  a  more  agile,  but  more  vulnerable, 
environment of virtual machines and cloud communities. These virtual domains are 
dependent  to  the  system  architectures  they  are  based  upon.  These  architectures 
although expedient to the demands of users are also an Enterprise security risk to the 
social-technical communities that rely upon them, (MacIntosh, 1998; Zittrain, 2008). 
 
The  second  layer  is  the  Information  Stack  (I-Stack)  that  provides  a  seamless 
transformation  and  transmission  of  data  structures  (information)  across  the 
Information Infrastructures hosted in Cyberspace. This Information Domain has many 
influencing doctrines (IX, IA, IM, IO and IW), policies and practices that determine the 
quality, presentation and dissemination of the Information assets. The third layer is the 
Knowledge  Stack  (K-Stack)  which  is  a  domain  that  is  recipient  of  the  Information 
presented  and  the  experience  of  the  communities  of  interest.    The  human-Cyber 
Interexchanges  are  formulated  within  this  domain  as  we  begin  to  understand  the 
emergent nature of cyberspace and the adaptation of new commodities, entities and 
services  that  evolve  the  socio-technical  Enterprises.  Information  Assurance  and 
Enterprise Architecture provide a lens to this Cyber Domain. It is the nature of building 
bridges to close down the gaps in our knowledge, system capability, skills, experience 
and  education  that  enthuses  our  desire  and  necessity  to  understand  how  the 
interdependencies of these 3 stacks create the new real and virtual world of the Socio-
Technical Enterprise.  
Business Drivers 
Cyberspace and the world created by the operations and interconnections of Socio-
Technical  Systems  and  the  Enterprises  that  sustain  them  is  a  rapidly  changing 
environment.    Enterprise  Architecture  and  its  business  drivers  benefits  the 
organisation as it provide long-term structure and direction to the superior decision 
making process, business processes and the Enterprise Shared Situational Awareness 
as  illustrated  in  table  13.  This  creates  a  business  imperative  for  the  success  of 
Enterprise Architecture that paradoxically becomes increasing harder to implements as 
the  changes  to  system  capabilities  and  the  environment  accelerate.  The  key  to 
successful implementation of Enterprise Architecture is to make it relevant to real-time 
operations and to-date most implementations have not fully lived up to expectations. Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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Table 7: Business Drivers and Benefits of Enterprise Architecture (Jones J. , 2012) 
Enterprise Architecture Business Drivers 
   
  Leveraging New Technology 
  Compliance 
  Increase Profitability 
  New Markets 
  Business Value Generation 
  Rapidly Changing Business Environment 
  Better Utilization of Resources 
  Mergers and Acquisitions 
  Integrating a number of cultures in a disparate organization 
  Collaborative working with external parties 
  Getting people within an organization to work together effectively 
  Achieving compliance with Government regulations in a cost effective 
manner 
Enterprise Architecture Business Benefits 
   
  Creates an structured environment for Superior Decision Making 
  Promote a climate of continuous business evolution, improving 
everyone's quality of work and deliverables 
  Enhance business flexibility by providing an adaptable framework, more 
supple structures and best business practices 
  Share skills, experience and knowledge to increase asset values 
  Generates the business technology infrastructures to deliver cost 
effective results 
  Bring business resources together to create a boundary-less business 
 
Understanding  business  systems  that  builds  cyberspace  and  appreciating  them  as 
socio-technical systems in the context of enterprise architectures is in itself a major 
piece of research and development.  Enterprise Architecture aims to provide a coherent 
approach for analysing the driving (strategic, operational and tactical) business and 
technological  factors  that  lead  to  strategic  business  aims,  goals  and  missions.  The 
essential  component  to  the  efficient  implementation  of  EA  is  properly  aligning  the 
people, process and technology aspects of the enterprise to business drivers which 
firmly lies within the domain of Information Assurance.  Studying the architecture of 
Enterprises  can  transform  behavioural  use  cases,  operational  assumptions  and 
constraints and how the business drivers provide the basis for planning and designing 
an information system and the creation of a shared awareness and superior decision 
making  as  illustrated  in  figure  42.  The  alignment  of  Information  Services  and 
Technology  for  Enterprise  System  Interoperability  allows  for  the  availability  of 
trustworthy knowledge, information and data services whilst ensuring traceability and 
reducing risk of decision promotes a more sustainable, efficient and effective Socio-
Technical Enterprise. Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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Figure 42: Enterprise Architecture Business Drivers 
Information Vision 
Modern  society  is  increasingly  reliant  on  the  storage,  processing  and  transmission  of 
information.  Ensuring  the  integrity,  security  and  privacy  of  information  is  thus 
paramount, regardless of whether the information is at the level of the citizen or at a 
national or international level. Moreover, future trends (as outlined in the Information 
Society Technologies Advisory Group (ISTAG, 2004) report, for example) in the so-called 
Ambient Intelligent Space (ISTAG, 2003) will only increase the role of information and 
our reliance on it. This brings with it great opportunities to enhance our quality of life, but 
at  the  same  time,  presents  major  challenges  in  terms  of  the  privacy  and  integrity  of 
personal information.      (Martinelli & Quisquater, 2005)  
 
Western  Critical  Information  Infrastructures  are  becoming  more  highly  dependent 
upon  the  global  cyber  infrastructure.  The  increased  automated  and  complex 
interconnections  where  network  routings  between  Private  Enterprises  and 
Government  Agencies  (Gasper,  2010)  has  made  it  less  practical  to  erect  barriers 
between military and civilian operations (Glebocki Jr., 2008) and many current barriers 
and information fortresses are actually operating against national interests (Hundley & 
Anderson, 1995; Allor, 2007; Dunlap, 2008). There is a common understanding that 
achieving greater security in information and communications technology (ICT) would 
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increase its development and diffusion, with concomitant benefits in many fields. While 
this technology is already spreading rapidly, it will only be possible to translate our 
physical interactions into electronic interactions if sufficient trust and confidence exist 
in the systems that process our information. The integrity, security, quality and privacy 
of information and communication are thus paramount, in everything from personal 
information transfer to government and critical infrastructures. It is now widely agreed 
that lack of trust in systems will prevent their widespread adoption. As a consequence, 
the development and deployment of systems with strong effective security is vital.  In 
addition, modern ICT systems may consist of up to several thousands of computation 
and communication resources whose number dynamically changes and thus are getting 
closer to creating Cyber communities; irrespective of the geographical location of the 
assets. In this new framework, the capability to represent, create, negotiate, monitor 
and evolve trust relationships in a secure way becomes mandatory. 
 
Trust and security are key enablers of the Information Society. For citizens to use and 
feel  comfortable  with  e-Government  services  they  must  have  confidence  that  their 
online services are trustworthy and secure. Similarly, for consumers and SMEs to use e-
commerce and e-business they need confidence in the security of online transactions 
and that the data presented is timely, relevant, consistent and accurate. As access to the 
Internet diversifies, from PCs to digital TVs, mobile phones and wireless devices, people 
feel  increasingly  concerned  about  the  protection of  their  assets  and  privacy  in  this 
networked world. These aspects will become more and more important as we move 
towards the smart digital environments based on many interacting objects, devices and 
systems. In the future, personal area networks and embedded computer chips will be 
everywhere in our cars, our homes and even in our clothes.  
 
Security in such extensive inter-connected environments will require solutions very 
different  to  those  of  today,  and  its  social  acceptance  will  require  totally  novel 
approaches to identity and privacy management through user-friendly and trustworthy 
interfaces, taking into account the privacy needs and data protection regulations in 
place. Underlying the service and user interface level we must give attention to the 
information and network security infrastructure. Modern service organisations, such as 
banking  and  finance, healthcare,  energy,  transport  and  others,  rely  on  ICT  for  data 
exchange and control, creating strong mutual dependencies. These critical information 
infrastructures must be dependable and resilient, protecting against malicious attacks, 
ensuring tolerance towards and recovery from attacks, and adaptable to the changing 
security requirements. “Information Superiority enables decision-makers at all levels in Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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all environments to make timely and informed decisions. It therefore contributes to the 
Defence Information Vision by delivering benefits in agility, effectiveness and efficiency, “ 
(MoD, 2011). 
 
The four, enduring, key benefits derived from the Defence Information Vision (MoD, 
2011)are: 
1.  Improved  Effectiveness  –  Our  outputs  are  better  when  they  are  enabled  by 
improved information flows;  
2.  Agility – Information can be accessed and manipulated whenever and wherever 
required, subject to affordability and security constraints; 
3.  Efficiency – Operational and their supporting processes are more efficient, both 
because information flows through them better, and Management Information is 
available to govern them; 
4.  Compliance – We comply with our legal and cross-Government obligations, so 
that we can focus our resources on supporting operations, while maintaining the 
Departmental reputation. 
The  effects  that  underline  the  benefits  of    MoD’s  Defence  Information  Vision  are: 
Strategic  Alignment,  Accessibility  and  Trust;  Value  for  Money  and  Information 
Exploitations and these fall within the conclave of the Information Assurance Domain 
and create further benefits to the Department. 
 
Superior Decision Making 
“Decision  making  is  the  process  of  sufficiently  reducing  uncertainty  and  doubt  about 
alternatives to allow a reasonable choice to be made from among them.  This stresses the 
information-gathering  function  of  decision  making.  It  should  be  noted  here  that 
uncertainty is reduced rather than eliminated. Very few decisions are made with absolute 
certainty because complete knowledge about all the alternatives is seldom possible. Thus, 
every decision involves a certain amount of risk. If there is no uncertainty, you do not have 
a decision; you have an algorithm - a set of steps or a recipe that is followed to bring 
about a fixed result,“  Robert Harris, 2009. 
“An  accurate  description  of  information  requirements  is  a  prerequisite  for 
effective information management,” (Choo, 2002). 
 
Generally, people make poor and/or risky decisions, often with “gut” instinct rather 
than gleamed cognitive knowledge, risk assessment and accurate intelligence. Decision-Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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Making should be considered a sophisticated aspect of Assurance, provisioned with 
better information sharing, better understanding, and some taught effective techniques 
and skills of what decision making involves, people would acquire superior decision 
making. This understanding would make  decision making a study of identifying and 
choosing alternatives based on the values and preferences of the decision maker (Harris 
R. , 2009; MoD, 2009). Within the structured military hierarchy, the C2 apparatus and 
the  soldier’s  roles  and  responsibilities  are  well  defined,  exercised  and  evaluated. 
Training,  reflection  and  operational  tours  complement  and  increase  their  body  of 
knowledge. Military commander’s problem solving and decision making processes are 
essentially co-ordinated tasks of planning, directing, and controlling where problem 
solving  knowledge  is  acquired  mainly  from  military  actors:  instructors,  advisors, 
commanders,  staff  or  from  peer  group  learning  in  most  training  scenarios,  combat 
situations  and  operational  planning.      These  actors  provide  multiple  perspectives 
(deriving  from  their  expertise,  experiences  and  knowledge)  to  time  and  often 
resourced constrained situations and in high tempo operations their decision making 
processes in joint actions can be unstructured, incommensurable, generating conflicts 
of  interests and inaccuracies to the joint operational picture with intangible and often 
ambiguous quantitative or qualitative apparatus providing, using and disseminating 
disjointed and misleading information and where often the time sensitivity pressure 
and  limited  resources  combine  to  cause  uncertainties  and  doubts  arising  from 
unexpected internal and external situations.  
 
A military operation is a complex, interaction of men, technology, weapon platforms, 
communications and the projection of force. The operational activities need reliable, 
trusted information that can be passed seamlessly across multiple security domain, 
forces,  organisations,  networks  and  individual  by  respecting  complex  and  possibly 
conflicting sets of policies, but above all the information needs to accurate, timely and 
managed. The Information Value Chain as illustrated in Figure 43 supports the NEC 
Benefit  Chain  as  it  illustrates  that  a  seamless  flow  of  information  needs  which  are 
"contingent, dynamic and multifaceted” (Choo, 2002) to get the right information at the 
right time to make the right decisions (MoD, 2005).  The model’s primary activities 
involve the direct handling and management of information resources, these resources 
are analysed in ways that increase their value: information acquisition, information 
processing and information distribution and finally through cognitive processes it is 
acted  upon  and  learnt.  Although  this  model  generates  and  manages  the  flow  of 
information,  it  does  not  provide  objectivity  or  governance  to  the  management  and 
administration of information. Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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Figure 43: Information Value Chain for government, (Gresham & Andrulis, 2002) 
Making a decision implies that there are alternative choices to be considered, and in 
such a case we want not only to identify as many of these alternatives as possible but to 
choose the one that has the highest probability of success or effectiveness and best fits 
with our goals, desires, lifestyle, values, etc. Within the military, and in particular the 
joint information environment, Dull (2006) stated that the changes in the Joint Doctrine 
needed to take account that decision making was biased by five key assumptions: 
1.  Quality of information of value to decision makers is subject to influence from 
geography, language, culture, religion, organization, experience, or personality. 
2.  Decisions are made based on information available at that time 
3.  Third, the relevant aspects of the information environment and processes used to 
make decisions are understandable. 
4.  Fourth, it is possible to affect the information environment of decision makers 
through psychological, electronic, or physical means. 
5.  Finally, the effectiveness of actions relative to an objective is measurable 
(Dull, 2006) 
Information is critical for every aspect of modern life (Brown & Duguid, 2002) and the 
quality of information largely determines the quality of decisions made, and, ultimately 
it affects the quality of activity and action outcomes in organizations and in the society 
in general (Stvilia, Twidale, & Smith, 2006). The Information Assurance of these five 
assumptions  can  provide  protection  (psychological,  electronic,  or  physical), 
dependability (reliability, safety and continuity) and integrity to the Information flow 
and  provide  asset  value  and  this  can  provided  at  the  strategic  level  as  well  as Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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operationally.  Information  Quality  can  be  summarised  by  the  following  eight  key 
attributes: 
 
ACCURATE  Information must be true, verifiable, and not deceptive. 
Accurate information is based on empirical data and can be 
validated by comparing sources or checking for internal 
consistency. 
 
CURRENT  The information must be applicable to the present time. Keeping 
information concurrent requires a process of storage and 
destruction. 
 
RELEVANT  Relevant information applies to the interests of the individuals who 
use it for the decisions they are facing. It should reduce a person's 
uncertainties about work and education while facilitating choice and 
planning.  
 
SPECIFIC  For information to be specific, it must contain concrete facts. 
General observations are often interesting and can provide a 
background for further analysis, but specific facts are essential 
to realistic planning and decision making. 
 
UNDERSTANDABLE  People using information must be able to comprehend it before they 
can use it. Data must be analyzed and converted into words. The 
content of the message should avoid ambiguities and be informative 
to the intended audiences. 
 
COMPREHENSIVE  The information should include all the important categories within 
its scope of coverage.  
 
UNBIASED  This characteristic is about the motivation or purpose for which the 
information is being produced and delivered. It is unbiased when the 
individual or organization delivering the information has no vested 
interest in the decisions or plans of the people who are receiving the 
information. 
 
COMPARABLE  The information presented should be of uniform collection, analysis, 
content, and format so that you can compare and contrast the 
various occupations, programs of study, and schools. 
 
Table 8: Attributes of Information Quality (Wang R. Y., 2005a) 
Asset value can be constructed by the Information Value Chain (Schwolow & Jungfalk, 
2010) as illustrated in Error! Reference source not found. which remonstrates the MoD 
nformation model  of action and behaviour (MoD, 2009b) however develops Porter’s 
classic Value Chain Model (Porter M. E., 2001) and taking accounts of Choo’s process 
model  of information  management  (Choo,  2002).  Furthermore,  this  model  usage  of 
Senge’s five disciplines: Systems Thinking,; Achieving Personal Mastery; Shifting Mental 
Models;  Building  Shared  Vision,  and  Team  Learning  .  These  provides  momentum 
towards system engineering and organised learning (Senge, Kleiner, Roberts, Ross, & 
Smith, 1994) and Marchand’s  Information Technology  practice  capability framework Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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(Marchand, Kettinger, & Rollins, 2002a) allowed Schwolow and Jungfalk to formulate 
their  Framework  for  Strategic  Information  Management    Although  the  Information 
Value Chain model doesn’t explicitly cover Dull’s observations to generating decision 
making, it effectively manages and drives the information usage information-gathering 
function  of  decision  making.  Whereas,  the  nested  model,  Figure  44,  is  inclusive  of 
Harris’s Decision-Making definition to Dull’s five points, Information Quality and the 
two Information Value Chains. This Superior Decision Making Information Framework 
takes the issues of the Quality of Information (impact of the environment, authority, 
scope  of  coverage,  and  objectivity),  its  availability  (accurate  and  timely),  assurance 
(structured,  managed,  dependable,  protected  and  trusted),  the  need  to  share 
(measureable and effective) and the cognitive process of knowledge transfers (making 
information  understandable).  These  five  elements  influence  and  provide  direct 
incentives for individuals and organizations to engage in the Information Management 
processes of Governance, Administration, Services and Infrastructures. 
 
 
Figure 44: Superior Decision Making Information Framework 
Information Governance as expressed by Gartner (2010) is: “The specification of 
decision rights and an accountability framework to encourage desirable behaviour in the 
valuation, creation, storage, use, archival and deletion of information. It includes the 
processes, roles, standards and metrics that ensure the effective and efficient use of 
information in enabling an organization to achieve its goals.” 
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Numerous  Information  strategies  have  commented  on  its  Governance  (Cash,  et  al., 
2004; Van Grembergen, 2004; Garson, 2006; Van Grembergen & Dehaes, 2007). The 
volume and variety of digital information is evolving, exploding and been continually 
exploited  by  innovative  methods.  Structured  (appropriately  authorised)  and 
transparent  services  which  use  information  are  becoming  more  instrumented, 
interconnected and intelligent (Palmisano, 2008).  
 
 
 
Figure 45: The Governance of a Socio-Technical Enterprise 
Our cyber connected enterprises require their operations to analyse new information 
faster and make timely decisions for achieving business goals within budget to achieve 
economic  advantages  and  competitively.  Sustainable  management  of  information 
quality,  through  the  Information  Lifecycle  and  Value  Chains  is  delivered  through 
Information Governance (Salmela, 1997; DeLone & McLean, 2004). 
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3.2  The I-Stack Model 
 
Cyberspace  is  a  holistic  overview  of  the  Real  and  Virtual  Socio-Technical  world  of 
online  interactions;  the  World-Wide-Web,  Computing  networking  and  capacity  and 
Enterprise Services meeting an increasing demanding community of users. The three 
underpinning elements of the contextual continuum of cyberspace (figure 120, p 120) 
were the Knowledge, Information and Data Stacks. This concept of an Information Stack 
stems  from  the  pyramidal  context  of  transforming  data  to  wisdom  and  has  been 
represented as the components of Enterprise Information Architecture (EIA). These 
five  components:  Knowledge,  Information,  Enterprise,  Technology  and  Data  (as 
illustrated in figure 128); have been the linchpin for many architectural models, e.g.: 
Information  Architecture  for  the  World-Wide-Web  by Louis  Rosenfeld and Peter 
Morville;  Decision  Driven®  Information Architecture  by  John  Fitch  and  Information 
Architecture by Richard Saul Wurman at the Information Architecture Institute. 
 
 Cyberspace33 is also a noted component of the 21 st Century Information Domain and 
should have its own part of MoD’s Environmental Operating Concepts34 (EOCs). Current 
UK Information Security Polices (DIAN 08, 2006; CESG, 2009 and JSP 440, 2010)  have 
declared how the UK military will use Cyber Operations35 within its current Defence 
Conceptual Framework (Command, Operate, Inform, Prepare, Project, Protect and 
Sustain) in light the UK Strategic Security and Defence reviews (2010) this will impose 
some insurmountable technical obstacles to current doctrine. An adaptive Operational 
Security (OPSEC), holistic, real and virtual, Information Assured cross -domain cyber 
solution with an inclusive and extensive risk as sessment policy that Bridges the Air 
Gaps is required.  
 
The  mapping  out  of  the  Information  Domain  into  clear  interdependent,  but 
independent, disciplines is essential for understanding the complex behaviour of the 
Human-Cyber Interchanges within system domains  and system of systems. 
                                                        
 
33 JDP 3-70 (2008) “Battlespace Management” Ministry of Defence, p 1-3. 
34 The current EOCs are the Future Land Operational Concept (FLOC); the Future Maritime 
Operating Concept (FMOC). The Future Air and Space Operating Concept (FA&SOC) and the Future 
Electromagnetic Operating Concept (FEMOC). 
35 DCDC/200080604/JtCon/Operate/Cyber “A stocktake of MoD’s Cyber Capability” 5 June 2008. Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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Figure 46: Components of Enterprise Information Architecture (EIA) 
The Information Stack (I-Stack) is a mapping framework to identify the joint functions 
of independent components of the Information Domain and their main linkages and 
dependencies. The purpose of this model is understand the Information Flow across 
the  domain,  the  interdependent  role  of  Information  Operations  and  Exploitation  to 
enable  Enterprise information  sharing,  transmission  and  storage in  an assured  and 
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managed  environment  as  illustrated  in  Figure  47.  The  framework  encapsulates  a 
number  of  existing models  and  places  the  physical  domain  of  the  Internet  (and  its 
variants and off-spring) as a component of its Cyberspace. 
 
 
Figure 47: The Information Stack and the Joint Functional Concept 
 
The Socio-Technical Centre of Gravity  
MoD’s Information Strategy (MoD, 2009; MoD, 2011) declared that we need to be better 
informed to create a better defence.  The strategy identifies the need to order to protect 
the information assets and that the Process Owners, Information Assets  Owners and 
individuals need to become aware of the governance and security policies, business 
drivers  and  continuity  planning,  Risks  and  to  be  accountable  for  their  roles  and 
responsibilities when handling information.  This needs to be in concert with continued 
capability  development  and  investment  in  specialist  skills,  whilst  maintaining  close 
partnerships with OGDs, allies, industry and academia.  This will allow the Department to 
manage its information risk effectively (MoD, 2011).   Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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The key benefits from adopting this strategy were declared as: Improved Effectiveness; 
Agility:  Efficiency  and  Compliance.  The  strategy  introduced  its  3  MODIS  pillars 
(Enterprise Architecture, Skills and Information Assurance) has recognise the need for 
strategic  positioning  of  the  Information  Asset  and  that  its  value  can  be  further 
appreciated through sharing whilst its sensitivity still requires appropriate protection 
and security. The Ministry of Defence Architecture Framework (MODAF) describes a 
set of protocols on how MoD will organise information about the business and deliver 
information to the right person. The second MODIS pillar is concerned with ensuring 
that  the  “right  person”  has  the  necessary  skills  and  behaviours  to  service,  manage, 
protect and exploit it.    
 
To  support  better  decision-making,  information  needs  to  be  assessed,  analysed, 
combined  with  other  information  and  knowledge,  and  presented  in  a  timely  and 
meaningful  way;  i.e.  information  needs  to  be  delivered  at  the  right  time!  The  third 
MODIS pillar is Information Assurance, which ensures that the Information is delivered 
dependably and securely to the appropriate decision makers, thereby giving it the right 
information to the right person, at the time! In this chapter, the IA Model will develop 
the  themes  of  how  this  is  achieved  and  its  influence  on  the  two  other  pillars.  The 
integration of the 3 pillars allows for a more agile, secure and dependable environment, 
where the systems are resilient, robust, tolerant and protected and information flows 
are trusted, risked managed and safe through the use of Enterprise Architecture (EA), 
Information & Data Architectures, Technical Architectures and Information Assurance 
Architectures (IA2). Such an assured capability and risk appetite has the potential to 
Bridge the Air Gaps and allow Cross-Domain Solutions. 
Figure 48: The Influence of Assurance to the MoD S's Information Strategy Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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The Information Asset as the Centre of Gravity 
 
“The centre of gravity is the dominant characteristic of a force, the “hub of all power and 
movement, upon which everything depends . . . the point against which all our energies 
should be directed.”                              Carl von Clausewitz, On War, 1832 
 
Without  the  timely  and  effective  use  of  information  our  decisions  become  jaded, 
inappropriate or suspect.  Whilst assured information is valuable, it’s the context it is 
used  in  that  values  it  as  a  commodity,  i.e.  information  must  be  relevant.  Military 
Commanders  and  their  strategists  develop  and  execute  missions,  operations  and 
campaign  plans  based  on  a  number  of  factors  such  as  Strategic  Purpose,  the 
environment,  capability,  the  threat,  Intelligence,  Joint  Force  structure,  weapons 
technology,  legal  and  their  own  experiences  and  education  (cultural).  Education  in 
military  doctrine,  theories  and  practice  helps  the  field  officers  to  understand  and 
explain the occurrence of an event or state of nature (MoD, 2010c).  
 
Theory can provide a framework to consider how to approach a problem. It can help one 
consider  issues  or  questions  to  solve  before  making  detailed  approaches  toward 
developing a theatre strategy or campaign plan. If a theory is sound, then one could use it 
to solve problems by predicting possible outcomes, identifying potential problems, and 
finding options to get an opponent to take certain actions or modify his behaviour. Theory 
can provide a foundation to help military strategists contemplate or evaluate potential 
courses of actions (Chun, 2010). The use of centre of gravity36 (Fowler, 2002) has been 
developed into this Seven Ring Concept Model to illustrate (Figure 135) the possible 
                                                        
 
36 US Joint Publication 5–0 defines centre of gravity as comprising “the characteristics, capabilities, 
and/or sources of power from which a system derives its freedom of action, physical strength, and the 
will to fight (take action). Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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influences  of  multiple  centres  of  gravity  (Economic,  Diplomatic,  Military,  Political, 
Social and Cyber) affecting the Information Domain.  In this model, the complex system 
property  of  emergence and  the  patterns  that  arise  out  of  the  interconnectivity  and 
multiplicity of its node’s relatively simple interactions produce integrative levels within 
the model where the sum of the collective nodes is less than the sum of the whole 
system. The model thus represents a holistic view of the Information Domain rather 
than building views from the domains in which it interacts. 
 
Figure 49: The Strategic Information Asset Seven Ring Concept Model 
The heterogeneous nature and any relative importance of the key nodes within each of 
the  seven  elements  should  not  have,  as  properties  of  that  element,  strategic  or 
operational  effects  on  those  they  link  to.  However,  as  the  model  illustrates,  the 
surrounding  centres  of  gravity  become  subservient  to  their  role  when  they  act 
interactivity and influences the whole system. It is the emergent consequences of these 
key nodes (threats and opportunities) and their linkage (that may represent strengths 
and  weakness)  that  comprise  subsystems  with  an  element  (thereby  creating  the 
individual element’s Centre of Gravity) generating new properties when the systematic Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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effect of act collectively with layers of interoperability (inclusive of the Information 
element) which truly reflect the importance of the Information domain to the global 
economy. 
 
Figure 50: EBO Steps to creating the Centre of Gravity, (Vego, 2006) 
EBO  needs  to  link  the  strategic  objective  to  the  desired  end  state  for  the  steps  to 
creating  the  centre  of  gravity  cannot  be  considered  in  isolation  from  the  military’s 
operational objective as illustrated in Figure 50. It is the objective that determines the 
situation and subsequently the level and scope of the analysis of enemy and friendly 
critical strengths and weaknesses.  The impetus from EBO is that System of System 
Architecture  has  to  articulate  the  positioning  of  Socio-Technical  Enterprise.  The 
strategic objectives of the Enterprise are influenced by the 7-ring concept model and its 
centres of gravity. This is an important research topic to be explored by the Assurance 
Community. Emergent properties of complex systems are rarely anticipated and often 
are  unknown.  The  nodal  properties  that  generate  the  uncertainties  may  represent 
opportunities to the Enterprise but also threats whereas the linkages can be used to 
determine the strength of assurance against the vulnerabilities the system produces. 
The understanding of the causal component of Emergence is a major factor in creating 
a trustworthy environment and will become a bridge linking System Engineering and 
Information Assurance (SEnIA). Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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The Policies and Practice Framework 
“Information  needs  to  be  clear,  accurate,  trusted  and  not  compromised,  lost,  leaked, 
disseminated, unauthorised, published or corrupted.”         (Fenz & Ekelhart, 2009). 
 
The  strategic  value  of  this  asset  is  maximised  with  effective  Information  Usage; 
ensuring that it is available as a shared, easily accessible service within an organisation 
and  a  sound  Information  Management  Doctrine  with  good  governance,  business 
continuity, administration, dependable infrastructure and services as indicated in the 
IA Policies and Practice Framework (Figure 51). It is incumbent of any information 
system used to structure, store, exploit and transfer data has to be capable of tagging 
and  logging  the  storing,  retrieving,  moving,  copying,  modifying  and  deleting  of  any 
information. “Under the current DoDI 8510.01, IA managers encounter difficult obstacles 
associated with monitoring IA situational awareness, conducting IA control validation 
activities, summarizing validation results, and attempting to preserve the IA posture of 
their  systems  individually  and  collectively  as  part  of  a  larger  System  of  Systems,” 
(Landree, Gonzales, Ohlandt, & Wong, 2010) 
 
The  IA  Policies  and  Practice  Framework  (Richardson  C.  J.,  2012)  provides  the 
practitioner a comprehensive matrix of the important issues of Information Assurance 
in a Socio-Technical Enterprise. The 12 Domains of the Framework are:- 
  Administration Policies 
  Auditing 
  Risk Management 
  Business Continuity 
  Personal Security 
  Enterprise Security 
  Physical and Environment Security  
  Communication Security 
  Infrastructure Assurance 
  Cyber Assurance 
  Incident Management 
  Standards 
The military Cross Domain Solution (CDS) requires an assured system architecture that 
provides  an  automotive  and/or  manual  ability  to  access,  transfer  and  store  data 
between two or more differing security domains (DoD DISA, 2008).  The US DoD Cross Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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Domain  Solution  is  planned  to  provide  net-centric,  service-oriented,  cross  domain 
information sharing solutions with guaranteed quality of service for authorized users 
anywhere on the DoD’s Global Information Grid (GIG). Within the UK’s MoD there is a 
need  resolve  the  assurance  and  accreditation  concerns  of  CDS  within  the  ISTAR 
community.  
 
There  are  a  plethora  of  operational  Communication  and  Information  Systems  (CIS) 
which we continue, to want, to integrate both within existing command structures and 
with our coalition partners. These systems of systems grow out of operational necessity 
Figure 51: IA Policies and Practices, (Richardson C. J., The Assurance of Socio-Technical 
Enterprise Operations, 2012) Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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and  are  becoming  more  interoperable  and  integrated  platforms  that  formulate  an 
interdependent, complex Enterprise Architecture (EA) as illustrated in figure 140. Such 
new EAs will require considerable time and skill to complete full accreditation, and the 
accreditation  process itself  will  need  to  converge  with all  partners. This  expansive, 
evolving  environment  (SPS  Components)  will  exhibit  emergent  properties  that  the 
stove-piped,  single  discrete  security  domain  accreditation  approach  may  overlook. 
Furthermore  potential  vulnerabilities  introduced  at  the  interface  between  an  ever-
increasing number of exploitive Information Services and Systems and by increasingly 
complex network connections may be undiscovered. There will also be consequential 
expense (cost in time, further analysis, training and verification) implications to assure 
these aggregated, heterogeneous Information Systems for Accreditation. 
 
The Information Assurance Diamond Model 
The Information Domain as illustrated in Figure 51 has a number of Enterprises and 
other formations that exploit the services, systems and archives of the Information 
Storage and Service Domains.  To ensure that the information flow is trustworthy, the 
model requires a holistic IA Framework. Taking Information Assurance as the focal 
point of a resilient, robust military network, the central Information Service Domain in 
figure 140 requires an Information Security policy to protect the Service Domain from 
any malicious error, fault and failure conditions. 
 
Information Assurance aligns the Information Domain interconnectivity with a 
structured approach that reflects the trusted roles and responsibilities of the 
communities of interest, their vetting, clearances and access privileges. 
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These Enterprise systems need to provide safe and dependable operations to 
reduce the incidents of system faults and failure. 
 
 
Risk Management  reviews the probalitity of a malicious event and the impact that it 
might have on the system failing and its ability of recovery. 
 
These conceptual routes of IA providing a robust Socio-Technical Enterprise can be 
framed as the diamond model as illustrated in Figure 52. 
 
Figure 52: The Information Assurance Diamond Model 
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The IA Model Quadrant  
“Interoperability enabled by Communication and Information Systems37 (IO by CIS) has 
been defined as...’the ability of systems, units or forces to provide services to and accept 
services from other systems, units or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable 
them to operate effectively together’.   (MoD ACP167, 2011). 
 
The basic 4 part model as illustrated in Figure 142 (and developed from Figure 39, 
p275)  doesn’t fully illustrate the increasing dependency exhibited with our military 
communication  networks  (Brass,  Galaskiewicz,  &  Greve,  2004)  and  their  service 
architectures (Lund, Eggen, Hadzic, & Hafsoe, 2007) which has significantly heightened 
concerns regarding their reliability (Soliman & Janz, 2004); security (Phillips, Ting, & 
Dem,  2002);  dependability  (Al-Kuwaiti,  Kyriakopoulos,  &  Hussein,  2009);  impact  to 
business  continuity  (Sikich,  2003;  VanVactor  &  Gill,  2010)  and  operational 
effectiveness (Cebrowski & Garstka, 1998).  
 
Figure 53: Building the IA Contextual Model Quadrants 
                                                        
 
37 IO enabled by CIS management and assurance is mandated by the MoD’s Vice Chief of Defence 
Staff (VCDS). It is mandatory for all UK MOD acquisition projects containing Communication and 
Information System (CIS) - regardless of financial approval category, lifecycle stage or operational 
theatre - unless agreed otherwise with the MoD Systems Engineering and Integration Group (SEIG). 
Available at: http://www.mod.uk/ 
DefenceInternet/FactSheets/InteroperabilityEnabledByCommunication 
AndInformationSystemsioByCis.htm (accessed 15th March 2011). Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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There is a critical dependency on these complex (Lukasik, 2003; Luiijf, Nieuwenhuijs, & 
Klaver, 2008), highly connected, interacting systems where their interoperability may 
inherently  produce  major  consequential  impact  upon  critical  and  cross  domain 
operational infrastructures from minor/simple network intrusion, failure and security 
violations (Qian, Joshi, Tipper, & Krishnamurthy, 2008). These risks exemplify the cross 
domain  problems,  where  NEC  interoperability  and  the  “Need  to  Share”  are  now 
mandated across MoD Networks.  Research and development of military systems have 
often  focussed  on  system  functionality  with  security  and  dependability  being 
independently pursued. These network fundamentally command and control modern 
military operations and that their information flows and exploitation are critical to 
Situational Awareness and Decision Making. The MoD’s Information Strategy (MODIS, 
2009) linking Enterprise Architecture and Information Assurance have articulated the 
need  to  provide  robust,  dependable,  fault-tolerant,  secure  and  trusted  networks. 
Enterprise Architecture and Information Assurance are positioned to converge these 
capabilities  and  provide  intrusion-tolerant  systems.  At  the  2011  Cyber  Warfare 
Conference,  a  USCYBERCOM  General  quoted  that  with  the  increased  and  more 
sophisticated cyber threat to Government and Military infrastructures and supporting 
networks  that  we  must  “expect  and  acknowledge  that  our  networks  are  already 
compromised and that we have intrusion”.  
 
Our objectives are a secure and resilient United Kingdom, and shaping a stable 
world.  In  pursuit  of  those  goals,  our  highest  priorities  are  tackling  terrorism, 
cyber security, international military crises and national disasters such as floods 
and pandemics." Prime Minister David Cameron. 
 
The admission that we cannot have absolute security on firewalled, encrypted, IPS, 
personnel vetted, air-gapped classified systems is a significant statement from military 
sources.  There  are  increasing  frequent  numbers,  multiple  types  of  attacks,  attack 
vectors, attack agents and malicious viruses are inflicting constant intrusions to our 
networks. Measured in the tens of thousands per day, these cyber assaults have become 
a national concern (Ministry of Defence, 2010). 
 
However, it’s not just the dependencies on the performance and functionality of the 
systems that Enterprise has become reliant upon, but how the systems interact with 
each other and with the communities of interest. This Human-Cyber interexchange is at 
the heart of the Socio-Technical Enterprise and Information Assurances provides the 
many of the trustworthy bridges that exist between these two domains as illustrated in 
figure 54.   Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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HUMAN  CYBER 
 
 
Figure 54: An IA Perspective to the Human-Cyber Interexchange 
The IA Model Quadrant, as illustrated in Figure 55, brings back the need to holistically 
view Information Assurance from four key areas of study:- (1) The System Engineering 
and Enterprise Architecture of the Information Infrastructure; (2) The investigation 
and modelling of System Dependencies and Safety; (3) The building of better, more cost 
effective security and protection devices and (4) controlling change, Human Factors 
and culture of the environment through Trust and Risk Management. 
 
 
Figure 55: The IA Model Quadrant 
Structure Dependability
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The quadrant illustrates the hierarchal construction of the 4 principle disciplines of 
Information Assurance; however a more holistic view would be depicturing the cyclic 
nature of those disciplines and their component elements which all interact with each 
other. The view exhibited in figure 55 demonstrates how architecture can affect the 
systems  information  dependency,  how  safety  influences  protection,  how  security  is 
risked managed and how trust affects organisation hierarchies.  
 
The cyclic nature of the model illustrates (as exhibited in Figure 56) the need not to 
focus not on anyone discipline within the Art and Science of Assurance, but to continue 
to re-examine, analysis and evaluate its impact, direction and guidelines. IA needs more 
research and development, more intellectual and industrial debates, more discussion 
across  a  greater  segment  of  society  and  more  education  in  our  schools,  colleges, 
universities and workplace. The Socio-Technical Enterprise has to evolve in this new 
dynamic marketplace, but it has to protect its information assets, its communities of 
interests,  the organisations that work with it and the Enterprises for which its services, 
products  and  values  that  have  become  to  rely  upon  it.  In  the  Information  Age, 
everybody is becoming connected, and those connections are becoming pervasive and 
dependent to our society. 
 
 
Figure 56: The Cyclic Nature of the IA Model Quadrant 
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Information Infrastructure: IA Components of Structure & Resilience 
In chapter 3, the arguments were focused on the Architecture and Interoperability of 
the Enterprise. These arguments help create this first quadrant of the IA Model. The 
Socio-Technical  Enterprise  will  create  a  changing  environment,  often  led  by 
technological innovation, but will be sustained by its social desire, wants and needs. 
Information Assurance has to address the business processes and their alignment to 
other  internal  and  external  processes  that  involves  Information  Assets,  Process, 
Storage and Transit. 
 
With  ubiquitous  systems,  the  complex  expansive  and  evolutionary  (Strategic 
Positioning)  environments  with  ever-changing,  agile  networks  boundaries  need 
Resilience, defined by Jean-Claude Laprie (2008) as the “persistence of dependability 
when  facing  changes”,  having  tolerance  to  cope  with  unanticipated  events  and 
boundary  changes  caused  from  interoperable  interconnection.    The  classical 
development of Resilience is of system persistence of service in periods of change that 
be dependably delivered. These Resilient services can be justifiably called trustworthy 
in an agile environment. 
Table 9: IA Resilience Attributes 
 
RESILIENCE ATTRIBUTES 
1.   Tolerance  Coping  with situations exceeding the 
System’s specifications and expectations  
 
2.   Robustness  The System retains its ability to deliver 
services in conditions which are beyond its 
normal domain of operations 
 
3.   Adaptability  Coping with an evolving system and having 
the ability to evolve whilst executing  
 
4.   Utility  The utility and diversity of the system to 
perform whilst coping with threats 
 
5.   Accessibility  Confident access to secure, verifiable and 
evaluated services 
 
 
The linkage between the attributes of the systems architecture and the architect of the 
business processes and Enterprise Structure has many creative and innovative tracks 
to be researched, developed and pursued. One of the more pressing is the building of 
tolerances  into  the  socio-technical  system.  Many  technical  systems  have  failed Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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catastrophically  when  confronted  with  malicious  attacks  or  major  design  errors. 
Information Assurance is a methodology that will question the Enterprise architects to 
minimise  risk  and  to  create  policies,  procedures,  good  practice  and  techniques  to 
ensure robust structures; more tolerant operations; greater utility of services; better 
access  to  the  community  of  interests  and  a  more  tolerant  working  environment  to 
intrusion and faults. Socio-Technical Enterprises require an assured purpose, a secure 
environment, dependable capabilities and a culture of trust. 
 
Information Dependability: IA Components of Dependability & Safety 
The  second  component  of  the  IA  quadrant  is  the  disciplines  of  System  and  KID 
dependability and socio-technical system safety. The more complex and integrated our 
real  and  virtual  worlds  become,  the  more  reliant  we  become  on  them  performing 
correctly. Enterprises are becoming more dependent on the interdependencies of its 
systems and those of other Enterprises with its becoming more interoperable with.  
The  sharing  environment  requires  dependable  services  and  information  and 
dependable knowledge management, transfer and understanding which both rely upon 
dependable data from our data sources. 
 
Figure 57: Assured Information Dependability is the fabric of the Socio-Technical Enterprise 
System  survivability  is  a  cornerstone  of  Enterprise  Assurance.  The  Socio-technical 
Enterprise have become custodians of the Critical Information Infrastructures in which 
our society and culture has adopted and become ever increasing reliant upon. These 
Enterprises themselves have to become dependable. Figure 146 illustrates that  safe Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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and healthy operations, that is routinely checked up (audited), that maintains the good 
state of its operations within performance tolerances, is agile and flexible to the access 
needs of its communities; capable of improving its readiness of services (across SOA 
platforms)  and  quality  (QoS);  is  good  enough  to  respond  to  threats  and  its  own 
vulnerabilities  will  provide  a  trustworthy  Enterprise  capability  and  ensure  system 
survivability within its own risk appetite. Safe and dependable operations provide firm 
foundations for a successful Socio-Technical Enterprise and its opportunities to grow in 
a complex, sometimes hostile, environment. The objective of this Assurance model is to 
provide  a  trusted  solution  to  the  communities  of  interest  that  will  allow  system 
confidentiality, integrity, availability, no-repudiation, authentication and access control. 
The Cross-Domain solution requires a de-confliction of  the “need to share “ aims and 
objectives and the current “need to know” principle where current military systems, 
implementing the Bell-LaPadula  Model (Bell & LaPadula, 1973; Bell, Looking Back at 
the Bell-La Padula Model, 2005). 
 
Information Security: IA Components of Security & Protection 
 
 
Figure 58: Security Attributes to the IA Model 
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The  Assurance  of  a  System  is  often  cited  by  its  levels  of  Protection  and  Security 
Markings.  Information  Security  is  the  protection  of  information  and  information 
systems from System Susceptibility and these attributes are listed in figure 58. It has 
been  defined  as  the  prevention  of  unauthorized  access,  use,  disclosure,  disruption, 
tampering,  modification,  interrupting  or  destruction  in  order  to  provide  integrity, 
confidentiality,  and  availability  (NIST,  2003).  A  secure  system  is  the  absence  of 
unauthorised access to, disclosure of, or handling of, system state (Avizienis, Laprie, 
Randell, & Landwehr, 2004). Furthermore, the ITU-T X.805 Recommendation (2005) 
adds 5 more dimensions (Non-Repudiation, Access Control, Communication Security, 
Authentication  and  Privacy)  as  attributes  to  reduce  System  Vulnerability38  to  the  3 
established  tenets  (Confidentiality,  Integrity  and  Availability)  that  allow  systems  to 
Detect, React and Adapt to  deny threat Capability, Intent and Opportunity  (Little & 
Rogova,  2006;  Gasper,  2010).  To  ensure  that  the  security  policies,  procedures  and 
guidelines are adhered to and accomplished, the Enterprise has to deploy protection 
mechanisms as illustrated in figure 59. 
 
 
Figure 59: The Sphere of Protection to the Socio-Technical Enterprise  
(Keller B. M., 2011) 
                                                        
 
38 System vulnerability is defined to be the intersection of a system susceptibility or flaw, access to the 
flaw, and the capability to exploit the flaw. Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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Information Trustworthiness: IA Components of Trust & Risk Management 
The fourth component of the IA Quadrant is Information Trustworthiness. The heart of 
the Socio-Technical Enterprise is its ability to manage its risks and maintain trust in 
both the real and virtual worlds. There are conflicting notions that trust can and cannot 
exist  in  Cyberspace  (van  Swaay,  1992;  Committee  on  Information  Systems 
Trustworthiness,  1999;  Minsky,  2003;  Sterner,  2011).  The  emergence  of  our 
Information  based,  networked,  society  requires  people  to  make  superior,  trusted, 
decisions from services, applications and data presented from cyberspace. The building 
of trust and relationships with online users, clients, customers, suppliers and cyber 
agents is of major importance to the online economy, social networks and coalition 
enterprises  (Luo,  2002).  In  our  3  layer  model,  the  Social  Domain  relies  on  social 
networking of the Human-Cyber Interexchange peer-to-peer cyber connectivity. This 
communicative world is veiled in anonymity, usurpation, covert channelling, coercion 
and subversion where our Cyber based interactivity and interactions can produce  a 
“disinhibition  effect”  (Suler,  2004)  in  an  uncertain  world,  where  fear  and  doubt  is 
common place; yet it’s our chosen space to social network, conduct e-commerce and 
publish thoughts, knowledge, media and private details.  Can we trust our trust under 
such circumstances? 
 
The recent EU study looking towards the future of the Internet (European Commission, 
2010) identified that culture changes had a face of visibility – that there exists a balance 
between ubiquity and security, pervasiveness and privacy, centralization and surveillance. 
Visibility could be seen in terms of two main “faces” of the internet:  
 
1.  Visible  internet  applications,  obvious  to  users,  requiring  input  or 
observability  
 
2.  Invisible  internet  applications,  operating  without  active  user  input  or 
observation.  
The report noted that: Difficulties arise when dealing with the second “face”, ie which 
aspects should be invisible, and how? This concept invokes the multiplicity of the future 
internet  and  how  it  will  be  manifested.  Major  sources  of  multiplicity  include:  privacy 
domains – an internet analogue of public and private space; identities; levels of user trust 
(eg high security retail vs. no-control segments); national or regional internets; and so on. 
For  the  Socio-Technical  enterprise,  the  context  of  trusts,  its  maintenance  and 
improvement is cost of doing business in Cyberspace. In fact, trust is the new Return of 
Investment calculation for its corporate viability and values. Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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In creating Trust in the Enterprise; how can the Human-Cyber interface can be viewed 
as  a  trust  relationship? Can  we  create  trust  in  Cyberspace?    These  two  important 
questions  are  still  to  be  resolved  in  finding  Cross-Domain  Solutions.  An  assured 
solution for the Enterprise architect requires the development of trust, trusted systems 
and system integrity as well as strategies for achieving dependable, safe and secure 
services, systems, infrastructures and networks. Is trust a people thing, or can things 
affect our trust. 
 
 
Figure 60: Trust is the new ROI for the Socio-Technical Enterprise 
How can we decide when to trust and does trust generate acceptable risk? Can we 
assure trust? The model allows to the questions to be asked and directs its other 3 
quadrants to argue and support solutions. The other component of the quadrant is risk 
management. which has a direct effect on the security and resilience of a system. The 
amount of risk in what is acceptable and what is unacceptable derives the Enterprise 
Risk  Appetite.  This  appetite  is  maintained  if  the  system  performs  within  agreed 
tolerances and benefits the Enterprise and its operational capability, however it can be 
eroded if Risk Management becomes checked boxed, non-compliant, lost in focus or 
neglected. Intolerances are the nemesis of the Social Technical Enterprise. 
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3.4 Creating a Reference Model for IA 
 
Information Assurance (IA) is the assumed responsibility (Corporate Governance) and 
accreditation of a socio-technical Enterprises across the 5-layers of the Cyber Domain 
(Geographical, Physical, Logical, Persona and Cyber Persona), inclusive of their Business 
Processes,  Information  Operations,  Information  Exploitation,  Management,  Services, 
Technologies  and  Infrastructures.  The  socio-technical  Enterprise  is  assured  by 
appropriate levels of maturity and awareness within the 8-Dimensions of Information 
Assurance  (Structure,  Resilience,  Dependability,  Safety,  Security,  Protection,  Trust  and 
Risk Management).                                                                (Richardson, C.J., 2011) 
 
Taking the above definition for Information Assurance and building on the modelling of 
IA  Interoperability  across  the  5-layers  of  cyberspace  and  the  IA  Quadrant  Model  a 
Reference Model can be created for Information Assurance as illustrated in figures 61 
and 62. 
 
 
Figure 61: Matching the Quadrant model to the Layers of Cyberspace Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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Throughout  this  thesis,  the  arguments  has  been  presented,  analysed,  modelled  and 
where possible evaluated to create this IA Reference Model. By taking any of the 3-
Dimensions, an IA practitioner can start to analyse a Socio-Technical Enterprise and its 
Systems from an Information Assurance Perspective.  
 
In  Bridging  the  Gaps,  Information  Assurance  provides  a  Strategic,  Operational  and 
Tactical  perspective  that  allows  an  Enterprise  to  function  in  a  robust  and  resilient 
manner, with a high degree of dependability, safe and secure operations; protected and 
risk managed and above all…Trusted. 
 
 
   
Figure 62: The Information Assurance Cuboid Model Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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CHAPTER 4:  
Bridging Gaps in Education and the Profession 
 
 
Whether  researching  new  technologies  or  implementing  information  risk 
management initiatives, information security professionals are being held to even 
more stringent standards than ever before.       (Frost & Sullivan, 2008) 
 
Sir Isaac Newton’s work once inspired and reassured a world that was ready to be 
enlightened. His original ideas that “results were proportional to the forces applied” 
and  that  “cause  precedes  effect”  generated  a  determinism  outlook  to  the  world 
(Baggott, 2004).  Determinism has long been used as a classic model to measure the 
effectiveness  of  practitioners,  including  IT  executives,  managers,  and  teachers. 
However, in the light of the digital age has determinism become dated? Do these linear 
models cease to help today’s practitioners to become effective cyber leaders, especially 
if there were some sudden, unexpected changes?  
 
Determinism measures against a matrix through some linear process to a predictable 
outcome. It was used to gauge and evaluate our ability to develop skills within the 
matrix and thereby this linearity would enable practitioners to effectively predict and 
control human systems and human behaviour through some small incremental change 
(Pentland &  Liu,  1999;  Burns,  2002).    Early  UK  Network  Enabled  Capability  (MoD, 
2009a)  skill  matrices  emulated  this  deterministic  skills  process  to  augment  the 
technological development of Netcentric Warfare with a matrix of defined roles and Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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responsibilities  (Alberts,  Garstka,  &  Stein,  1999).  The  matrix  defined  the  necessary 
educational and experienced required for each role and how that role fits within the 
Command and Control (C2) of the Organisation (UK, NATO or some other Coalition).  
However, this work soon produced a vast database with an ever increasing complexity 
owing  to  frequent  movement  of  personnel  within  MoD.  Time  in  posts  was  short 
(normally  2  to  3  years,  and  sometimes  a  lot  less)  and  the  individuals  had  few 
opportunities  to  engage  in  skill  up-training  (for  the  post  they  occupied  or  even 
prepping for their next post). A more inclusive methodology was needed to provide 
sufficient capability within an organisation that allows for the agile deployment of its 
staff  and  builds  the  necessary  infrastructure  for  training  and  education.  MoD’s 
Information  Strategy  (MoD,  2011)  recognised  that  up-skilling  was  pivotal  to  its 
doctrine and exonerated in the UK’s Cyber Policy (Cabinet Office, 2011a). Since the 
publication of the National Information Assurance Strategy (Cabinet Office, 2007) the 
need to quantify what the professional IA standards were required and the level of 
education specifically needed have been discussed and with many policies promulgated 
through  many  government  departments.  The  Cabinet’s  Office  Central  Sponsor  for 
Information  Assurance  (CSIA)  and  its  General  Information  Assurance  Products  and 
Services  Initiative  (GIPSI)  brought  together  more  representation  towards  an  IA 
standard from central and local Government, NHS, Criminal Justice Network, Industry, 
Commerce and Academia. This work was continued later on by CESG, Department of 
BIS, DfE and the Information Assurance Advisory Council (IAAC).  Six years on and the 
UK  still  has  to  create  a  National  Occupational  Standard  (NOS)  for  Information 
Assurance or even produce a comprehensive national framework to supply appropriate 
training for our cyber security practitioners. 
 
The NOS is essential for Higher Educational Establishments to focus upon the IA issues, 
skills and education that Government, Industry and the wider online community needs. 
CESG (the UK’s National Technical Authority for Information Assurance) has employed 
three institutions to develop its deterministic CESG Listed Advisors Scheme (CLAS) for 
certified  Accreditors  and  IA  Advisors:  BCS,  the  Institute  of  Information  Security 
Practitioners  (IISP)  and  APGM-UK.    This  exemplifies  GCHQ’s  specific  view  on  the 
educational standards needed, but fails to recognise those of Industry, the Legal and 
Accountancy Professions and of the business management of e-commerce. There is a 
more holistic need for authorities such as CESG, BIS, DfE and IAAC to engage with a 
wider community and the UKAS Skill Councils (who represent Industry and Academic 
interests)  as  their  actions,  themes  and  policies  will  have  a  ripple  effect  from  any 
derived national standards to the curricula, to professional development and finally to Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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created the necessary holistic learning environment for IA to flourish both as a science 
and  an  art.  A  National  Occupational  Standard  will  provide  a  necessary  bridge  and 
driving  forces  to  the  educational  gap  between  what  the  UK  enterprises  and  their 
organisations  requirements  (and  retraining)  and  what  training  and  education  can 
delivery within the current national education framework.  
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Figure 63: Force Field Diagram for the Assured Information Operations 
Equilibrium  is  required  to  be  struck  between  resource  allocation  and  necessity  to 
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and  corporate  reluctance  and  that  the  necessity  for  change  would  fail  if  a  balance 
wasn’t  achieved.  The  three  main  applications  (Change  Management,  Productivity 
Improvement and Decision Making) of Kurt Lewin’s (1951) force field model analysis 
allows IA practitioners to identify and understand the Enterprise’s assured state  to 
redress  the  current  shortfalls.  The  importance  of  this  analysis  is  its  ability  to 
demonstrate where changes are necessary and what forces need to impact. The model 
has proven to be a powerful decision-making tool as Business Managers can influence 
the  forces  to  maximise  the  corporate’s  risk  appetite  and  potential  of  changes  to 
succeed.  Figure  63  provides  strength  indicators  to  designate  the  scalar  levels  of 
influence where:  1 = extremely weak and 7 = extremely strong 
 
Many organisations are only just beginning to recognise Assurance Education; the bulk 
of their security budgets are paid out on consultancy and technologies; hence the high 
strength  score  marks  for  security  and  corporate  legal  obligations  such  as  the  Data 
Protection Act, 1998.  Motivation to protect corporate assets has always been strong, 
but for most acquired information systems the need for security was often an after-
thought or became a necessity after some fault condition. This late addition of security 
mechanisms  often  led  to  inappropriate  compromises  and  latent  vulnerabilities 
(Meunier, 2011). 
 
The apparent reluctance businesses to invest time and money in skills training and IA 
Education, measured as resilience in this model, is in part due to their perceived need 
to protect corporate assets rather than tackle the more intrinsic problems of changing 
cultures hence the lower score of 4 in capital investments.  Chapter 4 had demonstrated 
the  need  for  the  strategic  positioning  of  Information  Assurance  and  implicitly 
confirmed the necessity for a good education and training.  
 
With natural disaster like Katarina , terrorists attacks like 9/11 and data losses like 
TkMax and Sony Play-stations, business continuity has risen in corporate governance, 
however little has been done to the majority of the critical information infrastructure 
as the data from the World’s Economic Forum (2012) shows that the latest technologies 
are increasingly accessible to local industries, but indications relating to confidence in the 
institutions responsible for developing safeguards, including those that mage the risks of 
emerging technologies, have not shown proportionate increases. 
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4.1 Bridging the Professional Gaps 
 
As first discussed in Chapter 1, there is a capability gap between what we need to know 
and what we know. This lack of knowledge has developed from increasing complex 
picture of how we operate in cyberspace and the integration and interoperation of 
technologies, software applications and human ingenuity. The pace of this exploitation 
of cyber resources has outstretched many of our training and educational programmes 
leaving many communities of users ignorant of the issues of interoperability and safe 
operations.    Information  Assurance  in  the  Community  is  all  about  redressing  this 
capability gap and developing good IA practitioners, resourcing their education and 
continuous  specialized  training.  Corporate  Governance  mandates  adherence  to  best 
practice and security policies to assure the safety and protection of their information 
assets. More than ever there is a need for IA practitioner’s specialism to meet current 
security  requirements.  Have  our  communities  of  interests  become  naïve  to  the 
complexities of Cyberspace and the Human-Cyber Interfaces? The frantic and explosive 
technological  pace  of  the  Internet  has  not  produced  a  corresponding  cultural 
progression  towards  greater  awareness  of  its  emergent  properties.    Cyber  security 
education  remains  stubbornly  low  and  user  community’s  exhibit  poor  behaviour 
towards security breaches (Cornish, Livingstone, Clemente, & Yorke, 2011).  
 
There are too few practitioners implementing Cross-Domain Solutions and these few 
are having to cope with restricted budgets, reduced skilled resources and increasing 
complex  network  of  networks  with  new  properties  been  routinely  discovered  or 
exposed as vulnerabilities.  The UK’s Cyber policy (Cabinet Office, 2011a) recognises 
the need to change our attitude to training but it stills underfunds as we consistently 
fail to provide the necessary resources to train our professionals. Understandably, we 
all have to work within budgets, but those budgets have to be realistic to the risks 
involved  (Bhagyavati,  Agyei-Mensah,  Shumba,  &  Kearse,  2005).  When  it  comes  to 
Cyber Security; Ignorance is bliss: if you don’t know something, it can’t hurt you - that is 
to say it causes no discomfort. From childhood we learnt to protect ourselves from 
harm but we were also willing to explore; as we age, we began to restrain ourselves for 
the fear of others might do. This becomes more evident with our online experiences 
which  have  increasingly  obtruded  our  awareness  of  its  criminality  and  harm  from 
malware.  Cyberspace opens a new world of opportunities and making IA work will 
protect us in this virtual dimension. A programme of cyber awareness is necessary and 
Figure  64  illustrates  the  benefits  and  consequences  of  a  blissful,  exploiting  but 
educated user community. Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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Figure 64: The SWOT of Human Blissfulness in Cyber Communities 
The IA Profession needs to provide the knowledge, awareness and understanding to its 
cyber communities to provide more dependable and safe systems that the users can 
benefit from, trust, manage and exploit rather than be exploited. 
 
IA in the Defence Community 
John  Colley,  Chairman  of  (ISC)²’s  European  Advisory  Board  stated  that:  “The 
opportunity for the information security profession is immense. Clearly we must continue 
to  understand  the  evolving  threat  landscape  coming  from  increasingly  sophisticated 
criminal factions. We must also stay on top of the technology available to protect against 
these  threats,  recognising  them  as  tools,  rather  than  the  focus  of  our  jobs.  Most 
importantly, however, we must recognise that our jobs are not only critical to the ongoing 
running  of  the  business  and  protection  of  its  assets,  but  also  to  its  development  and 
strength in the future. We are driving a change in the role of the security professional. Let 
us make the most of our influence.” 
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Fundamentally, security is a compromise to influences, power and agenda and often 
may  be  not  fit  for  purpose.  Corporate  executives  have  employed  and  later  witness 
security  professionals  who  did  not  improve  the  business  situation,  but  further 
complicate or cause a degree of disbelieve when they present doomsday scenarios or 
forecast  future  major  IT  failings.  These  professionals  are  out  to  sell  services  and 
platforms  and  exploit  the  potential  threats  (malicious  attacks  to  a  risk  adverse 
clientele)  and  weakness  (unrealistic  trust,  fear,  uncertainty  and  doubts)  of  an 
uninformed community; as  illustrated  in  figure  111.  They expose  a  proliferation  of 
guidance, policies and security technologies to provide technical solutions to the issues 
of cyber management, architecture, assurance and exploitation; but they provide very 
little recognition of the skills, knowledge and education that is needed by the business 
community to communicate, comprehend and provide necessary cyber assurances for a 
sharing, informative community of people and cyber actors.  
 
The NEC is an inter-networking cyber dominated world of Information Exploitation 
(IX) which is both complex and chaotic (Russell & Russell, 1999; Spar, 1999; Wheatley 
M. J., 2006). Cyberspace has brought about uncertainty in an environment of cyber 
products, services and layered networks that have slowly lost cohesion as they mash-
up (Lee, 2005; Dreyfus, 2008).  NEC Command and Control, cyberspace management 
and leadership not only needs it’s personnel more experienced in its many capabilities, 
but also educated in its architect, processes,  procedures and policies  (Alberts D. S., 
1997). This takes time and the NEC roll-out hadn’t prepared adequate time for training 
and education (Major General Baxter, 2005). This process of development and lack of 
underpinning know-how has generated many issues, incidents and business process 
failures within coalition operations in Afghanistan (Kellner, 2008; Rickards, 2010). The 
following  MoD  Information  Assurance  Policy  and  Standards  are  the  current  key 
documents for Information Assurance and Accreditation.  
 
  The Defence Manual of Security: JSP 440  
  Data Protection Act 1998  
  HMG Information Security Standards  
  Defence Crypto-security Publications  
  The Defence Manual of Interoperable Core Network Technologies: JSP 457  
  JSP 600 - MoD CIS Policy and Assurance Process  
  Defence Co-ordinating Installation Design Authority Manual of Regulations 
  JSP 740 – MoD Acceptable User Policy 
  JSP 747- Information Management Handbook Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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The damage caused to the MoD by a lack of awareness of Information Assurance can be 
serious. Poor configuration of Information Systems, inappropriate behaviour by staff, 
careless information management, excessive distribution of documents and failing to 
apply security policies and procedures can expose vulnerabilities, reduce operational 
edge, expose the MoD to litigation and adversely affect its reputation. At this moment, 
the MoD has an underfunded and understaffed accreditation process to provide the 
assurance to an online community of 300,000 users and ineffective Information risk 
and incident management process, with very few individuals aware of it, understand it 
or  even  take  heed  of  their  contents  when  acquainted  with  it.  The  new  military 
perspective towards IA (MoD, 2011) is from the premise that it is assures the conduct 
of Defence business, whether on deployed operations or in the administration of MoD 
fixed  systems.    Military  IA  encompasses  all  activity  needed  to  assure  the  critical 
information  on  which  Defence  business  relies.    From  this  approach  and  the  model 
produced in Chapter 3, a new definition of IA can be established:  Information Assurance 
(IA)  is  a  holistic  management  process  and  architecture  designed  to  ensure  that  the 
systems and networks employed to manage, store and transit the critical information 
assets  across  the  human-cyber  interfaces  and  used  by  an  organisation  are  reliable, 
resilient, secure and trustworthy; and that tolerant measures and processes are in place 
to  counter  malicious  activity  and  inappropriate  behaviour,  in  order  to  support  the 
business needs of the organisation.  
 
Up-to-date, readily accessible and, above all, secure information is a critical component 
of the Defence Community’s that now has the drive to implement efficient and cost 
effective working practices. For the MoD, good IA is ensuring that the integrity of such 
critical information is maintained, while protecting systems from those that may seek 
to abuse them. Under the UK Cyber Policy (Cabinet Office, 2011a) this has become a key 
concern.  Above  all,  the  Defence  Community  requires  a  survivable  voice  and  data 
network infrastructure that delivers information in assured manner in the most testing 
of environments, while allowing it to take advantage of up-to-date technology such as 
email,  the  Internet  and  Virtual  Private  Networks;  e.g.  the  MoD’s  Defence  Fixed 
Telecommunications  Service  (DFTS)  has  been  working  since  1997  to  ensure  that 
information,  ranging  from  ‘unclassified’  to  ‘top  secret’,  can  be  accessed  easily  and 
securely via a fully interoperable infrastructure.  However, in life, people don’t react to 
reality; they react to their perceptions of reality and a lot of the MoD’s contextual work 
has not been implemented and its online community is still very ignorant of their roles 
and responsibilities within cyberspace (Roper, 2005). Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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Chaos Theory in development of an IA Community 
Understanding the need to identify and create the sensitivity, Lorenz’s Butterfly Effects, 
to a dynamically changing, chaotic rich environment formulates and captures issues to 
initiate, facilitate and support change within the domain influenced by Chaos Theories. 
The chaos paradigm replaces the ubiquitous paradigm of Newtonian reductionism that 
postulated  a  linear,  mechanistic  view  our  real  world.    Zohar,  (1990)  see  quantum 
physics as the bedrock of chaos that is “rich with imagery that almost begs application to 
the experiences of daily life.” 
 
Implicitly, experiencing this phenomenon is being very much involved the concepts of 
uncertainty through a necessary and directed process of establishing, inventing  and 
modifying government framework and educational structures to generate the new IA 
profession.  Understanding the theories of Zohar (1990),  the Quantum Self  and Zohar 
(1997)  Corporate  Brain  offered  an  interpretation  of  Chaos  Theory  to  structure 
organizations  for  fundamental  transformation.  She  demonstrates  how  people  must 
change the thinking behind their thinking. “rewire the structures of the corporate brain - 
to operate more fully and achieve genuine fundamental organizational change.” 
 
The Cabinet Office papers on Transformational Government (2005) and The National 
Information Assurance Strategy (2007) provides the source for transformational change 
and  which  Shelton,  (2003)  had  earlier  illustrated  could  provide  an  appropriate 
environment to evolve the paradigm;“by applying principles found in chaos theory an 
organization can make ‘lemonade out of lemons’ and become more responsive to change 
agents while continuously moving ahead and growing from the inside out without the 
fear of complete chaos.” 
 
Generating  the  IA  professional  qualities,  values  and  continuance  in  order  for  it  to 
become established, grow, develop, survive and adapt is a result of this re-invention 
and  creative  adaptation  to  providing  a  new  specialism,  the  wave/particle  dualism 
establishes  a  perturbed  equilibrium.  Dooley  (1995)  observed  that  learning 
organizations such as DCCIS could: “allows self-organization, rather than attempting to 
control  the  bifurcation  through  planned  change.  Being  “off-balance”  lends  itself  to 
regrouping  and  re-evaluating  the  system’s  present  state  in  order  to  make  needed 
adjustments and regain control and equilibrium. By understanding and introducing the 
element  of  punctuated  equilibrium  (chaos) while  facilitating  networks  for  growth,  an 
organization can change gears from “cruise” to “turbo” in regard to speed and intensity of Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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organizational change. While maintaining an equilibrium state seems to be an intuitively 
rational  method  for  enabling  an  organization  to  gain  a  sense  of  consistency  and 
solidarity, existing on the edge of a chaotic state remains the most beneficial environment 
for systems to flourish develop and grow. 
 
System management mechanisms deal with order and regularity, security deals with 
the  complexity  generated  by  irregularities.  With  Information  assurance  it’s  the 
understanding of interlacing architectural complexities and human behaviour produces 
a  complex,  dynamic  complexity.    This  complexity  has  elements  of  an  emerging 
structure, where the whole is often more than its parts, that there is no disaggregation 
but there is a lack of knowledge (uncertainty of relevant knowledge) and a degree of 
blindness and the sensitivity is dependent on the boundary conditions of unpredictable 
behaviour  and  bifurcation.  Dualism  within  the  Quantum  Theory,  by  a  simple 
transposition can create a security paradigm with a deterministic chaos /assurance 
dualism.  A characteristic of Chaos, as observed by Mitchell (1998) is that complex 
interactions modelling real (cyber-based) behaviours have demonstrated consistently 
that the potential outcomes have predictable limits. Thus in a security context, knowing 
the exact state how the system will end up is a requirement, but this is unrealistic as 
Heisenberg’s  Uncertainty  principle  confirms.  The  range  and  the  probabilities  of 
possible outcomes has to be constrained, allowing Assurance to take control which is 
ultimately very realistic. Finding the critical values to provide system assurance is a 
worthwhile future action and a recommendation to develop beyond this Thesis. 
 
The Right Policy 
Netcentric  warfare  effects-based  operations  (EBOs)  are  “processes  for  obtaining  a 
desired strategic outcome or effect on the enemy through the synergistic and cumulative 
application  of  the  full  range  of  military  and  non-military  capabilities  at  all  levels  of 
conflict”   (Alberts, Garstka, & Stein, 1999) 
 
EBOs routinely involve complex environments that require information exploitation to 
enable  decision  making  in  multinational,  multifunctional  collaborative  groups  and 
provide shared situational awareness to commanders. These operations pose problems 
when  insecure  information  resources  are  required  to  interoperate  with  military 
networks,  in  particular  the  Internet  has  become  essential  to  the  military’s  superior 
decision benefit chain. Under current UK’s information security standards, classified Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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networks have considerable security and risk exposure constraints that reduce system 
access across strategic, operational and tactical commands. Awareness of how IA affects 
knowledge  and  information  management  and  their  overall  trustworthiness, 
necessitates  further  investigation  and  analysis  of  the  NEC  and  in  particular 
understanding  how  IA  professionalism  plays  an  important  role  in  shaping  the 
behaviour and the complex nature of the NEC domains. Governments, corporations and 
the  military  have  undergone  “a  transformation  in  their  ability  to  gather,  share  and 
process  information.  The  result  is  an  unprecedented  reliance  on  information 
infrastructures  for  their  very  survival.  This  dependency  creates  new  opportunities  for 
disruption” (Anderson 2005). This presents an unprecedented reliance on information 
infrastructures for their very survival.” In one sense, this tautologises the reliance on 
technology that is new and is by definition “unprecedented” and in another sense, the 
need for the system’s dependency for survival. The claims are false, as “Information” is 
hardly the highest in the hierarchy of human needs (Maslow, 1943): water, food and 
shelter, law and order are surely still more important; but the trend toward increasing 
dependence on IT in our social systems provokes real issues; and whether it is wise to 
continue the trend of dependency, is a question which all security professionals should 
be engaged with.   
 
UK’s National Information Assurance Strategy (NIAS) 
 
Whether  researching  new  technologies  or  implementing  information  risk 
management initiatives, information security professionals are being held to even 
more stringent standards than ever before (Frost & Sullivan, 2008). 
 
The  UK’s  National  Information  Assurance  Strategy  (Cabinet  Office,  2007)  takes  a 
coherent approach to managing information security and its risk treatment by making 
it an integral and effective part of normal business process. Information is a valuable 
asset that must be safeguarded. In the case of information held by public authorities 
and businesses, especially personal information, people want to be certain that it is 
held securely, maintained accurately, available when necessary and used appropriately. 
Information Assurance (IA) is used to assure the management of risk to information 
and effective IA ensures that the opportunities provided by new technology can be 
exploited to maximum benefit.  Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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The convergence of interconnected data and systems causes unprecedented increases 
in the potential and actual security risks to information assets as they passes through 
an increasingly complex web of systems. Figure 156 illustrates the 2-sides of the HCI 
coin – FUD and IA. Effective IA education needs to achieve a step change to the security 
professionalism  that  overcomes  user’s  fear,  uncertainty  and  doubts.  As  enterprises, 
such  as  the  MoD,  adopt  collaborative  business  models,  based  on  highly  interlinked 
infrastructures, they are more vulnerable to attack. In the past, the MoD approach was 
to isolate, but now these highly secure, fortress solutions are no longer fit for purpose; 
rather the new military enterprise needs to adopt a solid architectural approach to 
designing secure, joined-up systems that maintain the integrity of the information they 
hold  and  what  they  pass  from  community  of  interest  to  another.  In  short,  visible 
security  needs  to  be  built  in  from  the  very  outset  to  allow  the  interoperability  of 
systems and the architects of such systems have to build high- assurance platforms that 
will allow these layers of system operability to cross domains, i.e. bridge air gaps. 
Core UK Security Principles 
1.  Ultimate responsibility for HMG security policy lies with the Prime Minister and 
the Cabinet Office. Departments and Agencies, via their Permanent Secretaries 
and Chief Executives, must manage their security risks within the parameters 
set out in this framework, as endorsed by the Official Committee on Security 
(SO) (see Appendix 2 for MoD’s board structure).  
2.  All HMG employees (including contractors) have a collective responsibility to 
ensure that government assets (information, property and staff) are protected 
in a proportionate manner from terrorist attack, and other illegal or malicious 
activity.  
3.  Departments  and  Agencies  must  be  able  to  share  information  (including 
personal data) confidently knowing it is reliable, accessible and protected to 
agreed standards.  
4.  Departments and Agencies must employ staff (and contractors) in whom they 
can have confidence and whose identities are assured.  
5.  HMG business needs to be resilient in the face of major disruptive events, with 
plans in place to minimise damage and rapidly recover capabilities (see figure 
157 for the threat exposure and mitigation to the UK public sector) Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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Figure 65: IBM view on UK’s information asset threats 
Culturally, within MoD, mind-set has to change about how solutions are constructed 
and this means visibility at strategic defence reviews, operational deployment planning, 
system design and run time about security attributes, claims, needs and outcomes. The 
vision  for  a  network  enabled  MoD  also  requires  a  more  holistic  approach  to  the 
National Information Assurance Strategy and to the education of its practitioners. It is 
no longer sufficient just to secure an organisation’s IT assets; the business processes 
that govern the use of those assets also need to be secure and robust (Cabinet Office, 
2011a).  This  means  developing  clear  processes  and  policies  to  govern  the  way 
employees, coalition partners and other stakeholders interact with MoD’s information, 
underpinned  by  a  safe  and  secure  infrastructure.  Without  this  combination,  the 
integrity of the Department’s business will still be threatened. Only such a multi-faceted 
approach  to Information  Assurance  that encompasses  people,  policy,  processes  and 
infrastructure  will  ensure  that  the  risks  of  joined-up  operations  can  be  balanced 
against the benefits. 
 
The  NIAS  (2007)  strategic  outcomes  and  other  IA  initiatives  such  as  the  HMG  IA 
Maturity Model and Assessment Framework (Cabinet Office, 2010), and modular Code 
of  Connection  (Police  National  Accreditor,  2009)  and  Risk  Managed  Accreditation Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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Document Sets (CESG, 2010) placed on enterprises such as  the  MoD and the UK’s 
police force (NPIA Information Assurance Capability Team, 2010) can be achieved and 
evolved by focusing on three IA performance objectives set out in the NIAS. These will 
have  important  implications  for  the  way  that  organisations,  particularly  within 
government, do business.  
 
UK National Information Assurance Strategy Objectives (Cabinet Office, 2007)are: 
 
Objective 1: Clear and effective information risk management by organisations. 
  Clear board-level ownership and accountability for information risks will be 
required; 
  Where information is shared, a single point of risk ownership will be 
identified. 
That IA should be visible and understood by all Government employees at all levels and 
across all of its organisations. 
 
Objective 2: Agreement upon and compliance with approved and appropriate IA 
standards. 
  Organisations, particularly those within, or linking to government, will 
operate within a national framework of IA common standards; 
  Trust and confidence in the use of information will be maintained through an 
effective model of compliance with these standards. 
Enterprises are required to take ownership and manage the IA issues, empowering its 
IA  practitioners  and  ensuring  proper consultation  it  done  with  stakeholders  in  the 
decision benefit chain 
 
Objective 3: The development and availability of appropriate IA Capabilities. 
  Government will work more closely with wider sectors in the development of 
Capabilities’ to enable organisations to manage information risks; 
  These capabilities include: availability of the right products and services; 
coordinated and appropriate efforts on innovation and research; improved 
professionalism, and awareness and outreach. 
 
That there is a common understanding and awareness of the enterprise Risk processes 
and  its  mitigation  by  the  communities  of  interest  and  this  is  conveyable  across 
domains, coalition networks and other interoperable systems. Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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The Broader Social-Contemporary Security 
Information assurance can be an important business enabler, supporting 
secure, effective and agile information services, but only if a hostic view is 
taken.” Detica white paper, 2008 
 
The traditional (Cyber Layer 1) geographical, defence-based, physical security is no 
longer the only criterion that defines human well-being and development. Increasingly, 
security has become a combination of attributes relating to freedom from persecution, 
want, fear and a broad range of other concerns, such as the security of water, food, 
energy and environmental security. Aspects of this trend are recognised by the United 
Nation’s ‘Responsibility to Protect’ agenda (UN, 2004), which focuses on preventative 
and developmental lines of activity (including ‘pre-emptive’ action) rather than purely 
reactive intervention. However, prevention requires a longer view and proportionately 
more effort in recognising the indicators of an impending crisis and in tackling the root 
causes of instability rather than the more obvious symptoms. In turn, early responses 
may be difficult to determine, but will, in an inter-connected world, always require 
decisions  and  intervention  across  a  wide  range  of  activity  including  economic, 
diplomatic, military, developmental, humanitarian and now cyber. In military terms, 
people  and  their  business  processes  have  become  the  vital  ground  for  Information 
Operations (IO) which deliberately intervenes and interferes how they go about their 
business.  IO  can  disrupt,  coerce,  harass  and  sabotage  across  the  5  dimensions  of 
military operations.  
 
Effective holistic education of Information Assurance  has to advance understanding 
through quality education of our leaders, practitioners and the user  community the 
fields of information operations and cyber security including Information management, 
services,  exploitation,  security  and  its  assurance,  critical  infrastructure  protection, 
national  security  information  management,  and  computer  network.  The  United 
Nation’s ‘Responsibility to Protect’ agenda (UN, 2004) has in part contributed to the 
MoD’s Joint Discussion Note JDN 4/05. The JDN illustrates the complex and dynamic 
strategic environment of the 21st Century and how the department should encompass 
strategies  like  the  NIAS.  Figure  158  illustrates  the  strategic  importance  of  IA  (as 
discussed in Chapter 4) which aligns the JDN with national policy. The Comprehensive 
Approach (MoD, 2006) discussion paper signalled that there are significant potential 
challenges to peace and security to which we need strategies to ensure safety, security 
and  integrity.  That  these  challenges  are  likely  to  persist  throughout  the  global Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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environment  with  the  interconnected,  globalisation  nature  of  several  transnational 
trends that will affect resources, science and technology, social, military and political 
dimensions as developed in Chapter 4. The JDN discussion paper describes the world of 
sovereign states, unequal in development and resources, conflicts and tension seem set 
to  continue  among  nations  and  power  groupings.  The  symptoms  of  crisis  will  be 
spawned  by  a  combination  of  climate  change,  ideology,  greed,  ethnic  animosity, 
residual territorial claims, religious fanaticism and competition for resources including 
agricultural land, mineral wealth, water rights and oceanic resources. The desire for 
socio-economic  improvement  and  population  migration  (refugees  and  Internally 
Displaced Persons) driven by war, economic and environmental collapse or natural 
disaster will generate national responses and demands for international assistance and 
these emergency responses are becoming more dependent on system interoperability 
and  Information  availability  .  Additionally,  terrorist  actions,  communal  violence, 
endemic criminality and ethnic disturbance will continue to complicate international 
relations,  while  individuals  and  commercial  interests  are  likely  to  have  multiple 
identities,  allegiances  and  cyber  proxies.  This  will  compound  the  protection  and 
security  requirements  for  Critical  Information  Infrastructures  and  Emergency 
Response Services which are often privately run and often controlled by organisations 
outside the nations they serve. 
 
The Human Dimension in the Social Context of Security 
The  human  security  agenda  requires  a  response  that  is  sensitive  to  the  extensive, 
particular needs of societies, communities and individuals. To this end, all constituent 
parts  of  a  society  (rule  of  law,  education,  commercial,  humanitarian  and  health, 
information, military, economic and diplomacy and governance) should be considered, 
as well as the history and culture of an individual society as illustrated in figure 66: 
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Only  then  can  a  range  of  appropriate  objectives,  resources  and  contributors  be 
established to influence the situation. The spectrum of involvement, doctrinally and 
familiarly  known  as  the  ‘Complex  of  Actors’,  might  comprise  other  governments, 
International Organisations, NGOs and private and commercial interests. Additionally, 
experience has indicated that successful resolution would overwhelmingly rely on the 
attitude and motivation of the indigenous and/or local population at the heart of the 
crisis and those in the surrounding region, although care should be taken not to create 
a dependency culture. Two other groups that should be considered in any responses 
are opportunists, who seek to benefit from the situation or the perpetuation of a crisis, 
and spoilers who have an interest in undermining the response. 
Implementing NIAS through the Defence System Approach to Training 
 
Figure 67: The Strategic Positioning of Security 
Information is a critical asset for any organisation, and particularly so to the MoD.  Its 
exploitation  is  fundamental  to  the  achievement  of  business  objectives.  The 
Government’s National Information Assurance Strategy (NIAS) enables organisations in 
the  UK  to  fully  exploit  the  benefits  of  information  and  communications  technology 
(ICT), while at the same time ensuring that wider UK interests are maintained.  The Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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Central  Sponsor  for  Information  Assurance  (CSIA)  uses  the  term  “Information 
Assurance” to describe the appropriate management of information risks (that is to 
ensure the availability, integrity, confidentiality, non-repudiation and authentication of 
information  and  information  systems)  in  order  that  the  benefits  of  ICT  are  fully 
realised.   The NIAS  explains  that  ownership  and  responsibility  for  this  strategy  for 
Information Assurance rests with the Official Committee for Security and its chair, the 
Cabinet Office Permanent Secretary, Intelligence, Security and Resilience.  
 
For effective decision making, information needs to be clear, accurate, trusted and not: 
compromised, lost, leaked, disseminated, published (without approval) or corrupted. 
The  Rawlinson  Report39  highlighted  the  need  to  provide  both  an  educational 
framework and the IA Profession within MoD.  Organisations like the Defence College 
for Communication and Information Systems ( DCCIS) have begun to take a proactive 
part  in  delivering  the  goals  of  NIAS  and  responding  to  Brigadier  Rawlinson’s 
observations:-  
 
1.  How  NIAS  will  affect  the  DCCIS  and  its  training  regime  and  how  within  the 
organisation  the  effect  of  the  IA  Professional  Framework  will  have  on  job 
specifications and training requirements? 
 
2.  The  NIAS  calls  for  a  new  profession  of  IA  practitioners  with  a  prescribed 
Government career  structure  and  professional development.  This  creates an 
opportunity  for  the  Royal  Signals  to  take  an initiative  to  adopt  the  NIAS  to 
create an IA trade group in conjunction with its current IS trade group.  Existing 
Operational  Performance  Statements  (OPS)  will  need  modification  and 
enhancement  to  reflect  the  IA  Framework  and  to  identify  how 
graduates/trainees will meet the necessary prescribed SFIA and NQF standards. 
 
3.  How DCCIS can leverage its expertise to establish future accredited IA courses 
for MoD and other Government Departments for pre-employment training and 
continuous professional development? 
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As  DCCIS  is  the  MoD’s  centre  of  excellence  for  communications  and  information 
systems, then it is incumbent on the college to take a lead in promoting professionalism 
in  IA.  Information  security  and  its  assurance  is  an  issue  with  people  rather  than 
technology and it is reliant on people, their awareness, ethics and behaviour. This is 
partially reflected in DCCIS (2011) current training goal to:“ensure that personnel have 
an appropriate awareness of information security policies and practice to the extent that 
their duties require, and to fully understand their responsibilities including their legal 
obligations”.  
 
A holistic approach to delivering aspects of NIAS through the MoD’s own IA Maturity 
Model will require Training Needs Assessment to identify each post and assign the IA 
level  of  competency  required  to  meet  the  framework  and  the  necessary  training 
requirements  for  the  post  holder.  NIAS  requires  that  IA  practitioners  have  further 
specialized training, developing the necessary transferable skills, with focused courses 
of  increasing  educational  content  and  the  provision  of  professional  development 
courses. NIAS calls for the development and availability of appropriate IA capabilities 
and identifies seven specialisms within its professional framework.  Many existing roles 
and posts within the MoD’s CIS environment cover in part, or are identifiable as IA 
functions.  
 
The  MoD’s  Information  Strategy  (MoD,  2011)  framework  requires  practitioners  to 
obtain  educational  and  transferable  skills  for  these  posts.  Consequently  there  is  a 
requirement  to  assess  the  current  IA  post  and  incumbents  against  skills,  training, 
educational and Continued Professional Development (CPD) needs of IA Foundation, 
Practitioner and Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) as illustrated in figure 161.  JSP 822 
directs  all  Defence  personnel  accountable  for,  or  with  influence  over,  the  delivery  of 
Defence capability, the meeting of performance requirements, or the implementation of 
Defence policy, for which T&E interventions are required.  It applies to all decision makers 
and  practitioners  employed  in  the  Regular  Forces,  the  Reserves,  MOD  civilians,  and 
Industry  who  are  engaged  in  the  derivation  and  assurance  of  Defence  capabilities  or 
performance requirements, and/or the development, delivery, or assurance of associated 
T&E interventions (MoD, 2012). 
 
NIAS and the expected National Occupational Standard (NOS) will modify or create 
through  the  Defence  Systems  Approach  to  Training  (DSAT)  a  new  Operational 
Performance Statement (OPS)/ Competency Framework (MoD, 2012).  The DSAT OPS 
will be required to develop the envisaged Defence IA Practitioner at SO2 / SO3 level, Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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but also targeting supervisors (Yeoman, Foreman & IS supervisors).  Specialist’s roles 
such as ITSOs and SACs should also be included. We will also have to derive the OPS to 
cover  the  soft  issues  of  Information  Assurance.  MoD’s  Network  Enabled  Capability 
doctrines of Information Superiority (MoD, 2006; MoD, 2011) have predicated the need 
for information security and its assurance.  Interoperability, Information exploitation 
and  ICT  advancements  has  brought  a  transformation  risks  and  new  trends  in 
information  system  threats  and  vulnerabilities.  Vulnerabilities  introduced  by  the 
complexity  of  the  new  military  information  systems  and  the  impact  of  degraded 
systems  within  Information  Operations  from  increasing  complex  attacks  has 
necessitated  the  adoption  of  information  assurance.  NIAS  has  identified  there  is 
requirement for a change of culture and acceptance of IA to be fundamental to our 
business goals, which Rawlinson (Rawlinson, 2005) also commented on.   
 
 
Figure 68: JSP 822: The Defence System Approach to Training (2012) 
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However, the gaps in our operating processes, business continuity and awareness of 
the user communities have to be managed, corrected and where necessary a change of 
culture introduced. Bridging the Gaps in IA Education and Professional Standards is 
essential for the MoD Information Strategy to gain the benefits it clearly wants from its 
Operations,  Coalition  partnerships,  Decision  Making  and  achieving  Information 
Superiority. However, DSAT is an expensive process, with considerable overheads in 
resources, manpower and costs. The MoD has tried over the last 20 years to outsource 
its Education and Training programmes as a cost saving process. These attempts have 
concentrated  the  training  (reducing  the  number  of  trainees  and  training 
establishments) but have failed to attract a private consortium to take over the Defence 
T&E commitments. 
Policy Driven IA Education 
Individual  security  lies  with  the  skills,  knowledge  and  experience  that  we  have  in 
ourselves. An important objective which can be facilitated by DCCIS, to aid the change 
of  culture,  is  transforming  the  Defence  Information  Strategy  and  the  NIAS  into  a 
profession development programme that: 
 
a)  Provides  recognition  and  career  development  of  transferable  skills  and 
knowledge for the profession with timely, supportive, accredited development 
courses for the MoD and in turn for other Government Departments. 
b)  Provides an forum for the understanding of the issues and the proliferation of 
the guidance, policies and security technologies involved in IA 
 
The  proposed  Information  Security  Professional  Development  (ISPD)  programme, 
delivering the Right Skills, to the Right People at the Right Time, supports the NIAS 
framework and the Institute of Information Security Practitioners structured career 
path and provides the MoD la clear direction for IA Education and Training to meet the 
UK’s Cyber Security Strategy (Cabinet Office, 2011a). The programme will be geared to 
provide  educational  qualification  and  transferable  skills  to  practitioners  as  it  is 
intended to help them to stay on top of the available technologies and innovations and 
thereby sustain our assurance against these threats. Most importantly, the aim of the 
ISPD is to provide recognition through academic excellence, an understated goal in the 
NIAS.  IA practitioners are not only critical to the on-going running of our core business 
and protection of its assets, but also to its development and strength in the future. This 
unique service to provide understanding of the evolving threat landscape coming from 
increasingly sophisticated attackers should be established within DCCIS.   Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
Engineering Doctorate  Page 175 
 
4.2  Federated Education 
 
Understanding risk at an enterprise level is a fundamental requirement for Information 
Assurance. While many business drivers are not exclusively related to IA, there are 
nevertheless  many  information-based  factors,  such  as  information  sharing  policies, 
which  contribute  to  overall  risk  and  therefore  need  to  be  considered.  Holistic  IA 
Education requires methodologies that take a Strategic Position of Security (SPS) of the 
enterprise to identify key business drivers and risks, which can then be examined from 
a specific IA perspective.  Within the MoD our Information Assurance practitioners 
need to construct risk-balance cases, which are rigorous appraisals of the risks and 
their impact, which support the Network Enabled Capability (NEC) decision-making, 
risk prioritisation and potential trade-offs within the enterprise. Risk owners should be 
clearly identified and given a better understanding of their risk appetite. The business 
drivers and prioritised set of MoD’s risks should be used to create an IA vision and 
strategy for the department. The holistic approach to effective Information Assurance 
education  will  need  a  more  detailed  IA  curricula  derived  from  business  cases  and 
implementation roadmaps for the department going forward.  
 
The Right Skills 
“You don’t want to open that Pandora’s Box, because you never know what Trojan horses 
will leap out”.                                        Rt. Hon Ernest Bevin MP 
 
Pervasive computing, Information Services (IS) and Information Technologies (IT) is as 
much  a  part  of  our  lives  as  Maslow’s  (1943)  pyramid.  Information  Security,  its 
Assurance and risk management has become technically and holistically challenging to 
the practitioners and academia. They have become key issues in today’s transforming 
and  pervasive  information  driven  world  and  its  complex  of  actors.  Securing  our 
Information  assets  is  critical  as  it  is  pushed  and  pulled  around  us  all  24/7.  It  is 
exploited, stored, manipulated, targeted, controlled, stolen and often compromised (US 
CERT 2008). 
 
“Professionalism” requires a sober and objective approach to risk assessment: but the 
dilemma for the security industry is that wherever threats are evaluated as remote, the 
security  industry  will  receive  very  little  attention  (funding)  from  anyone.  The  IT 
security sector has been notorious for the way it trumpets any vulnerabilities it finds to Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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one  and  all,  usually  well  before  they  have  been  discovered  let  alone  exploited  by 
anyone else, merely as a means self-publicity and headline-grabbing, in order to attract 
funding. So the dilemma for the profession is how its “professionalism” will allow it to 
step out of this maelstrom of self-interest, and convince the public at large that it is 
objective, and has no particular interest in exaggerating security threats. The record of 
IT professionals (in general) in the area of proportionate threat assessment is not good 
(e.g.  the  Millennium  bug  that  wasn’t).  Easy  sensationalism  is  easier  than  evidence-
based threat assessment and scientific objectivity, it would seem. “We live and work 
both as individuals and as part of communities [complex actors], within organizations 
and society as a whole. Our understanding and acceptance of the  world around us is 
couched within negotiated meaning of those contexts. Security needs to support users in 
seeing and negotiating safely on those terms within technologically mediated systems.” 
(Adams and Blandford, 2005). 
 
The  Computer  Security  Institute  /  FBI  (2007)  reported  a  significant  upswing  in 
cybercrime and these criminals are becoming well organised. Motivated individuals and 
criminal groups see the Internet as a medium to further their causes; disseminate their 
SPAM and other propaganda; to change, poison, disrupt or destroy existing structures.  
Information Infrastructures need to become more interoperable and robust; systems 
more dependable and critical infrastructures have to be trusted. Mitigating complexity 
to  develop  and  secure  NEC  systems  and  their  application  IA  Practitioners  have  to 
understand both the enterprise architecture and the adversaries. The knowledge and 
skills  to meet  this demand  have  to  be  gained  and  continuously  developed  and it  is 
incumbent that IA Education has to provide a holistic approach to emergent designs 
and application complexities (Bishop, 2002; Wasim 2006). 
 
In the virtual world, informed knowledge often has a very short shelf life. Whitman 
(2004) expounds new vulnerabilities are often found each day and on the same day we 
can experience a threat. These threats vary from espionage, sabotage, hacking, identity 
theft, crime to terrorism. The level of sophistication and speed of development of the 
tools  being  used  to  create  security  breaches  and  attacks  are  growing  exponentially 
(Eloff, 2005). This constantly changing, chaotic environment encapsulates why security 
knowledge needs to be continuously evaluated and disseminated as deployed counter-
measures  become  bypassed  and  obsolete  overnight.  Consequently,  IA  practitioners 
must be continuously updated with a holistic, concurrent and relevant development 
programme. Professional Institutions and universities providing IA education have a 
duty to keep their curriculum innovative and relevant. NIST (2003) has a framework to Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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developing  IA  education  courses.  However,  Information  Assurance  is  very  diverse, 
combining  the  disciplines  of  holism,  complexity  theories,  computer  science, 
information philosophy, CIS engineering, soft systems, forensics, education, psychology, 
business  administration,  law,  and  accounting.  The  interdisciplinary  nature  requires 
cohesive  perceptions  and  perspectives  of  specialist  educators,  lecturers  and 
practitioners often requiring different schools to collaborate. Such a multi-disciplinary 
curricula  approach  and  subsequent  integration  will  require  careful  planning  and 
implementation.  Gibson (2007) posits that the IA profession needs modern business 
administration skills to the already complex multidiscipline portfolio and figure 162 
illustrates the depth of 3 components of this portfolio. Many universities incorporate 
Information  Management,  Risk  Management  and  Business  Studies  modules  to  their 
undergraduate  and  post-graduate  courses  and  they  are  starting  to  address  the 
capability gap in our knowledge and expertise of Security, Risk and it Management. Our 
learning institutions are beginning to produce a growing number of professionals with 
Information Assurance expertise.   
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Security Education 
“Blame human psychology: when it comes to information security, we’re simply not built 
to intuitively rank actual risks. Learn how building threat models can help companies 
rationalize the biggest security and compliance risks they face,” Mathew Schwartz 2006.  
Figure  70  illustrates  the  information  asset  is  often  seemed  wrapped  around  the 
technologies and applications that support it, rather than the content of the knowledge 
it represents. Hence people become distant to the content and rely on the technology as 
barrier  hoping  that  processes  will  protect  themselves  and  their  systems  from 
vulnerabilities,  threats  and  possible  attacks.  Often  the  environment  and  the 
organisations that have built it will play an important role to the judgement of these 
actors  in  their  complex  world.  We  can  see  that  Assurance  and  its  associated  Risk 
Management needs to address all the spheres of influences, to protect the services, 
organisation,  people  and  the  information  asset;  transposing  the  vulnerabilities  and 
threats vectors away from the assets to the dimensions of Assurance.  
 
 
Figure 70: Encapsulating the Assurance of Information 
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information leaks, while ignoring the threat of insiders or social engineering attacks, 
and wait for some impending governance, risk, and compliance platform silver bullet to 
solve  all  future  problems.  Lack  of  information  is  frequently  not  the  cause  of  our 
inability to identify our biggest information security and compliance-related threats. 
Rather, it’s a more fundamental problem. “We are not adept at making rational security 
trade-offs, especially in the context of a lot of ancillary information designed to persuade 
us  one  way  or  another,”  alleges  BT  Counterpane  Chief  Technology  Officer  Bruce 
Schneier in a recent essay titled “The Psychology of Security.” In particular, he identifies 
five  areas  “where  perception  can  diverge  from  reality”  when  it  comes  to  evaluating 
security  trade-offs:  risk  severity,  risk  probability,  cost  magnitude,  countermeasure 
effectiveness, and the actual trade-off itself. 
 
Students and practitioners are faced with many complex, ill-defined challenges with the 
virtual  environment.  Information  infrastructure and  their  knowledge  silos  are  been 
linked, routed and dumped routinely without authority. To be successful practitioners, 
they  will  need  to  be  able  to  solve  the  ill-defined  holistic  problems  caused  by  our 
complex actors and the system of systems architectures. This reflects the nature of the 
information security environment assessing the risks, threats, and vulnerabilities are 
only  the  beginning  to  assuring  and  accrediting  the  systems.  This,  in-turn  poses 
significant challenges to the educators, who need to prepare the IA professionals to 
recognize and manage complexity (Janet, 1986).  
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Figure  71  illustrates  how  education  facilitates  understanding  and  in  particular  our 
curiosity and need to know is a strong motivator as commented by Peter Senge and his 
Fifth Discipline (Senge P. , 1990). However, even though the Defence Strategy calls for 
better education, it fails to provide suitable and substantial resources to enact a fruitful 
outcome.  Why?  - It is not about resources, in particular cash, it is about how we 
manage our human resources, how we engage in the wider communities of interest and 
how we educate and make aware those complex actors. Figure 72illustrates the process 
required to build a Continuum of Understanding as described by Shedroff (1999) and 
as developed into a learning organisation by Peter Senge. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 72: The Continuum of Understanding (Shedroff, 1999) 
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Higher  educational  institutions  like  Bournemouth  University  have  planned  and 
implement  BSc  courses  in  Security  and  considering  potential  job  opportunities 
(Participatory  in  Figure  165)  in  information  security  want  a  large  number  of  their 
undergraduates  to  enrol.  Most  students  (Consumers  in  Figure  165)  are  motivated 
(Cognitive Stimulus) to acquire practical skills and future security courses will need to 
cover  a  wide  spectrum  (Comprehension  Awareness)  of  security  concepts,  designs, 
applications, governance, simulations and practicals including hacking (Brian, 2006).  
Current University courses are equally popular among the undergraduate and graduate 
students. At the Defence College there has been a clear distinction in their increasing 
numbers  wanting  to  undertake  security  projects.  While  CIS  Management  graduate 
students  tend  to  look  for  more  theoretical  projects  leading  to  their  theses  most 
undergraduate students are more interested in “hands-on” implementation-oriented 
projects that are more offensive than defensive (Martin, 2006).  
 
Why would managers, administrators, practitioners and even users want to engage in, 
develop and relearn Information Assurance? Often we hear “if the Government educates 
and  trains  it  personnel,  industry  will  entice  away”.  In  practice  this  is  not  apparent. 
Holistic career minded individuals are not always motivated by salary expectations, 
many  see  rewards  from  achieving  objectives  and  being  recognised  for  doing  so. 
Education is rewarding.  We need a shift of mind to develop and foster Senge’s Personal 
Mastery,  to  produce  a  shared  vision  from  the  development  of  mental  models  as 
structured in his book. 
The Information Security Professional Development Programme 
The soldier’s or civilian’s Continued Professional Development (CPD)  is a process by 
which individuals take control, taking the responsibility and ownership of their own 
learning and development, by engaging in an on-going process of reflection and action. 
This is a process that empowers, excites and can stimulate individual achievements, 
aspirations  and  career  goals.  The  Information  Security  Professional  Development 
Programme  (ISPD)  is  a  proposed  solution  for  the  professional  development  of 
practitioners  based  on  the  Government’s  IA  Profession  Framework.  The  aim  is  to 
provide  a  clear  career  path  supported  by  a  certified  educational  and  training 
programme for Government and NGO security professionals. In particular, there is a 
greater need to focus on educating existing professional practitioners and accrediting 
their professional competencies. The ISPD Programme should extend to cover List-X 
companies and other Government contracted agencies.  Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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More work needs to be done to formalise the ISPD such as scoping a Training Needs 
Assessment  and  establishing  guidance  for  the  identification  of  roles  and  proposed 
certification  of  personnel  conducting  information  security  functions  within  the 
Department,  its  networked  information  environment  and  the  security  roles  across 
other  Government  Departments.  This  extra  work  will  provide  the  foundation  to 
establishing  the  National  Occupational  Standard  (NOS)  for  Information  Assurance 
(currently under discussion between the Skills Council, BIS, CESG and BCS). 
 
The proposed ISPD programme will have three core security disciplines: 
  Physical security 
  Personnel security 
  Information security 
 
However, there are a number of other important NEC security-related topics which, 
where  appropriate,  will  be  included  in  the  curriculum  at  an  appropriate  level  of 
complexity.  It  is  envisaged  that  general  security  training  courses  are  designed  to 
provide specialized training in areas beyond the core security disciplines. These include 
Communications  Security,  Business  Continuity,  Information  Assurance,  Operations 
Security  (OPSEC),  Information  and  Risk  Management.  And  Gerald  (2006)  gives  a 
compelling case for certification and accreditation methods to be incorporated into an 
information security curriculum. 
Table 10: ISPD Levels of Competencies 
Level  Competency  NQF Levels 
1.  Basic training – CBT and distant learning  2 
2. 
Practitioner training and education– Taught 
and distant learning module courses 
3 and 4 
3. 
Expert training and education – Specific 
taught modules with distant learning 
material 
5,6 and 7 
 
The ISPD would be organised into distinct levels of competencies, illustrated in table 6, 
will  provide  the  opportunities  to  gain  nationally  recognised  civilian  qualifications Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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through the accreditation of education, training and experience. This is an important 
component of MoD’s personnel strategies since it provides recruiting, development, 
retention and resettlement benefits.  The ISPD training should align the established 
SFIA / NEC framework against the Qualifications and Curriculum Authority’s National 
Qualification  Framework  (NQF)  and  any  future  Occupational  Standard.  It  would  be 
organised into its distinct levels of competencies as illustrated. 
 
The key element to the ISPD programme is a framework that addresses the following 
Education and Continuous Professional Development objectives: 
 
1)  Develop  a  skilled  profession  with  a  common  understanding  of  the  concepts, 
principles  and  applications  of  Information  Management;  its  Security  and 
Assurance  for  each  level  to  gain  information  superiority  and  enhance  the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of the information infrastructure. 
 
2)  Develop a more holistic approach to Information Security and Assurance by aiding 
the establishment an IA profession. 
 
3)  Establish  an  education,  training  and  awareness  baseline,  against  the  SFIA/NEC 
framework, scoping the technical and management of information security skills 
amongst  personnel  performing  security,  information  management,  risk 
management and Information Assurance functions within Government and NGOs. 
 
4)  Provide qualified security professionals. 
 
5)  Augmenting  skills  developed  through  training  and  experience  with  the 
implementation  of  a  professional  development  programme  comprising  of 
residential courses, distributive and computer based training, distance learning, 
supervised on-the-job training, exercises, examination and certification. 
 
6)  Verify,  audit  and  sustain  knowledge  and  skills  through  standards,  qualification 
testing and certification. 
 
The ISPD should develop and certify some additional material which reflects specific 
business  best  practice,  legal  requirements,  technical  standards  and  ethics  that  are 
international, contextual and organisation specific (Janine, 2006).  While each level in 
the ISPD programme is open for students meeting certain formal prerequisites, the 
sequence of CPD modules and degree courses will be designed in such a way as to allow Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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students to progress from NQF levels 3 to 7 without undue overlap or repetition. This 
would  still  provide  the  flexibility  for  this  organisation  and  other  departments  to 
recognise relevant international qualifications but still have the professionals having 
knowledge  of  the  local  content  and  regulations  which  are  necessary  for  practising 
information security.   
 
Figure 73: The Proposed Modular CPD Roadmap 
The UK’s greatest asset is our information, whether its intellectual knowledge, data 
sources or financial transactions, we need to protect it, and thus we need assurance and 
this assurance will be provided by accredited professionals, who have a career path 
with rewards, to secure its confidentiality, integrity and availability to authorised users. 
The ISPD programme is something long overdue and what the IA community has been 
asking  for.  The  proposed  programme  provides  the  education  element  to  a  new 
structured career path for the security professionals. It will educate them in areas in 
which they have been entrusted, to protect people, information, facilities, operations, 
and activities. This initiative will provide the UK trained security professionals with a 
genuine career path. 
The Federated MSc 
The opportunity for the information security profession is immense. Clearly we must 
continue  to  understand  the  evolving  threat  landscape  coming  from  increasingly 
sophisticated criminal factions. We must also stay on top of the available technology to 
protect against these threats, recognising them as tools, rather than the focus of our 
jobs. Most importantly, however, we must recognise that our jobs are not only critical Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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to the running of the business and protection of its assets, but also to its development 
and  strength  in  the  future.  We  are  driving  a  change  in  the  role  of  the  security 
professional.  
 
 “Imagination  is  more  important  than  knowledge.  Knowledge  is  limited. 
Imagination encircles the world.” Albert Einstein 
 
Image  studying  security,  its  vulnerabilities  and  failures  in  a  dedicated  academy;  a 
depositary of knowledge and incidents; a facility to pursue innovative solution. A place 
that coordinates IA issues, where threats and attacks can be diagnosed and investigated 
without  compromising  commercial  sensitivities  or  the  confidentiality  of  military 
systems.  
 
Figure 74: Proposed Federated Master of Science (MSc) in Information Assurance 
Frankly,  this  is  much  easier  said  than  done  and  indeed  if  the  academy  operates 
confidentially, it may have some problems convincing the public that it indeed is a 
“professional”  organisation,  rather  than  just  a  “closed  shop”.  That  there  may  be 
difficulties to achieve the aforesaid feedback into development processes if evaluations 
are classified and hence we will need some way of protecting case details from being 
inferred from general security advice. Some might argue that the very fact that some 
organisations do not wish details of security mistakes to become known is symptomatic 
of  inadequate  security  culture.  There  is  considerable  literature  about  the  need  for Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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security education and a contrasting perception of little resources to facilitate it. The 
implementation of an ISPD facilitates the ideal of building a UK IA Academy which can 
coordinate  and  accredit  CPD  courses  for  Educational  and  Professional  Institutions, 
Government Agencies and corporations.  Focus and efforts should follow, but also, the 
UK should develop the US programme for National Centre of Academic Excellence in 
Information Assurance Education established by the U.S. National Security Agency. 
 
 
Figure 75: An Alternative Schedule for a Federated MSc in Information Assurance 
Like a number of our universities Bournemouth’s BSc scheme of work for their new 
Information Security and Forensics course has initially focused on various aspects of 
adding  and  integrating  IA  subjects  into  their  existing  curricula.    The  proposed 
Federated Master of Science (and possibly a Master of Research-MRes) framework are 
illustrated  in  Figures  167  and  168  and  exhibits  the  two  semester  programme 
examining the Human-Cyber Interfaces and Understanding the IA Cross-Domain with 
an underpinning selection of core lectures and studies and a laboratory work in the 
kinetic learning environment of a (SEnIA) cyber –range. 
 
A general outline of the curriculum that is widely recognized and replicated is required 
and  typically  a  degree  course  should  contain  four  core  modules:  “Information 
Management”;  “Security  Devices,  Mechanisms  and  Cryptography”;  “Information Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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Assurance”  and  “Computer  Security  and  Network  Defence”  which  should  be 
accompanied  by  several  elective  modules  and  a  final  project.    Bournemouth  has 
recognise that other universities are increasingly offering more dedicated courses that 
broaden the scope of undergraduate courses to post graduate degrees and diplomas 
such as The Royal Holloway, University of London, MSc. Degree in Information Security, 
which first commenced in 1992.  
 
Bridging the capability gap requires more than a few Universities pioneering courses. 
There  should  be  a  national  requirement  to  focus  and  scope  more  courses  towards 
professional than academic careers. Current security courses are typically dictated by 
faculty research interests, considerable attention has since been devoted to the 
systematic  curricula  design  process  of  academic  programs  particularly  at  the 
undergraduate level (Hjelmås and Wolthusen, 2006). However fascinating, “information 
forensics” (or the study of vulnerabilities) is really only worthwhile if it leads to general 
lessons being learned from particular cases; this requires that a vulnerability analysis 
leads to concrete proposals for changes to the computer systems development process; 
the aim of these changes should be to eliminate the whole class of vulnerabilities to 
which the subject vulnerability belongs. Randomised analysis of programmer error is 
not  of  much  value,  but  a  systematic  classificatory  analysis  stands  more  chance  of 
improving IT products significantly prior to delivery: a valid goal for any professional 
IA academy. 
 
So  do  security  professionals  have  role  in  dissuading  product  suppliers  from  seeing 
security as their own private business? This dilemma has been a problem for CLEFs 
operating Common Criteria assessments, since the assessment is generally paid for by 
the product supplier: if the details of the assessment are not made public, there is 
always some question about whether the evaluation certificate is just the result of a 
circular “rubber-stamping” exercise for the sake of getting paid: as Ross Anderson put 
it, “the real issue is (said to be) ‘confidence’; that is, convincing people that systems are 
secure even when they aren’t”.  
There are challenges and opportunities presented by offering a UK wide IA Education 
and CPD programme, to be innovated, timely and relevant, to offer a clear progression 
academically  challenging  and  professionally  rewarding  education  which  will  enable 
students pursue further careers in both academia and industry. The IA Academy is an 
imaginative  solution  but  it  can  be  positioned  to  facilitate  security  knowledge 
management. Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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“The control of knowledge is the crux of tomorrow’s worldwide struggle for power 
in every human institution.” Alvin Toffler 
 
 
Figure 76: A detailed sematic of the first proposed IA MSc Semester 
Figures 169 and 170 illustrate a detailed sematic timetable for the proposed Federated 
MSc  in  Information  Assurance.  It  encourages  a  high  ratio  of  contact  time  between 
students  and  staff  and  allocates  considerable  time  for  experimentation  and  system 
simulation workshops. This paper proposes the development of the IA Professional 
Framework with a specific security educational programme, the ISPD and developing a 
network of academia and practitioners through a national centre of excellence. Such a 
centre will need the resources and cooperation of Government Departments, NGOs, 
Corporations, training organisations and higher educational institutions. 
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Figure 77 A detailed sematic of the second proposed IA MSc Semester 
In  partnership  with  Bournemouth  University,  the  Defence  College  is  continually 
developing an innovative security education paradigm.  By working closely with other 
government agencies in developing an information security and assurance curriculum, 
institutions  like  Bournemouth  University  will  able  to  provide  a  unique  and  rich 
learning  environment  for  their  students  and  ensure  that  government,  NGOs  and 
corporate  employees  gain  their  Professional  Development  in  relevant  practices  of 
Information Assurance.  Bridging the capability gap is important and a recognised IA 
Academy can bring together government agencies and corporations into a resourced 
research  laboratory  that  will  ultimately  facilitate  the  real  paradigm.  The  Academy 
would be a facility where security problems can be solved with innovation by teams of 
faculty  members,  professionals,  and  students.    Qualifying  and  sustaining  IA 
practitioners  is  a  challenge  to  be  conquered.  The  Academy  will  need  to  progress, 
develop and implement an Educational and IA CPD programme to train student and 
existing and newly accredited professionals effectively, economically and with a holistic 
approach.  Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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4.3 Building an Information Assurance 
Competency Framework 
 
The IA competency framework set out in this paper is inclusive, and practitioners are 
encouraged  to  consider  whether  any  other  specialist  skills  relate  to  their  work, 
particularly  in  relation  to  the  Government  IT  Profession  and  Knowledge  and 
Information Management Profession. 
There are six key strands to the implementation of IA professionalism: 
  Professional Competency Framework – described in this document. 
  Networking and mentoring. 
  Training and opportunities to share common experience. 
  Private sector collaboration – the IISP will be key in this area. 
  Communication. 
  Partnership  –  working  with,  and  alignment  to,  Professional  Skills  for 
Government, the Government IT Profession, the Knowledge and Information 
Management  Profession  and  other  professions  and  stakeholder  groups,  in 
particular the IISP. 
Recognition and understanding of IA 
This IA Competency Framework proposes a structure for an IA profession, to which all 
those with IA responsibilities would belong (although it does not preclude membership 
of other professions, such as the Government IT Profession, where appropriate). It does 
not  take  account  of  the  professional  needs  of  the  other  specialists  with  which  IA 
specialists  work,  such  as  IT,  project  management  and  finance  professionals.    IA 
specialists need an appreciation of these other professionals’ particular areas and their 
relationship to both the organisation’s business and IA.  In the same way, these other 
professionals  need  an  understanding  of  the  need  for  IA  and  the  roles  of  IA 
professionals.    Indeed, all  staff  need  a  basic  appreciation of  IA  and  their particular 
responsibility for protecting information within their own sphere of influence.  This is 
comparable  to  the  inclusion  of  Finance  as  a  core  competence  within  the  PSG 
Framework. This wider understanding of IA is outside the scope of this Competency 
Framework, but it is vital in ensuring that IA specialists are given proper recognition 
for their contribution to the organisation’s business.  In turn, all IA professionals need Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
Engineering Doctorate  Page 191 
 
to ensure that they can communicate effectively with the business, and with others 
outside IA, in appropriate language. 
Although IA is a distinct profession, there are potential areas of overlap with both IT 
and Knowledge and Information Management, as shown in Figure n below.  Members of 
one  profession  might  therefore  also  be  members  of  one  or  both  of  the  others, 
depending on their role and background. Information Technology (IT) is concerned 
with the application of technology to enable business objectives.  It encompasses a wide 
variety of specialisms, including design, implementation and operation of information 
systems.  The Skills Framework for the Information Age (SFIA), used as the basis for the 
Government IT Profession framework, covers a broad church, including such diverse 
activities as procurement and project management, which are clearly professions in 
their own right, but with some overlap with the IT profession.  Information Assurance 
holds a similar relationship with IT, in that it is distinct, but with elements of overlap. 
The Government IT Profession brings together all IT professionals working across the 
UK public sector, from new entrants through to the members of the Chief Information 
Officer (CIO) Council.  It is coordinated by the Delivery & Transformation Group within 
the Cabinet Office, and the CIO Council provides sponsorship and direction from the 
highest level.  Its aim is to create a joined up, government–wide IT profession which 
provides IT professionals with a career of mutual benefit to the individual and the 
government. HMG defines Information Assurance as “the confidence that information 
systems will protect the information they handle, and will function as they need to, when 
they need to, under the control of legitimate users”.  The IA Profession needed to include 
roles which provide this confidence by ensuring that the confidentiality, integrity and 
availability  of  business  information  and  information  systems  are  appropriate,  cost 
effective  and  compliant  with  legislation,  regulation  and  standards.  The  2007  UK’s 
National Information Assurance Strategy defines “the development and availability of 
appropriate  IA  Capabilities”,  including  improved  professionalism,  amongst  its 
objectives.  
The Government’s General IA Products and Services Initiative (GIPSI) Profession sub-
group subsequently established a competency framework and career structure for the 
Information Security and Assurance profession.  The present need is for a programme 
to  progress  and  accredit  education  and  professional  development  of  existing 
practitioners.  The  framework  links  the  Skills  Framework  for  the  Information  Age 
(SFIA), which is currently used by the Government IT Profession, to a career path and 
expected  educational  standards.    It  defines  competencies  from  Entry  to  Head  of Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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Profession across IA, and expands IA into seven specialisms: 
 
The Government Framework (also see Annex 5) further identifies the educational and 
training  qualification  requirements  and  the  accredited  continuous  professional 
development  certification  through  membership  of  professional  bodies  such  as  the 
Institute  of  Information  Security  Practitioners  (IISP),  BCS  and  the  IET.  The 
qualifications  were  defined  for  each  level  in  line  with  the  National  Qualification 
Framework (NQF).   
 
While each level in the ISPD programme is open for students meeting certain formal 
prerequisites, the sequence of CPD modules and degree courses will be designed in 
such a way as to allow students to progress from NQF levels 3 to 7 without undue 
overlap or repetition. This would still provide the flexibility for this organisation and 
other departments to recognise relevant international qualifications but still have the 
professionals  having  knowledge  of  the  local  content  and  regulations  which  are 
necessary for practising information security in the UK.  
 
The opportunity for the information security profession is immense. Clearly we must 
continue  to  understand  the  evolving  threat  landscape  coming  from  increasingly 
Figure 78: UK Government IA Framework 
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sophisticated criminal factions. We must also stay on top of the available technology to 
protect against these threats, recognising them as tools, rather than the focus of our 
jobs. Most importantly, however, we must recognise that our jobs are not only critical 
to the running of the business and protection of its assets, but also to its development 
and strength in the future. 
Table 11: Competency Levels of an IA Practitioner 
Level  Competency  NQF Levels 
1.  Entry awareness based training  1 
2.  Basic training – CBT and distant learning  2 
3. 
Practitioner training and education– Taught 
and distant learning module courses 
3 and 4 
4. 
Expert training and education – Specific 
taught modules with distant learning material 
5,6 and 7 
 
We are driving a change in the role of the security professional. The UK’s greatest asset 
is  our  information,  whether  its  intellectual  knowledge,  data  sources  or  financial 
transactions, we need to protect it, and thus we need assurance and this assurance will 
be  provided  by  accredited  professionals,  who  have  a  career  path  with  rewards,  to 
secure  its  confidentiality,  integrity  and  availability  to  authorised  users.  The  ISPD 
programme is something long overdue and what the IA community has been asking for. 
The proposed programme provides the education element to a new structured career 
path for the security professionals. It will educate them in areas in which they have 
been entrusted, to protect people, information, facilities, operations, and activities. This 
initiative will provide the UK trained security professionals with a genuine career path 
and appropriate accreditation. 
Under  current  UK  Information  Security  standards,  classified  networks  have 
considerable security and risk exposure constraints that reduce system access across 
strategic, operational and tactical commands. Awareness of how IA affects knowledge 
and information management and their overall trustworthiness, necessitates further 
investigation and analysis of the NEC.  IA professionalism plays an important role in 
understanding the behaviour and the complex nature of the NEC domains.  Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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Figure 79: Ignorance of Network Behaviour, Management, Operations and Security 
 
Governments, corporations and the military have undergone “a transformation in their 
ability to gather, share and process information. The result is an unprecedented reliance 
on  information  infrastructures  for  their  very  survival.  This  dependency  creates  new 
opportunities  for  disruption”  (Anderson  2005).    This  presents  societies  with  an 
unprecedented reliance on information infrastructures for their very survival. In one 
sense,  this  is  tautologous:  any  reliance  on  technology  that  is  new  is  by  definition 
“unprecedented”; in another sense (our dependence for survival), the claim is merely 
false: “information” is hardly highest in the hierarchy of human needs: water, food and 
shelter, law and order are surely still more important; but the trend toward increasing 
dependence  on  IT  in  the  systems  that  provide  these  things  is  the  real  issue;  and 
whether it is wise to continue the trend is a question all security professionals are 
engaged in answering. 
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CHAPTER 5:  Thesis Conclusion – 
Managing the Holistic Paradigms 
 
 
“Information Assurance (IA) is the assumed responsibility (Corporate Governance) and 
accreditation of a socio-technical Enterprises across the 5-layers of the Cyber Domain 
(Geographical, Physical, Logical, Persona and Cyber Persona), inclusive of their Business 
Processes,  Information  Operations,  Information  Exploitation,  Management,  Services, 
Technologies  and  Infrastructures.  The  socio-technical  Enterprise  is  assured  by 
appropriate levels of maturity and awareness within the 8-Dimensions of Information 
Assurance  (Structure,  Resilience,  Dependability,  Safety,  Security,  Protection,  Trust  and 
Risk Management).” (Richardson, C.J., 2011) 
 
Cyberspace has transformed our society, the way we do business and it affects our lives 
in countless ways. We depend on its global connectivity, which delivers information at 
light speed to most destinations in the world. In the Internet of Things, we and system 
agents order goods, do successful transfer of products to markets, manage financial 
assets, banking, travel arrangement and social networking to global communities: it 
affects  us,  it  is  beginning  to  control  us  and  at  the  same  time  it  offers  new  hope, 
freedoms and new opportunities. Cyberspace has become mankind’s event horizon. Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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The goal of the thesis was to research the question does system isolation work. Can we 
really keep our secret, secret on a need to know bases and is this viable in the medium 
to long term future of Government (Diplomatic); Intelligence; Military and Economic 
(DIME) communities. The electronic isolation of our information systems is called Air 
Gapping and it was sensible when our systems were used as administration tools for 
departments,  armed  forces  and  other  agencies.  Bespoke  systems  were  designed  to 
meet physical electronic attacks, signal interceptions and spectrum analysis, they were 
often enclosed in TEMPEST shielded facilities and had very few terminals for a very 
select set of users; such systems are still operated today. However, the information 
stored in their data files are now needed by many new agents, actors and system users, 
they  need  to  share  intelligence,  government  communications,  mission  media  and 
financial  transactions  with  an ever increasing  number  of  suppliers  and clients.  The 
original context and contents of these silo-like knowledge repositories may be subject 
to new analysis, data mining, knowledge transfer and decision making processes. The 
Socio-Technical  Enterprise  of  the  Information  Age  needs  to  share  its  Knowledge, 
Information and Data Assets. 
 
The  consequence  of  this  research  is  to  brush-off  linearity  and  drill  into  complex 
systems. To look beyond limited lifecycle models, so prevalent in system engineering 
and enterprise architecture to encompass the problematic human behaviour affecting 
such  systems.    This  thesis  has  set  out  to  capture  the  more  torridialG  models  of 
interoperability,  where  each  type  of  system  behaviour  impinges  on  the  holistic, 
combined operational pictures of Human-Cyber Interexchanges. The thesis asks the 
questions  and  offers  some  methodology  to  find  the  answers  from  an  Information 
Assurance Perspective. It doesn’t have the answers, but it does show how we can get 
better at making informed and trusted decisions. 
What is the research question? 
Can Information Assurance provide sufficient Trust and Risk Reduction to allow 
information processed, stored and communication within highly sensitive (often 
critical) networks, with their own discrete security domains (including encryption 
mechanisms), which are often Air-gapped (physically and electronically isolated) 
to interact safely and securely, particularly across many interoperable networks 
and including the possibility of interfacing with the Internet. Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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The  Hypothesis  questioned  can  the  Socio-Technical  Enterprise  and  transforming 
Governments, NGOs and the particularly the military afford to risk its most sensitive 
data to a probably cyber-attack. Stand-alone systems with their own security domains 
which  are  physically  and  electronically  isolated;  protected  from  other  systems  and 
unauthorized access; are assumed to have a high level of security and are essentially 
Air-Gapped.  Whereas,  bridged  air  gapped  systems  have  made  intrusion  easier  by 
multiple  access  points,  multiple  system  integration  and  uncontrolled  access.    The 
Hypothesis further questions whether the operational benefits overcome the potential 
loss of assets; does the mission goals become realised in a more efficient and superior 
manner if the communities of interests acted more coherently with a better situational 
awareness,  does  the  Enterprise  have  an  risk  appetite  to  do  better,  to  share  more 
frequently and encourage greater interoperability with its partners. The wish has been 
clearly stated, but is the will there? As fear is a very potent barrier. 
 
 
Figure 80: The cost of doing business in military cyberspace 
To answer the hypothesis a methodology was created to discover the causal effects of 
Bridging the Air Gap (Figure 24, p16). The methodology road-mapped 6 different paths 
to argue that Information Assured Socio-Technical Enterprise could, and would, work 
more efficiently and more effectively even with the risk of loss. However, such a risk 
Land Sea Air Space Cyber
Persona 
Ubiquitous Communications 
Information Infrastructures 
Network of Networks 
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had to be managed with more stringent safeguards, a better cross-domain solution and 
a better understanding of the systems of systems created. 
 
From a military perspective, (figure 80) the cost of doing operations in Cyberspace is 
considerably cheaper than the other four military domains (Land, Sea, Air and space) 
and this hasn’t gone unnoticed by other State Actors and potential adversaries. The 
military has  to consider,  develop,  deploy and  be  willing  to  use cyber  weapons  and 
consequently we have Cyber Warriors who have a serious dilemma in Cyber Network 
Operations: when to defend and when to attack and is the potential to attack a good 
defensive  policy  -  deterrence?  This  dilemma  produces  a  distinction  between 
Information Operations and Information Exploitation as modelled in I-Stack (Figure 47, 
p133). The Defensive Approach allows IA Policies and Best Practice Framework (figure 
51,  p139)  to  identify  a  comprehensive  and  coherent  metric  structure  to  analysis, 
manage and evaluate the Enterprise performance against International Standards. The 
IA metric will provide sufficient Trust and Risk Mitigation to the Enterprise when the 
system’s  resilience  and  dependability  components  are  driven  through  the  Diamond 
Model (figure 52, p141) to create a more assured Socio-Technical Enterprise. 
 
Meeting the Research Aims 
The  research  aim  was  to  find  a  balance  between  protection  and  availability  of 
Knowledge, Information and Data (the security of the KID components) and the need to 
exploit  the  information  assets  of  a  Socio-Technical  Enterprise.  This  balance  had  to 
trusted,  dependable,  risk  managed  and  resilient  to  errors,  faults,  intrusions  and 
failures.  The  development  of  Information  Assurance  offers  such  a  possibility.  The 
Global and Military information environment demonstrated that bridging the air gap 
will allow the integration of many organisation (and create many vulnerabilities and 
attack routes). The safety of the Enterprise System is equally as strong as its security as 
these Information systems and operations are critical to our society, way of life and 
most likely our lives.  If Information Assurance was to offer any solutions then we had 
to  understand  that  the  critical  components  of  a  safe  and  secure  environment  is 
paramount  to  military  success  and  national  security;  the  context  and  concepts  of 
Information Assurance had to be thoroughly examined. Building models of the key IA 
issues provided that examination. 
 
In  addressing  the  primary  aims  of  research  into  Bridging  the  Air  Gap  from  an  IA 
perspective  this  thesis  postulated  the  “need  to  share”  and  the  active  building  of 
inclusive communities of interests through technical to social interoperability has more Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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impact to the overall well-being of a Socio-Technical Enterprise than the risk adverse 
“need  to  know”  policy  and  its  restrictive,  exclusive  practice of  limiting  access.  This 
thesis has met its 5 primary aims and Engineering Objectives (Eos) as summarised in 
Table 12:- 
 
Table 12: Compliance of the Research Primary Aims 
  Primary Aims  Compliance 
  To  provide  an  Information  Assurance 
Capability  that  will  facilitate  Cross  –
Domain  Solutions.  This  capability  will 
need a framework that formulates the 
assurance  implications  of 
interoperability  within  cyberspace, 
human factors, protection of networks 
and  secure  data  content,  alignment  of 
enterprise  architecture,  any 
organisation  culture  changes, 
information  exploitation,  management 
and  service  dependability  from 
bridging  the  air  gap  between  highly 
classified  networks  and  possible 
interaction  with  lower  classified 
networks and the Internet and how it 
might  be  done.  The  investigation  will 
also consider when those bridges might 
be considered an acceptable risk. 
EO1: The strategic positioning of IA as 
the underpinning science of Socio-
Technical interoperability, the mapping 
of the Information Flow (figure 47, 
p133) ; Security of the Cross-Domain & 
System Survivability (figure 62, p153) 
and the effective management and best 
practice to control the Human-Cyber 
Interexchange  (figure 51, p139) have 
been explored, modelled and argued 
within this thesis. Its investigation has 
produced working models that allow 
greater understanding, perception and 
awareness that the application of IA is 
essential for the trustworthiness of 
Systems and survivability of 
Enterprises operating in Cyberspace. 
 
  Establish  and  develop  an  information 
assurance  framework  and  appropriate 
models  to  meet  operational 
interoperability  requirements; 
whereby  the  study  shall  analysis 
various  contextual  and  conceptual 
considerations  of  aligning  and 
harmonising  domain  internetworking, 
thereby  offering  an  assured  cross-
domain  solution  to  military  CIS 
interoperability. 
EO2: Chapter 2 (Figure 21, p74): The 
Composite Model of Interoperability 
provides an IA Framework that 
encapsulates Enterprise Architecture; 
the layering of Interoperability (Figure 
5, p19) and systems of systems 
interoperability. 
  Exploring  six  main  topics  within  the 
layered environment of Cyberspace (see 
figures  11,  14  and  25)  and  thereby 
framing  the  Cyber  Landscape  through 
modelling  IA  concepts.  Analysing 
dependable,  resilient  convergence  of 
technologies  and  networks  and 
developing  a  Cyber-Assured  Culture 
through  Education;  Promoting 
Transferable  Skills  &  Professionalism 
will  provide  a  new  capability  for 
Information  Assurance.  IA  will 
demonstrate how to provide solutions to 
system  interoperability;  operational 
EO1, EO2 & EO3: The development of 
the  IA  models  and  their  current 
application to various business (figure 
32,  p100);  Enterprise  systems  (figure 
34,  p108)  and  educational  (figure  78, 
p192)  problems  is  a  testimony  of 
importance  and  application  of  this 
research.  More  has  to  be  done  and 
there are future recommendations. The 
alignment of the 8-Dimensions of IA is 
needed to find Cross-Domain Solutions, 
System  Tolerance,  Risk  Mitigation, 
Compliance and Maintenance of Shared 
Situational  Awareness.  This  creates Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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benefits;  operational  security  and  new 
community learning outcomes.  
additional, but necessary, complexity to 
highly  integrated,  relational  concepts 
of  the  Information  Domain  and 
Cyberspace. 
  Illustrate  the  value  of  this  research 
approach to the network-centric security 
problems  of  NEC  (and  the  Global 
Information  Environment  as  illustrated 
in Error! Reference source not found.) 
nd  highlighting  the  real  human-centric 
assurance  issues  to  the  various  layers, 
domains  and  environments  of  an 
interoperable  Cross-Domain  Solution 
and  provide  a  discussion  on  how  the 
qualitative  experience  of  this  research 
and  individual  perceptions  can  be 
analysed and developed. 
 
EO1  &  EO3:  The  Thesis  provides 
sufficient  breadth  and  depth  of 
modelling IA Cross-domain Solutions of 
Socio-Technical  Enterprises  (some  of 
which  are  been  actively  used  by 
Enterprises) and has recommended to 
further test the validity and impact of 
these models in a (SEnIA) Cyber Range. 
  To  identify,  formulate  and  exhibit  this 
approach  and  model  implementation 
demonstrating  it  as  a  worthwhile 
Doctoral investigation. The thesis will be 
a  successful  project  managed  research 
programme  with  achievable,  realistic 
outcomes within well-defined goals and 
agreed deliverable products. 
EO4:  The  contextual  and  conceptual 
modelling  of  IA  as  formulated  within 
this  thesis  has  extended  the  State  of 
Art,  knowledge  and  understanding  of 
the  Science  of  this  new  Academic 
Philosophy. 
 
The Human-Cyber Interexchange within a Socio-Technical Enterprise and the coupling 
across  Enterprise  Boundaries  is  a  complex  and  evolving  environment  with  many 
known  and  unknown  emergent  properties  that  can  create  new  opportunities  or 
jeopardise  our  societies.  The  ability  to  promote  and  to  have:  safe  and  secure, 
transforming,  Information  Operations  across  Cyberspace  with  protected  Critical 
Information Infrastructures is a tier-1 national priority (Cabinet Office, 2011a).  This 
Thesis has provided the context in which IA may allow Enterprise to meet that priority 
and the concepts and models of where and how this can be done. 
 
5.1 Business Solutions to the Bridging the Gap 
 
The rise of the Socio-Technical Enterprise, its real and virtual business operations, the 
ever increasing capacity to process, store and transmit Knowledge, Information & Data 
(often  referred  as  Big  Data);  the  introduction  of  Moore’s  law  to  computer  design 
creating more powerful petabyte multi-cored machines; the phenomenal growth the 
Internet of Things (man and virtual agents) and this vast new world and symbiosis of 
Human-Cyber  Interexchange  (as  illustrated  in  figure  81)  has  transformed  how 
Governments, Industry, the military and individuals interact. We are becoming more Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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aware of our environment, more socially connected and much more knowledgeable 
with vast arrays of Knowledge repositories a few clicks away. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The social landscape of the natural (real) word has created the Human-Cyber world 
and  the  social-technical  enterprises  that  maintain,  expand  and  evolve.  The  Social-
Technical  Enterprise  is  a Social  Machine  described  by  Professor  Tim  Berners-Lee 
(Berners-Lee & Fischetti, 1999) as a “processes in which the people do the creative work 
and the machine does the administration” which Theodore Piepenbrock (2004)  further 
described as a dynamic spatial and temporal complex system “where cause and effect of 
management's  strategies  and  policies  are  distant  in  space  and  time…  Temporal 
complexity recognizes that policies, decisions,  structure and delays are interrelated to 
influence growth and stability. An enterprise's long-term success therefore is a function of 
management's ability to control this dynamic complexity. 
 
This  dynamic  complexity  presents  the  Enterprise  with  new,  vibrant  management 
challenges, new opportunities to grow on a global scale; interact and access a global 
audience, to create new communities of interest and to share information to the benefit 
of all. Newtonian physics betrays this ideal world, for the opposite is true, the challenge 
is to keep out the unwanted, the criminals, people with malicious motives and actors 
who  want  to  steal  the  Enterprise  intellectual  property.    Dynamic  complexity  also 
produces fear, uncertainty and doubt (see chapter 3.1, p156), it creates vulnerabilities 
and weaknesses that can threaten the existence of its business, and the business of 
others; the spatial nature of the cyber world is that we all are interconnected. 
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In  Cyberspace,  the  good  does  outweigh  the  bad,  Social  Technical  Enterprises  are 
flourishing,  social  networks  are  expanding,  e-commerce  has  a  phenomenal  rate  of 
growth and most of our society’s institutions and supporting systems are administered 
across the Internet. There is cybercrime, but there has always been crime in human 
society; this is just a different attack pattern that we need to become more aware of 
these attack profiles and have better socio-technical solutions. Resolving Cyber Attacks 
and patching our vulnerabilities has become harder, the anonymity of individuals that 
roam the networks makes policing and attribution much more difficult. 
 
Billions of Dollars have been spent on Cyber Security and the protection mechanisms of 
network edge devices and anti-virus software and yet, it takes a few $100 and some 
rudimentary knowhow to penetrate these most sophisticated defences. The protection 
mechanisms  are  needed because  they  do  deter, hinder  and capture  most malicious 
attacks  (CNA)  but  they are  frequently  been  exposed  to  social  attacks  and  zero-day 
vulnerabilities. This natural has kept many Intelligence Agencies arguing for electronic 
isolation  (Air  Gapping  the  Systems)  of  our  more  important  and  sensitive  Critical 
Information Infrastructures, Military Capability and Knowledge Repositories. Nations 
and Enterprises need to keep their secrets, secret. However even isolated secure data 
silos  have  been  compromised,  penetrated  and  may  still  have  insider  intrusions; 
absolute security is impossible. Furthermore, these system silos have information that 
their  user  communities  need  to  share,  amongst  themselves  and  with  others.  The 
sharing  of  information  has  created  new  interpretations;  new  knowledge  and 
understanding; a greater awareness of the problems to be solved and has benefitted the 
Enterprise with more informed, superior decision making. The shared awareness has 
greatly improved the mission success, operational performance and efficiency of the 
Enterprise.  
 
What is required is an Assurance Process that will allow the transfer of KID assets 
across  Enterprise  boundaries  that  will  not  compromise  their  operations,  but  will 
benefit their social-technical capabilities and strategic goal. This thesis has attempted 
to  find  the  socio-technical  bridges  that  might  be  employed  to  make  our  sharing  of 
information  more  trusted,  dependable  and  secure.  There  are  technologies  such  as 
encryption, data diodes, intrusion prevention systems and multi-layered authentication 
and access control that all contribute to the protection of Information Systems and the 
Information  flow  across  distributed  services  and  databases  which  are  making  our 
cyberspace more secure and protected, but it isn’t enough. Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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As  Chapter  3  demonstrated,  the  layers  of  interoperability  stem  from  the  technical 
interface to the social systems of organisation and the motivation and psychological 
human  factors.  With  people,  there’s  always  insecurity.  The  largest  single  threat  to 
Cybersecurity is the Insider Threat. Information Security needs a new perspective. 
 
Chapters 1 to 4 have argued that this new perspective is Information Assurance and its 
architecture,  framework  and  models  are  needed  to  provide  and  the  resilience, 
dependability,  safety,  security,  protection,  risk  managed  and  trustworthiness  of  the 
Socio-Technical Enterprise. Chapter 7 has provided a number of arguments to create IA 
practitioners and education for the communities of interest. Bridging the Air Gap was 
never going to be a technical solution. Cross-Domain solutions and system survivability 
needs informed and knowledgeable IA practitioners to formulate evolve and evaluate 
the constant variable picture of cyber operations and the flow of information. 
Strategic Reprise 
In 2006 a number of on-going conversation were converging on the need to provide a 
national response and direction for Cyber-security and the protection of our Critical 
Information Infrastructures and Institutions (Rawlinson, 2005; Cabinet Office, 2005; 
Dull, 2006). In Afghanistan, NATO was trying to provide a mission secret platform for 
all communities of interest, including Afghan Government and military agencies. These 
systems  were  under  constant  Advance  Persistent  Threat  (APT)  attacks  and  well 
published exposures were hurting the reputation and integrity of these communities 
(Allor, 2007). 
 
In  2007  the UK  Government  published its National  Information  Assurance  Strategy 
(Cabinet  Office,  2007)  which  formulated  a  number  of  (CSIA)  Government  Working 
groups to provide methodologies to implement this strategy and at a Bletchley Park 
NATO Seminar the concepts of security compromises was raised as a Socio-Technical 
problem (Richardson C. J., Security: a necessary compromise?, 2007). 
 
In  2008  the  US  White  House  published  the  Comprehensive  National  Cyber-security 
Initiative (The US National Security Council, 2008) and started to invest money in new 
military organisation (CYBERCOM), security initiatives and IA education in Government 
Departments  and  Universities.  This  initiative  was  challenging  and  demanded 
improvements  to  defend  national  interests  and  information  assets.  This  theme  was 
promulgated at the NECTISE conference at Leeds University (Richardson C. J., Bridging Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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an IA Capability Gap, 2008) and the drafting of a proposed IA professional framework 
(Richardson  C.  J.,  The  IA  Professional  Framework  -  Draft  White  Paper,  2008)  to 
Although  these  doctrines  were  based  on  the  development  of  Information  Security 
attributes and policies, they were only beginning to formulate issues involved with a 
social-technical  environment  and  in  particular  in  the  high-tempo  environment  of 
military operations  Telic  and  Herrick.  This  required  a  new  look  at  the context  and 
concepts of Information Assurance as initially described at a MSc Guest Lecture,  DCCIS, 
Blandford  Forum,  (Richardson  C.  J.,  Cyber  Situational  Awareness:  The  Assurance  of 
Information Operations, 2008b) and the need to federate our networks in theatre. This 
became a central theme of Chapter 4, the CSIA sponsored GIPSI working Group on 
Professionalism.  This  framework  was  later  modified  and  reintroduced  to  the 
competency  framework  of  IA  practitioners  in  Institute  of  Information  Security 
Professionals (IISP) and then by CESG for IA Practitioners for Government Services. It is 
now also used for bases for a National Occupational Standard (NOS) currently been 
formulated by BIS and the Skills Council for IT (e-Skills). 
 
The cyber initiatives have placed Information Assurance as the main policy for the 
security and protection of Cyberspace and this had become the focus of IA Architecture 
and Information Management Strategies, (Willett, 2008; MoD, 2009).  
 
 
The strategic Positioning of Information Assurance as argued in chapter 2.4 (Figure 34, 
P108)  has  focused  IA  as  a  major  component  of  Corporate  Governance,  Business Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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Continuity  and  the  trustworthiness  of  business  and  decision-making  processes 
(Richardson, C. J., Information Assurance: Holistic and Human Centric, 2011b). This 
new focus integrated the concepts of strategic business modelling to an IA framework 
that  mapped  the  follow  of  Information  and  the  responsibility  of  the  Enterprise  to 
protect its information assets. This formulated a new strategic composite model for IA 
as illustrated below, 
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Reprise of the Cross Domain
 
Figure 82: Current MoD System Access Schema 
CDS is a main issue of IA (p.8) and has three assurance categories:  
 
1)  Access  Solutions:  The  development  of  Geo-positioning,  authentication 
access control system was an important component of developing a Cross-
Domain solution. This problem was the instigation of this thesis and a major 
development programme for MoD IT Access Control.  The majority of this 
work is beyond the classification of this thesis, however it is believed that in 
the  last  5  years,  significant  progress  has  been  made  and  a  system  is 
currently been evaluated. 
 
2)  The  need  to  provide  Cross  Domain  Transfer  Solution  is  has  been 
modelled  with  an  IA  perspective  to  Enterprise  Interoperability  and 
Layering of Cyberspace. This thesis argues that these two 3-Dimensional 
models will provide a greater insight to the properties and attributes of CDS 
and  allow  for  more  systematic  approach  to  analysing  the  potential 
solutions. 
 
3)  Accredited Solutions:  The Framework proposed in Chapter 6 (Figure 111, 
p342) provides the assurance for secure and trusted CDS for Information 
Operations and Exploitation. The next task is to develop the framework as a 
logical  automated  software  model  and  experiment  its  capabilities  in  a 
cyber-range. Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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5.2 Assuring the Human-Cyber Interexchange 
 
The thesis has presented a number of arguments that has changed the perception of 
Information  Assurance.  Some  of  these  arguments  still  require  considerable 
experimentation and simulation to validate their premise and verify their capability to 
the communities of interest. However, these models are been analysed and have made 
impact in the education of the assurance socio-technical systems and engineering of 
systems.  With  appropriate  and  detailed  testing,  the  models  will  provide  the 
communities an important tool set towards the understanding and control of the Cross-
Domain and System Survivability. The EU and HMG are creating a number of research 
programmes to further investigate Trust in Cyberspace and these models, along with 
some future recommended research will provide an important perspective. 
 
At the 2011 Cyber Security Conference held in Brussels the challenging consequences 
of these frameworks and the Human-Cyber Interexchange modelling concepts were 
introduced  (Richardson C.  J.,  Cyberspace:  The  5th  Domain, 2011). The  need  to  test 
these models was accepted and the plans for a Cyber Range at DCCIS, Blandford Forum 
was planned and a financial costed business plan was produced 
 
With the movement of the Engineer Researcher to a new lectureship at Bournemouth 
University, the Cyber Range concept and proposed simulations and experimentation 
has been revisited, planned and  a multi-million pound revised business plan produced. 
The new System Engineering and Information Assurance (SEnIA) platform has been 
incorporated  into  the  University’s  2012-2018Strategic  Business  Plan  for  the 
continuation of Socio-Technical System (of systems) research; the development of IA 
simulations and threat modelling and any possible EU Horizon 2020 research 
themes.   Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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Reprise of the IA Models 
The IA Composite Model of Interoperability (Figure 21, p74), as illustrated below, 
provides a 3-Dimensional holistic interpretation for the alignment and harmonisation 
of Enterprise business processes and its architecture with the technical-organisational 
layers of Interoperability of interconnecting Social-Technical Enterprises. 
 
 
 
This composite model creates a new insight to the functionality and issues of CDS and 
Enterprise  interoperability.  The  3-D  Cuboid  utilises  the  analytical  capabilities  and 
functional views of Enterprise Architecture, the identified NCIOC layers of Enterprise 
Interoperability  and  Systems  of  Systems  model  developed  by  Carnegie  Mellon 
University. 
 
The  378  functional  components  of  this  model  will  provide  a  holistic,  coherent  and 
comprehensive picture of system interoperability of interconnecting Social-Technical 
Enterprises. 
 
The Assured Cyber Defence Architecture (Figure 40, p119), as illustrated below is a 
jigsaw of components that influence and affect the cyber defence of a Socio-Technical 
Enterprise.  The  framework  provides  a  coherent  overview  of  IA  Architecture  as  a 
methodology to provide Cyber Network Defence and a platform for Shared Situational 
Awareness and Superior Decision Making. Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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The  model  identifies  8  domains  (with  multiple  elements)  that  influence  the  Cyber 
Defence and the creation of a trusted Cyber Operation Picture used by the Enterprise 
Communities  of  Interest’s  decision-making  processes  and  shared  situational 
awareness.  The  ability  to  control  and  secure  operational  and  trusted  repository 
information  is  essential  to  well-being  and  efficiency  of  the  Enterprise  and  the 
performance of its mission goals. 
 
The Information Functional Concept Model (Figure 47, p133 ) is a six layer model 
that  differentiates  the  flow  of  information  through  a  Socio-Technical  Enterprise.  
Formulated on the principle Knowledge comes from Information which comes from 
Data (KID), the I-Stack Model provides a contextual overview of the Information flows 
from  the  physical  components  of  the  Data  Layer  to  the  virtual  components  of  the 
Knowledge  Layer  demonstrating  the  Human-Computer  interactive  components  of 
Information Exploitation and Information Operations. 
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This model provides a new holistic picture of the Information Domain. 
 
The 4 layers of Information (its technology, Architecture, Control and Utility) provide a 
framework for many interrelating and interconnecting activities. The model provides a 
simple  relationship  of  many  more  established  models  and  best  practices  such  as 
Information Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL); The Open Archival Information 
System  (OAIS);  The  Information  Security  Forum  for  Best  Practises  for  Information 
Security, MoD’s Joint Doctrine Publications for Information Operations and Information 
Management  and  a  host  of  CESG,  RFC,  ISO  and  ITU  standards  and  guidelines,  in 
particular ISO 20000 and ISO 27000. 
The  Information 
Assurance Cuboid 
Model  (Figure  57 
p153),  is  the  key 
model  for 
interpretation  of 
Information 
Assurance  in 
Cyberspace.  The 
thesis  has 
illustrated  the 
process  that 
structures  this  3-Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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Dimensional Cuboid.  The model builds on the argument that there are 8-Dimensions of 
Information Assurance as presented in the IA Quadrant Model (and themed through the 
report)  which  are  mapped  against  the  flow  of  information  (Process,  Storage  and 
Transit)  and  the  military’s  perception  of  the  layers  of  Cyberspace  (Geographical, 
Physical,  Logical,  Persona  and  Cyber  Persona).  The  IA  Cuboid  Model  provides  a 
reference to all the attributes of Assurance and allows the practitioner to build policies, 
procedures and best practices to design, maintain and develop IA in social machines 
and the Socio-Technical Enterprise. 
 
 
The IA Skills Framework (Figure 78, p192) as illustrated below was derived from 
the UK’s National Information Assurance Strategy (Cabinet Office, 2007) to develop the 
IA profession (Richardson C. J., The IA Professional Framework - Draft White Paper, 
2008).  Incorporated in the latest draft of HMG’s Information Assurance Competency 
Framework; the model has also been developed for the UK’s National Occupational 
Standard for Information Assurance: 
 
 
The framework has been used to create a federated MSc and many of the degree’s 
models are been used for Continuous Professional Development of IT Professionals and 
other communities interested in Information Assurance Architecture. 
   
Figure 83: UK Government IA Framework 
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5.3 The Future Direction and Studies of IA 
  
History  has  taught  us:  never  underestimate  the  amount  of  money,  time,  and  effort 
someone will expend to thwart a security system. It's always better to assume the worst. 
Assume your adversaries are better than they are. Assume science and technology will 
soon be able to do things they cannot yet. Give yourself a margin for error. Give yourself 
more security than you need today. When the unexpected happens, you'll be glad you did.  
Bruce Schneier, 1997 
 
The Information Domain has many rooted problems and the potential to provide great 
opportunities  to  society,  science  and  business:-  the  diversity  of  the  markets  and 
Enterprise it supports, the open architecture of the Internet and its protocols (TCP/IP), 
the pervasive technologies and services that make physical and virtual machines our 
real  world  and  our  motivation  to  be  innovative  and  creative  opportunist  or 
reactionaries, greedy criminal with a thirst for power or money. Cybercrime is, globally, 
on the increase and has made significant impact of Governments, Multinational and 
SMEs, Financial Institutions and upon Individuals.  It has generated a new Cyber-arms 
race with potentially ruinous outcomes for the Global Society. The APTs and SMART 
CNA are exploiting the complexities of interconnected systems, poor security and zero-
day vulnerabilities. System Intrusion and passive attacks are common occurrence to 
DIME Organisation and Governments have finally begun to realise the true magnitude 
of  Cyber  Threats.  Information  Assurance  provides  a  Socio-Technical  barrier  to 
malicious Cyber Network Exploitation. It is the rationale for Information Security and 
Protection Mechanisms; the Risk Management of Business Information Processes; the 
trustworthiness of Information Assets for superior decision-making; the resilience and 
tolerance of dependable system of systems and the methodology to understanding and 
creation  of  a  good  state  of  operations  for  an  information  demand,  sharing  and 
exploiting global communities of interest. Society needs to understand the need for 
Assurance; it needs better education and more IA professionals; an awareness of the 
persistent  cyber  threats  and  the  knowledge  to  mitigate  the  risks  of  working  in 
cyberspace. Time and Resources are needed to expand the research and development 
of IA, knowledge transfer to the Enterprises and the education of Individuals. The US 
Government has made a large financial commitment to bring and implement a national, 
comprehensive  strategy  of  Information  Assurance.  The  EU  has  made  IA  a  policy 
Directive  and  has  made  IA  a  major  component  of  its  Horizon  20020  Research 
Programme. The UK’s new Cyber Strategy has started to organise national centres and 
some research initiatives, but it is not enough. Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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A number of our large-scale system of systems have been suspended or cut owing to 
the apparent failure to delivery to cost and functionality. The biggest concern with most 
of  these  projects  was  their  lack  of  awareness  to  interoperability  and  its assurance. 
There  is  enough  evidence  and  a  strong  correlation  that  System  and  Software 
Engineering  needs  High  Assurance  and  that  these  system  architects  require  better 
understanding  of  IA  and  its  impact  on  the  business  processes  of  Socio-Technical 
Enterprise. IA is about get the right information (accurate and dependable), to the right 
people  (trusted,  vetted  and  in  need  of  the  data)  at  the  right  time  (sensitivity, 
geographical distributed and accessible). The creation of the System Engineering and 
Information  Assurance  (SEnIA)  Platform  with  its  4  Cyber  Laboratories;  3  Skunk 
Workshop Seminar Rooms; the building of 12 PhD IA programmes and the creation of a 
Federated MSc at Bournemouth University are examples of the commitment that this 
institution has to the fusion of research, development and education it has towards 
Information  Assurance  and  the  concepts  and  potential  impact  this  thesis  has  to  its 
Science and Societal impact. 
 
Reprise Contributions 
The following public conference proceeding, symposium and guest lectures have 
contributed to this thesis:  
Richardson, C. J. (2007). Security: a necessary compromise? NATO Conference, Bletchley 
Park, 26 June 2007. Telindus. 
Richardson, C. J. (2008a). Bridging an IA Capability Gap. Realising Network Enabled 
Capability (RNEC’08), NECTICE, Leeds, UK, 13 October 2008. NECTISE 
Loughbourgh University. 
Richardson, C. J. (2008b, October 20). Cyber Situational Awareness: The Assurance of 
Information Operations. CISM MSc Lecture. Blandford Forum, Dorset, UK: 
Defence College of CIS (DCCIS). 
Richardson, C. J. (2008c). The IA Professional Framework - Draft White Paper. Defence 
College of Communication and Information Systems (DCCIS), ICT Faculty. 
Blandford Forum: Cabinet Office. 
Richardson, C. J. (2008d). Managing Information Security and its Assurance. Blandford 
Forum: Defence College of Communications & Information Systems (DCCIS). 
Richardson, C. J. (2009a). A Holistic Approach to Effective Information Assurance 
Education. Military Information Assurance and Security Symposium, MoD Abbey 
Wood, 16 April 2009. Cobham Technical Services. Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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Richardson, C. J. (2009b, November 10). Computer Network Operations: Military Cyber 
Operations in Theatre. CISM MSc Lecture. Blandford Forum, Dorset, UK: Defence 
College of CIS (DCCIS). 
Richardson, C. J. (2011). Cyberspace: The 5th Domain. Cyber Security 2011, Brussels, 
Beliguim, 31 May- 1 June 2011. IQPC. 
Richardson, C. J. (2011). Information Assurance: Holistic and Human Centric. iGRC TD2 
Presentation, Birkbeck, University of London Symposium, 15 December 2011. 
Bournemouth University 
Richardson, C. J. (2012, June 5). The Assurance of Socio-Technical Enterprise 
Operations. MSc Information Assurance Module 2. London, UK. 
 
The themes, concept models and the impact of IA has been taught as degree modules at 
the  Defence  College  of  Communications  and  Information  Systems  (DCCIS):  MSc 
Communication  and  Information  Systems  Management;  BSc  (Hons) 
Telecommunications  Systems  Management;  BSc  (Hons)  Management  of  Military 
Information  Systems  and  the  FdSc  Communication  Systems  Management  by  the 
Engineering Researcher since October 2005 and recently BSc (Hons) Digital Forensics 
and  Security  at  Bournemouth  University.  Furthermore  there  have  been  10  MSc 
published Dissertations by DCCIS students, supervised by the Engineering Researcher, 
that have taken military aspects of IA and applied them to operational  and system 
concerns in theatre, within MoD CIS, NATO NEC and with the New Zealand Command 
and Control Organisations. Bournemouth University is currently assessing both a new 
MSc  and  a  MRes in  Information  Assurance  and some  of  the  proposed modules  are 
already been taught on its outreach CPD programme with the BBC. There are 3 new 
PhD Research Programmes in the application of IA in Cybercrime and Policing are been 
supervised  by  this  Researcher  and  another  2  have  been  instigated  and  await 
candidature. Some of the models have used by a European Multinational to develop its 
new  business  strategy  and  operations  in  European  Information  Security,  by  UK 
institutions to develop a Professional Competency Framework for IA practitioners and 
by  the  UK  Skills  Council  (e-Skills)  to  create  a  National  Occupational  Standard  in 
Information Assurance.  These initiatives have been promulgated through the Cabinet 
Office, the Information Assurance Advisory Council (IAAC), The Ministry of Defence and 
a number of conferences. Some Knowledge Transfer Partnerships (KTPs) are currently 
been developed between Bournemouth University and some local SMEs to encourage a 
greater dissemination and adoption of this research IA methodology and models. 
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5.4 IA Bridges 
 
The counter argument to 20th Century Deterrence is knowing how to use Information 
Assurance in the 21st Century.   Richardson, C. J., 2012 
 
Information  Assurance  is  the  rationale  behind  Safe  and  Secure  flow  of  Information 
assets  across  the  Information  Domain  of  a  Social  Technical  Enterprise.  It  is  not  a 
component of Information Operations, but a component of Information Exploitation. 
This is a fundamental concept for the Socio-Technical Enterprise  when Information 
operations may have outright offensive (other than penetration testing) component 
which  is  ethical  (and  morally)  unacceptable  to  the  IA  philosophy.  IA  is  not  an 
operational  deterrence,  but  a  trust  building  process  for  the  Enterprise  business 
process. However IA practices do, and should continue influence Operational Security 
(OpSec) policies. In building bridges, as illustrated below (figure 17, p65) the thesis has 
demonstrated  that  there  are  a  number  of  methods  (see  table  13)  to  provide 
Information Assurance to the Enterprise. 
Table 13: IA Methods to Build Bridges 
Bridges to Build  IA Methods 
1.  The Need to Share 
 
Providing Information Assurance to the Technical to 
Organisational Layers of Interoperability 
2.  The Need to Know 
 
Providing Security and Protection Mechanisms (Access 
control, Encryption, IPS, etc) to maintain System 
Confidentiality and Integrity 
3.  Landscape 
 
Human-Cyber Interexchange 
Federated Networks of Networks 
Cross-Domain Solutions (CDS) 
Systems of Systems IA Architecture (SoS IA2) 
Socio-Technical Enterprises 
4.  Domain 
 
Developing a Cross-Domain Solution for System 
Interoperability and Resilience in Cyberspace. 
5.  Initiatives 
 
The BU SEnIA platform Initiative 
The EU FP7 – Theme 10 Security 
EU Horizon 2020 
The SDA Security & Defence Cyber-Security Initiative 
EPSRC  Centre of Excellence in Cyber Security Research Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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6.  Trusting 
 
The IA Cuboid and Diamond models have incorporated 
the 9-Dimensions of trust into a metric that aligns them 
to the dynamic components of assurance, the 3 layers of 
information  flow  and  the  5  layers  of  Cyberspace.  This 
produces  over  30,000  trust  entity  relationships.  (The 
Cyber Security-Trust relationship alone has 9pp x14bfp 
x9T-Ds x3(P-S-R) x5(CLs)= 17,010 E-Rs) 
7.  Learning 
 
A Federated & modular kinetic learning is an important 
first step in IA education. The practitioners need to 
understand the working concepts of IA policies in system 
behaviour and architecture. 
8.  Good Practice 
 
The IA framework structures many standards, 
guidelines, working models, legal compliance and 
established good practices (ISF). 
 
Future Work 
The research (Figure 4, p16) had 4 main themes (Strategic Positioning of Information 
Assurance;  developing  a  Cross-Domain  Solution  for  Interoperability  and  Resilience 
within Cyberspace; development of 8-dimensional IA Cuboid and the development of IA 
Education and its Profession); each component has generated considerable external 
interest and this has been reflected in table 21. 
Table 14: Possible Future Work to this Thesis 
  Possible Future Work 
1.    Building a relational data model for all (30K+) components of the IA Cuboid and 
data mine the model for possible linkages, exclusions and external influences 
2.    Building a relational data model for the 378 component composite cuboids of the 
Interoperability Model 
3.    Map the IA Policies and Practice Framework to the above two databases and 
produce a comprehensive IA Reference Model 
4.    Simulate threat modelling to OODA operations and impose IA constraints, 
compliance and policies Bridging the Air Gap:  An Information Assurance Perspective 
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5.    Develop a universal Access Control Model for Cross-Domain Operations. 
6.    Develop a Meta-tagging PKI for inter-domain Grey Networking with PRIME IP 
encryption 
7.    Create Large-Scale Systems of Systems (physical networks, simulated networks 
and system-in-the-loop) and test IA policies to current emulated CII systems. 
8.    Create a Federated MSc with at least 5 UK Universities 
9.    Continue to aid the development of the UK National Occupation Standard 
10.   Continue to develop a Professional Competency Standard for IA Practitioners 
11.   Influence and help build the EU Policy on Information Assurance 
12.   Build and develop the BU SEnIA platform 
13.   Build Socio-Technical Enterprise Emulations to test future SoS Architectures 
 
Summary 
Bridging the Air Gap has generated a number of key research themes which has been 
further developed from the original concepts described within this thesis.  
 
Information  Assurance  is  a  vibrant  and  evolving  science  with  numerous  UK  and 
European initiatives; particular in Trusted ICT, Assured System Architecture and Cross-
Domain  Interoperability  Solutions.  This  Thesis  has  created  a  number  of  models  to 
address the current evolving; expanding and exploitative issues involved in IA and the 
future work will ensure that the research concepts will become impact models for the 
benefit and safety of Socio-Technical Enterprise and other DIME organisations. 
 
The Research already generate further Government, Industry and Academic Research 
and Development and is hoped that it continues to add value to the IA community and 
to the expanding world of Cyberspace. 
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